Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

145. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 16, 1956¹

Washington, March 16, 1956

SUBJECT

• Dutch-Indonesian Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. van Roijen, The Netherlands Ambassador
• Mr. Ketel, First Secretary, The Netherlands Embassy
• EUR—Mr. Merchant
• WE—Mr. Dunham

Ambassador van Roijen, who called at his own request, said he had been instructed by his Government to reiterate the comments made by Foreign Minister Luns to Ambassador Matthews² with respect to his Government’s dismay over the Secretary’s visit to Djakarta. They recognize, of course, that the Secretary of State, as a representative of a great nation, is free to go where he wishes, but the Netherlands Government, in this particular instance, would have appreciated it if it had been consulted in advance about the visit, the signature of the $96 million economic aid program (PL 480) agreement, and the invitation to President Sukarno to visit the United States. In this latter connection the Ambassador contrasted our failure to consult them with the action of the British who consulted the Dutch Government some time in advance of their invitation to the Indonesian Foreign Minister to visit London during the Indo-Dutch negotiations at Geneva.

The Ambassador pointed out that these events had occurred immediately after the Indonesian Government had unilaterally abrogated the Round-Table Treaties and in the midst of public excitement in Holland over the Jungschlager trial.³ Thus, from our actions, it appears to the Dutch that we have given the Indonesians a pat on the back and are encouraging them in the course they have been following. In their view, it consequently seems that we have abandoned our neutral position. Their feeling, the Ambassador said, was further confirmed by the message the Secretary sent President Sukarno after his departure (see attached)⁴ and he mentioned particularly the following paragraph:

“I believe that only those who have gone through the process of transformation from being a colony to being an independent nation can understand the problems that are involved. You and we have had a common experience which we can share with a special sense of fellowship.”

The Ambassador commented that he personally was sure these actions have no connection with the abrogation of the Round-Table Agreements and with the Jungschlager trial. However, public opinion cannot be blamed for failing to understand them. Our actions, he said, have aroused profound indignation in Dutch public opinion and his Government and the beginning of anti-American sentiment can now be observed. The Jungschlager trial and the abrogation of the treaties have already aroused great excitement in Holland and the public fails to understand why the United States does not help the Netherlands as an ally in the same manner that other nations have assisted. Instead they now feel that the United States has left them in the lurch, the more so when the Secretary appears to have gone all out to give support to the Indonesians.

The Ambassador then briefly reviewed the Jungschlager case which he said they regard as a politically motivated trial, a farce and a frame-up. He handed Mr. Merchant the attached protest of the International Jurists’ Commission which had been given to the Indonesian Ambassador in London by the Executive Committee of the Commission (attached).⁵ He pointed out that this protest had been prepared because the jurists felt that Jungschlager has not received a fair trial. Furthermore, he said, sworn testimony has been given that Jungschlager was in the Netherlands when some of the crimes he is charged with are alleged to have been committed.

In the Dutch view, the Ambassador said, when an oriental people have gone as far as the Indonesians have in such matters as the Jungschlager trial and the abrogation of the Round-Table Agreements, they will be encouraged to go even farther by actions such as those which occurred during the Secretary’s visit to Djakarta. The Dutch now fear the Indonesians will continue to move against Dutch and other interests in Indonesia. He pointed out that, with the abrogation of the Round-Table Agreements, the basis for the protection of foreign investments in Indonesia is now gone. These Agreements had served as protection for Dutch and other foreign investments in the absence of Indonesian legislation. Now, however, others must take the lead in protecting their own investments there and the Dutch will have to seek their protection through most favored nation treatment.

The Ambassador concluded by stating that he had been asked to bring these matters to the Department’s attention, although most of these points had already been expressed to Ambassador Matthews, and he felt it his duty in representing his Government’s views to speak in this frank manner.

Mr. Merchant said that he could partially understand, against the background of the Jungschlager trial and the failure of the Indo-Dutch negotiations at Geneva, how Dutch opinion would feel regarding these developments. We would, of course, deeply regret any misunderstanding which might have lead to this reaction.

With respect to the Secretary’s trip, Mr. Merchant said that it may have been an oversight on our part not to have told the Ambassador of the Secretary’s plans. However, the Secretary is accustomed to making such visits on his trips abroad. He had long planned to visit Djakarta but had been unable to include it on his itinerary until now.

The invitation to President Sukarno to visit the United States is a somewhat different matter, Mr. Merchant said. This was a personal invitation which was extended on the President’s behalf by the Secretary and the President is not in the habit of informing other Governments of such a personal invitation to a chief of state.

Regarding the PL 480 Agreement, Mr. Merchant pointed out that the Agreement had been in the process of negotiation for a long time and he expressed the hope that the coincidence in the timing of its signature would not be misunderstood by the Dutch.

Mr. Merchant then referred to the Jungschlager trial. He stated that we are maintaining our interest in this case and are continuing to follow the trial closely. He felt he could assure the Ambassador that a representative of our Embassy will be present at the concluding sessions of the trial. He further assured the Ambassador that the absence of any action on our part to date should not be considered as a failure to appreciate its humanitarian aspects; rather, it is a matter of considering and determining when and how the United States can best be of assistance.

Concerning the abrogation of the Round-Table Agreements, Mr. Merchant informed Ambassador van Roijen that we had authorized our Ambassador in Djakarta some time ago to take up the general question of the protection of foreign investment in Indonesia, ours as well as others.

Mr. Merchant then indicated the hope that the Ambassador and his Government would recognize and understand the deep sentiment which exists in this country for new nations who have gained their independence, a feeling arising from the parallel with our own history. He asked for this same appreciation of our position in the Far East where the United States feels a deep sense of responsibility in combatting the threat of the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. These obligations are a heavy burden and our actions in carrying out the responsibilities we have in this area the Dutch may often feel are wrong. However, we hope they will give us their sympathetic understanding because we are moving in that area in a way we consider to be not only in our interests, but for the good of all our friends and allies. We hope, therefore, they will not misunderstand and misinterpret our motives.

Mr. Merchant referred to the close friendship and association which has existed for so long between the United States and the Netherlands and stressed our alliance in NATO, reaffirming our belief that there is nothing that approaches the strength and importance of our NATO ties. We expect that our close relations can withstand these present difficulties and any misunderstandings and we hope that we can look to the Dutch Government for its understanding of our problems and for its assistance in reducing the growth of the anti-American feeling in Holland to which the Ambassador had referred. We need the help of our allies, Mr. Merchant said, in assisting us to maintain our role in world affairs through such understanding both of our actions as well as of our motives.

Ambassador van Roijen expressed his appreciation for Mr. Merchant’s comments and particularly for his references to NATO and to the close ties between the United States and Holland and promised that he would bring them to his Government’s attention. However, he said, he felt he would be less than forthright if he did not say frankly that he expects the Dutch Government will still think that they cannot count on our help when they need it most, that they will feel that their needs either do not penetrate to our understanding or are not seriously considered.

Mr. Merchant replied that, while we may be disagreed with in the various steps which we take, we hope our friends will not impute ill motives to us and will understand that we are endeavoring to act for the good of all. It is for this reason that we hope our friends will do all they can to prevent misunderstanding of our actions and intentions by uninformed opinion.

The Ambassador expressed his appreciation of this point of view, but said that he thought his Government would still feel that the Secretary’s visit, the invitation to President Sukarno and the other events which he had mentioned were markedly ill-timed, and would continue to regret that the United States had not seen fit to consult with it as an interested party and an ally. Mr. Merchant replied that, while he did not wish to press this matter further, he felt that even if we had consulted the Dutch, they would necessarily have had to object and, while their objections would have received serious consideration, he felt confident they would not have altered the Secretary’s plans. Ambassador van Roijen said he thought we would have found them in this matter, as in others, a realistic people.

Ambassador van Roijen then concluded by expressing his appreciation for the opportunity to present these views to Mr. Merchant in this frank and friendly manner.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/3–1656. Secret. Drafted by Dunham and initialed by Merchant, indicating his approval.
2. Matthews reported in telegram 1447 from The Hague, March 13, that Luns had called him in that afternoon at the instruction of his government to express dismay over recent U.S. actions toward Indonesia. (Ibid., 611.00/3–1356)
3. The trial of Leon N. Jungschläger, begun in February 1955, was nearing its conclusion.
4. The attachment, not printed, is a partial text of the Secretary’s message, which he sent to Cumming for delivery to Sukarno in telegram 28 from Bangkok to Djakarta(sent to the Department as Secto 46), March 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/3–1356)
5. Dated March 14, not printed.