213. Editorial Note
At a meeting of the National Security Council on February 28, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles commented on developments in Indonesia as follows: [Page 358]
“The Director of Central Intelligence stated that developments in Indonesia had taken a dramatic turn, and a critical situation was in the offing. President Sukarno is threatening to abandon the experiment in Western forms of democracy, in favor of a new concept of government to consist of an all-powerful advisory council as well as a new cabinet. In both these bodies the Communists would participate along with representatives of the other 28 parties currently in existence in Indonesia. Sukarno proposed to be chairman of this new top advisory council, which would act as a guide to the cabinet. Sukarno’s plan has received strong backing from the Indonesian Communist Party. The Communists are launching strong anti-Western campaigns, especially in the city of Djakarta. These campaigns could cause serious trouble. In the new cabinet the Communists desire the portfolios of Labor, Education and Agriculture.
“In seeking to achieve their objectives, continued Mr. Dulles, the Communists can make use of the largest Indonesian labor union, the SOBSI, and thus create strikes if the Communists are not admitted to the new government. At the moment, President Sukarno still has the upper hand on the island of Java. It is still not clear what the Moslem parties or the army propose to do. The Indonesian army forces in Java are already infiltrated by Communists and anti-Western elements. But this is not the case in Sumatra, where the revolt against the central government continues. It is quite possible that Sukarno will declare a state of siege in Indonesia if serious opposition to his plans should develop.
“The Director of the Bureau of the Budget asked for an explanation of the apparent change in Sukarno’s attitude since the time when he visited the United States and we had given him such a build-up that we supposed he had come over to our side. In reply to Mr. Brundage, Mr. Dulles pointed out that Sukarno had a very volatile temperament and was increasingly frustrated by the difficult situation and the opposition which he faces at home. One could certainly not depend upon him for a consistent attitude. [Acting] Secretary Herter pointed out that Sukarno had also visited Communist China after his visit to the United States. Mr. Dulles commented on the ineffective leadership in the Moslem parties. The President inquired whether the Moslem parties together did not constitute a parliamentary majority. Mr. Dulles replied that the two together barely managed to achieve a majority, and they could never be sure of maintaining it against the delegates of the National Party and the Communist Party.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, March 1; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)