144. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State1
2186. No distribution outside Department. Following is summary conversation with President March 12 which Secretary has not yet cleared. I am delivering completed draft to him in Manila tomorrow.2
Foreign Office Secretary General Roeslan Abdulgani and I were present.
After exchange amenities, President asked Secretary’s views on Asia. Secretary referred to evolutionary processes apparently going on in Soviet Union especially since spring 1955 culminating in 20th Party Congress.3 It not yet clear whether these changes indicate strategic trend or whether purely tactical in character. Changes might be only formal not substantial but ultimate goal Soviet Communism remains unchanged; namely, imposition their system on whole world. We must continue hope, however, that at some time people of world [Page 241] can be released from present heavy burden military expenditure which might be obtained through collective defense for those who desire it. President indicated agreement that world’s people should be released from armament burden.
Re Asian scene, Secretary said he struck by number conflicts including Irian, Pakistan–Afghanistan difficulties, Pakistan–Indian distrust and Ceylonese concern re Indian intentions.
President stated that in Irian dispute Indonesia feels strong because people 100 percent united in demanding its return which is not claim single party but of all Indonesian people who felt revolution uncompleted until Irian became Indonesia’s. He said that Indonesian independence has “not yet been fully achieved” and his people would continue struggle for “complete freedom”.
Secretary pointed out that after United States obtained independence there were series disputes lasting 50 to 70 years with Great Britain. He referred to northeast boundary dispute and Oregon difficulties when we had slogan “54 degrees 40 minutes or fight”. However, we did not fight but worked out problem in evolutionary way, even accepting British investments without feeling we sacrificed any independence. Secretary said he assumed Indonesia did not wish fight for Irian. President replied with emphasis “no”.
Secretary pointed out Communists using all means sharpen international conflict. He mentioned Soviet arms transactions with Arabs, offer of economic and technical assistance Asian countries and suggested we must be very careful of new tactics which did not mean any change in Communist goals. Adverting to Irian and United States non-interference this question resulting from our alliance with Dutch and friendship with Indonesia, Secretary emphasized continuance historic United States support in evolutionary processes bringing forth some 15 new nations especially since World War II. He mentioned United States interest especially in Indonesia after war and encouragement we had given Indonesia.
President acknowledged United States assistance Indonesian independence struggle but said problem for Asians is not pro or anti-Communism but that whole Asian scene showing “stamp of nationalism”; what Nehru means when he refers “mind of Asia” is nationalism. He concluded that every attitude taken by other countries measured by Asian people in respect national aspirations. President added American voice is not so clear now as 1945 to December 1949; on question Asian nationalism Communist voice more clear.
Secretary said nationalism which President mentioned as being primary influence Asia at present is very principle which United States has stood for since earliest days. He said that this belief in nationalism and right peoples be independent was part every American. With our widespread commitments and our sense of responsibility, [Page 242] we could not always openly go as far or fast as some nations might wish. We do not believe it helpful tear apart fabric relationships with colonial powers with whom we have so many ties. United States would not go in for cheap promises. Even though our efforts could not be openly discussed they have been so successful as in some cases to arouse resentment colonial powers. Communists however can make cheap promises which they have no intention of fulfilling even if in position to do so.
President agreed promises cheap but these cheap promises listened to in Egypt, Burma, India and by part Indonesian peoples.
Secretary asked President continue have confidence in good faith of American people in their sincere and continuing opposition to colonialism. He hoped President and our friends in colonial areas would have confidence in United States support general trend nationalism and anti-colonialism even if not satisfied every detail our actions.
Referring at one point collective defense arrangements for those countries which desire them, Secretary mentioned Indonesia happily in geographical position where it not subject direct aggression. He fully understood Indonesia desire not engage political and military commitments abroad but to be free concentrate their energies on development their country. There was no intention on United States part to impose anything on Indonesia shoulders. United States not critical Indonesian position but if Indonesians ever need help they know where they can get it.
Secretary then said to understand Americans better President should come to United States. President replied nothing he would like better but that depended upon American Government. Secretary said on behalf President Eisenhower he inviting President Sukarno to visit United States suggesting dates May 16–19 as perhaps mutually convenient for Washington visit to be followed by few days visit through United States. President, with visible evidence pleasure, expressed his warm appreciation, accepted invitation in principle but because commitments here would have consider final dates.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/3–1456. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Manila for Secretary Dulles.↩
- A copy of the memorandum of conversation is ibid., 110.11–DU/3–1356.↩
- The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in February 1956. For documentation on U.S. policy with respect to the Soviet Union, see vol. XXIV, pp. 1 ff.↩