Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

150. Telegram From the Embassy in the Netherlands to the Department of State¹

The Hague, April 7, 1956—2 p.m.

1622. I was requested to call this morning on Secretary General Van Tuyll² to receive Dutch Government’s reaction to Secretary’s talk with Van Roijen. Van Tuyll said report of discussion had been discussed at cabinet meeting and he was instructed tell me Dutch Government was not satisfied with several aspects. Dutch Government was not convinced that Secretary’s failure to raise Jungschlager case and unilateral Indonesia abrogation of treaties was in fact a “neutral” attitude. It believed, on the contrary, this omission was in fact taking the Indonesian side. Dutch emphasize RTC treaties had been negotiated under UN and US auspices and we had played a large part in its conclusion. To raise no objection to its unilateral abrogation was, in Dutch view, not “neutral”. Similarly, failure to mention outrageous Jungschlager case was likewise not neutral but in effect tacit approval justifying Indonesian action.

Van Tuyll said furthermore that Dutch Government did not agree with Secretary’s view that he did world a great service by his visit to Indonesia by influencing formation of new government without Communist participation. In chronological outline he said Dutch had expected as far back as October that new government would consist of PNI, NU, and Masjumi without Communist inclusion. Ali had been appointed formateur March 8 and already political discussion made it clear those three parties would be in government. As early as March 6 Communist Central Committee had issued statement that if new government’s program was satisfactory they would not insist on having ministers in cabinet. This, said Van Tuyll, was clear indication that Communists did not expect to be in government. Secretary’s visit to Djakarta took place March 12 and 13. Government list was presented to press afternoon March 16, its composition was in accord with expectations. The danger of Communist inclusion therefore only arose when Soekarno said he would consult PNI, NU, and PSI, and only after their expression of satisfaction did he accept that government. Therefore, said Van Tuyll, danger Communist participation arose after Secretary’s visit and not before. I promptly pointed out that estimate of influence of Secretary’s remarks on Soekarno was clearly a matter of opinion; that it could well be argued his talks had weighed much in the balance with Soekarno. He agreed.

Van Tuyll, with some embarrassment, said he had also been instructed to remind me of Dutch attitude in the Oatis case³ where they had supported United States for nearly three years in preventing Czech overflights of Dutch territory.

In conclusion Van Tuyll said he was instructed to make two requests: First, Dutch Government hoped Secretary, in carrying out his promise to Van Roijen⁴ to talk with Soekarno during latter’s visit to US re Jungschlager case and Indonesia’s unilateral treaty abrogation, would do so in “forceful” terms. Second request was that flightlogs of United States aircraft be put at disposal of Jungschlager’s defense. He said Secretary’s statement in April 3 press conference that no United States aircraft were involved was useful but was not sufficient for legal requirements of defense. He ended by saying that while Dutch Government was not satisfied with results of talk with Secretary they felt no useful purpose would be served by sending any “notes”. He agreed with me fact that Secretary took initiative in calling in Van Roijen was evidence United States interest in good United States-Dutch relations and therefore helpful.

I was, unfortunately, at disadvantage during interview since memo of Secretary’s conversation referred to Deptel 1646 April 2⁵ has not yet been received and I had no idea what had or had not been said.

Matthews

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/4–756. Confidential.
2. Baron van Tuyll, Secretary-General of the Netherlands Foreign Ministry.
3. For documentation relating to the case of William N. Oatis, an American journalist convicted on charges of espionage by a Czech court on July 4, 1951, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. IV, Part 2, pp. 1277–1436, passim, and ibid., 1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp. 1–79, passim.
4. Telegram 1688 to The Hague, April 10, noted that this reference appeared to be a Dutch inference from the Secretary’s “less specific statement” and quoted part of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Document 148. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/4–756)
5. Telegram 1646 informed Matthews of Dulles’ conversation with van Roijen and suggested that he talk to Luns along similar lines following receipt of a copy of that memorandum of conversation. (Ibid., 611.00/4–256)