212. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State1
2173. Manila for Ambassador Allison. This morning I paid farewell call on former Vice President Hatta whose rather urgent expression desire see me before I left crossed my formal request for appointment through Foreign Office.
Hatta conceives his present role to be one of active behind-the-scenes intervention in current political turmoil using his very considerable influence, which he frankly acknowledges without false modesty, first to further coordination of all Islamic parties in opposition to admission Communists to Cabinet and if possible to Advisory Council; second, to encourage unity within army circles and especially to keep alive resistance to Communism; thirdly, to use his influence bolster morale and will to resist Communism of youth groups, peasants, cooperative organizations and civil service especially at Bupati level; fourthly, to work as effectively as political discretion presently permits to improve conditions in Sumatra which he considers, correctly in my opinion, to be almost unanimously opposed to Communism with exception oil workers in Palembang area, some estate workers in East Sumatra and some army leaders in North Sumatra.
He is optimistic with only slight reservations of possibility Masjumi and NU forming organized front against inclusion Communists in both Cabinet and Advisory Council and thinks that there is even a possibility of PSII going along with Masjumi and NU when leaders see through current Communist and Sukarno-inspired “mass demonstrations” of support for President’s concept and realize depth and breadth of opposition in the country as a whole, especially Sumatra and Kalimantan. Hatta said some NU elements, openly opposed to PKI admission to both Cabinet and Council, might at some stage compromise by agreeing to PKI in Council only but Masjumi would remain firm and this “plus other very confidential negotiation now going on” gave him a certain feeling of optimism as to the outcome.
Referring to estimate of Sukarno’s artistic temperament which he had given me during our last conversation (mytel 1524 [1534]2) he said that Sukarno as artist was enormously upset when he saw building or picture which was incomplete or lacking in symmetry, that he had emotionally similar reactions when he saw the country lacking in unity and one element pulling against another to detriment of well- [Page 357] being of people as whole as Sukarno conceived their well-being. Hatta said that Sukarno did not however realize fully that human beings are not as susceptible to correction as is a building or painting.
On other hand Hatta thinks that this very quality of Sukarno’s makeup also gives him a distaste for demonstrations and excesses such as Communist and certain youth organizations have staged in past few days. (Hatta noted and this conforms to our own information that so far as he knew these demonstrations have been confined to Djakarta and have not yet occurred in any other parts of Java although he does not exclude such possibility.)
Hatta thinks that present turmoil, word he frequently used during conversation, will continue for roughly two months, that there will be crises and demonstrations but sometime during this period Sukarno would come to realization not only of the eventual unity of the Islamic parties and of important elements in the army, as well as people of West Java and areas outside of Java, in opposition to Communist participation in government, but also to an appreciation of extent to which Communists and their allies are using for their own purposes (which to Hatta means purposes of Moscow and Peking), the President’s concept designed in his mind to bring about national unity. Hatta said that most difficult period would be when Sukarno realized that his concept instead of bringing about national unity was actually creating disunity and moving country towards civil war. At this point it would be necessary to devise formula which would save Sukarno’s face, take into account Sukarno’s unquestioned prestige with masses, and with weight of political and armed forces behind it compel Communists to acquiescence. Hatta said he had absolutely no idea at this time what such formula could be.
Of considerable interest was Hatta’s frequently repeated remark that failing developments along lines mentioned above there would sooner or later take place in this country serious internecine disturbances.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/2–2857. Secret. Repeated to Manila.↩
- Document 199.↩