Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

147. Telegram From the Embassy in the Netherlands to the Department of State¹

The Hague, March 27, 1956—1 p.m.

1545. I have given careful thought to Deptel 1555, March 22² and possible steps we might now take in effort to check growing loss of confidence in United States leadership in both Dutch official quarters and among general public. I should point out that deterioration United States–Netherlands relations has not been an overnight development and is not too susceptible to overnight cure. Unfortunately, government, Parliament and public no longer believe in our willingness to consider the interests and feelings of Netherlands as our ally. This process of doubt, as I pointed out in 1954 began with our position of “neutrality” re New Guinea issue in UN and has continued to deepen ever since. As I have reported ad nauseam, Dutch feel strongly in the lightness of their cause and believe that in our hearts we share their conviction that transfer of New Guinea to Indonesia is in the interest neither of the inhabitants nor of the west. They believe our failure to take a position stems from timidity and failure to understand oriental psychology, and it is basically this which has shaken their confidence in our judgment and our leadership to the core.

Starting from this premise, what can we do in the present crisis? It is well to recognize that some of the causes which produce this low state of our prestige here cannot [and] will not be undone.

• First and foremost, I assume we are not prepared to alter our policy of neutrality re New Guinea.
• Second, we cannot and should not now cancel the $96 million surplus commodity agreement.
• Third, we cannot now retroactively consult the Dutch in advance.
• Fourth, we cannot withdraw the invitation to Sukarno.
• Fifth, I assume at this late date we are unwilling to criticize Indonesian unilateral abrogation of solemn treaties with Netherlands.
• Sixth, but not least, we cannot deny or explain the Secretary’s laudatory public statements re Indo leaders. This leaves but one subject in this field, namely the Jungschlager case, which has sparked the present unanimous and deep-felt popular indignation. Whatever the Indo’s assertions that they inherited their trial procedures from the Dutch, it is this travesty of justice which has done more to shake popular confidence in United States integrity than in any other factor in present Netherlands–United States relations. Department is fully aware from reports from Djakarta and The Hague that Jungschlager has not been permitted adequate defense facilities, that prosecution witnesses have contradicted and changed their testimony repeatedly and that it has been established beyond any reasonable doubt that Jungschlager was in the Netherlands on leave, cashing bank checks in Limburg, at the very period when he was charged by the prosecution with engaging in air operations and conspiracy involving, among others, United States and British Embassy planes.³ In such circumstances, the public prosecutor’s demand for the death penalty is, the whole Dutch nation believes, outrageous. Any argument that the case is still sub judice and that comments thereon are therefore out of order finds no response in this country.

I suggest, therefore, that a public statement, preferably by the Secretary himself but if not at least one by the Department, is the sole present step we can take to help right the balance.

If this is impossible I can only recommend that we sit tight and ride out the storm. The latter will subside eventually and it may be in the course of a few years our acts [and] our policies in various areas of the world may help restore some of the confidence we hitherto enjoyed. But it depends very much on the nature of such acts.

I am in full accord that a thorough discussion by the Secretary with Van Roijen will be helpful and will at least give the Dutch a feeling that they are heard. I strongly urge an early meeting.

As to a statement by me here, I strongly recommend against it. Ambassador Dillon’s statement⁴ was excellent and most valuable, but there is a basic difference between the situation here and in France. In France our job was to correct a possible misunderstanding of our support for France in Algeria. Here there is no misunderstanding at issue but policy of non-support of the Dutch. Initial conciliatory statements reportedly made by Department officers in response to press queries following Luns’ statement in Parliament⁵ have produced only horse laughs and added irritation. A statement, for example, that the Secretary’s visit to Djakarta might contribute to the improvement of Netherlands-Indo relations, was reported in the press with four exclamation points in the headline; for the Dutch are convinced that our silence on the abrogation of Union agreements and praise for Indo leaders will only encourage latter to take further action against Dutch interests. So if no helpful statement on the Jungschlager case can be forthcoming, I urge that silence is, if not golden, at least not acid.⁶

Matthews

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.56/3–2756. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Djakarta by the Department.
2. Telegram 1555 to The Hague requested Matthews’ comments on steps that were under consideration to halt the deterioration of U.S. relations with the Netherlands and to counteract the growth of anti-American sentiment. The actions proposed were a discussion between Secretary Dulles and Ambassador van Roijen, a simultaneous discussion between Matthews and Foreign Minister Luns, and a public statement by Matthews. (Ibid., 611.56/3–2256) In telegram 1488 from The Hague, March 19, Matthews had reported “unanimous and bitter resentment” in the Dutch press at the U.S. attitude toward Indonesia, especially because of U.S. silence following the prosecution’s demand for the death sentence in the Jungschläger trial and because of remarks praising Indonesian leadership that Secretary Dulles had made at a press conference during his visit to Djakarta. (Ibid., 956.61/3–1956)
3. One of the witnesses at Jungschläger’s trial alleged that American Embassy personnel were involved in his activities in 1952. When these charges first appeared in the press, Cumming issued a statement that there were no facts to support the allegations. (Telegram 1071 from Djakarta, January 5, 1955; ibid., 756D.00/1–555)
4. Ambassador to France C. Douglas Dillon had delivered an address on March 20 concerning U.S. policy toward North Africa; for text, see AFP: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 703–707. Telegram 1555 to The Hague had suggested a similar statement by Matthews.
5. Luns declared on March 22, in response to a question, that the Netherlands Government was shocked and disappointed by some of Dulles’ public statements in Indonesia. (Telegram 1517 from The Hague, March 22; Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/3–2256)
6. In telegram 2347 from Djakarta, March 30, Cumming commented that statements by the “United States before judgment has been made might boomerang to hurt Jungschlager, and would certainly undermine the good which Secretary’s visit, invitation to Sukarno, and other recent accomplishments here have done for United States.” Cumming concluded that he agreed with Matthews’ recommendations that “we sit tight and ride out the storms.” (Ibid., 611.56/3–3056)