Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

148. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 2, 1956¹

Washington, April 2, 1956

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Netherlands Relations following Secretary’s Trip to Djakarta

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Dr. J.H. van Roijen, Netherlands Ambassador
• Baron S.G.M. van Voorst tot Voorst, Minister, Netherlands Embassy
• Mr. Livingston T. Merchant,EUR
• Mr. John Wesley Jones, WE

The Netherlands Ambassador called today at the Secretary’s request to discuss the latter’s recent trip to the Far East and more specifically to Djakarta. The Ambassador complimented the Secretary on his appearance after such a strenuous trip to the Middle and Far East. The Secretary agreed that it had been strenuous and he added, jokingly, that he understood the Netherlands Ambassador felt that he had not adequately done his homework, particularly with respect to his visit to Indonesia. The Secretary went on to say that his visit to Djakarta had coincided with important political developments there and with the conclusion of negotiations which had been going on for some time for the granting of some $96 million worth of surplus agriculture commodities under the PL 480 program. He could say in confidence that the coincidence of these several events had had a favorable and positive effect on the formation of the new Indonesian Government, to the exclusion of any Communist participation therein. He felt that this was a favorable development of great significance not only to the United States but to the Netherlands as well and to the position of the West in general. The internal political situation in Indonesia had given us more concern than any other of the newly formed Far Eastern states and we had, until that time, greatly feared Communist participation in the new Government with its fatal effect upon key ministries and the stability of the entire Government. When one went to these countries in an official capacity one had to make flattering and generous remarks. It was not possible to adopt a lecturing or admonitory tone in public press statements or communiqués. In response to a comment from the Netherlands Ambassador the Secretary agreed that what could not be said in public could often be said very effectively in private. He went on to say that we very often spoke in private to our friends on such occasions and that that was one of the advantages of inviting a man like Sukarno to the United States; that on the occasion of his visit opportunity would be made to say many things to him in private which would be helpful to the position of the West.

The Ambassador replied that he wished first of all to make the position of his Government clear with respect to the various measures which the United States Government had taken and was taking to strengthen the democratic elements in the Indonesian Government and to keep the new Republic outside the Communist orbit, either Russian or Chinese. His Government did feel, however, that the effect of the Secretary’s trip to Djakarta, at least in the reaction of the public in the Netherlands and in Indonesia, had been to give unreserved approval to all of the actions of the Indonesian Government to date, including the violation of the sanctity of treaties and of human rights as demonstrated by its unilateral abrogation of the Roundtable Conference agreements and by its irresponsible prosecution of the Dutch subject, Leon Jungschlaeger. The Netherlands Government felt that it was not incompatible with a sympathetic and friendly interest in the young Indonesian Republic that the United States speak a word of warning on issues of general international importance where the behavior of the Indonesian Government left something to be desired. The Ambassador expressed the view that any other course merely encouraged the young Republic in its course of improper conduct internationally and in fact detracted from the standing and prestige of the United States among Indonesian leaders. The Ambassador went on to say that the sentiment of the Netherlands cabinet was that the Netherlands had not been treated as an ally might expect in the circumstances and that it had been given little consideration in United States relations. In this connection, he added, his Government felt that it might have expected to have been consulted on the invitation to President Sukarno as the British Government had done before the Indonesian Foreign Minister was invited to London several months ago or as the Canadian and Australian Governments had done before issuing invitations to Sukarno to visit in those countries. This expectation he explained was not based on any desire to approve or disapprove but rather to have an opportunity to express its views on developments that closely affected it.

The Secretary said that the world wide situation was extremely complicated and that the United States had tremendous responsibilities and interests which required constant cultivation and development. Many decisions and actions had to be taken promptly without the possibility of consultation with all interested parties. The United States had something like 42 allies and if we were unable to move ahead in the conduct of our foreign affairs without thorough consultation with all of those interested we would find ourselves in an impossibly inflexible mold and find the implementation of our policy at a standstill. The Secretary went on to say that he was perfectly willing to admit that the implementation of our foreign policy was not always perfect; that because we were human beings mistakes were made; that perhaps he should have consulted with the Dutch before going to Djakarta; that he did not have the benefit of all of his advisors on this trip and that certain decisions along the way had to be made at the time opportunities presented themselves. For example, while there had been thought given to the matter there had not been any final decision to invite Sukarno to the United States;² that he was in Djakarta for only one day; that during the course of his visit with the President of Indonesia, the latter had said that he would like to visit the United States but that he could not do so without an invitation; the Secretary immediately responded “You now have one”. He went on to explain to the Netherlands Ambassador that this seemed to be the only possible response in the circumstances; that any useful effect which the visit might ultimately produce would have been vitiated had he replied otherwise. The Secretary added that there were constant instances in our own Government where thorough clearances among U.S. Government agencies were overlooked or rendered impossible by time or other factors. He felt that his record in pursuit of the objectives of Western policy, which were also those of the Netherlands Government, was sufficiently clear that he might be entitled to confidence and understanding from the governments to which we were allied.

In response to the Ambassador’s reference to the Jungschlaeger case the Secretary said unhappily there were many instances of the miscarriage of justice around the world; that the Chinese Communists were holding Americans under intolerable conditions and trumped up charges; that when he went to Korea the government there complained to him about the detention of Koreans in Japan and when he went to Japan the Japanese Government complained to him about the continued detention of Japanese fishermen in Korea; and that even right here in our own United States we had the problem of adequate defense and proper trial of Negroes in some of the Southern States. The Federal Government did not feel that it would be helpful to intervene in these cases affecting legal processes of some states of our own Union and in the light of this it was not practical for the United States to set itself up as an arbitrator in the many miscarriages of justice which unhappily existed in the world today. The Ambassador replied that, in his opinion, the interest of the United States in the Jungschlaeger case went beyond the more general aspects of human rights and miscarriage of justice to a more specific issue, namely, that, as part of the evidence of the public prosecution against Jungschlaeger, a U.S. Embassy plane, piloted by a U.S. official named Kennedy,³ had been implicated. The Ambassador went on to say that, while the U.S. Embassy had sometime ago publicly denied these allegations, it had not done so since the prosecution had used this false evidence in its summation which ended in a request for the death penalty. This curious silence on our part was another factor which led the Dutch Government to feel that we did not have a sufficient concern over Dutch interests in Indonesia or an adequate understanding of what was necessary to maintain U.S. prestige in the oriental mind. The Secretary replied that he was unaware of the prosecution evidence involving the U.S. Embassy and of our action to correct this error. Mr. Merchant confirmed the Ambassador’s understanding that the Embassy had made one public denial when the testimony was given in the first instance.

The Secretary concluded the interview by saying that at no time during his visit to Indonesia had he been conscious of working against Dutch interests; that he had been pleased with the results of his visit there and that no one could have been more surprised than he when, subsequently, he discovered the violent reaction of the Dutch Government and people to his visit and to related developments. He said that he hoped that the Ambassador would convey these views to his Government and would add that he felt that in the long run it would be recognized that his visit had proven beneficial for all of us.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.56/4–256. Confidential. Drafted by Jones. The initials JFD appear on the source text, although not in Dulles’ handwriting, indicating the Secretary’s approval.
2. In an earlier draft of this page, attached to the source text, this phrase reads: “For example, there had not been any pre-decision to invite Sukarno to the United States;” the words “while there had been thought given to the matter” and “final” were inserted in Dulles’ handwriting.
3. When this allegation was first made, the Embassy commented in telegram 1039 from Djakarta, December 31, 1954, that a check of Naval Attaché files revealed no employee by that name. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/12–3154)