Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

138. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, February 20, 1956—4 p.m.

1946. My telegram 1923.² During audience this morning Sukarno touched on following subjects:

(1) Irian. I replied I thought Indonesian position well understood in Washington but I saw no indication change from our neutral attitude on sovereignty question.

(2) His Pontianak speech (my telegram 1357)³ and January 15 statement (Embassy telegrams 1665 and 1739).⁴ I said that I was glad he had spoken with such frankness regarding his real views before I went home in December but that continued statements by him of this kind naturally tended to lead newspaper readers to think that he was inclined towards tolerance of Communism and PKI. He repeated explanation given my telegram 1460⁵ and also said that he was “positively certain” that PKI would not be represented in government which will be formed shortly and would not be represented in any government while he was President. (Comment: This does not, of course, exclude repetition of situation under Ali Cabinet.) [Garble] said PNI and NU were already very close together and that Masjumi would be welcome join coalition although he personally would be unable fully to trust Masjumi until Masjumi leaders disclaimed connections with Darul Islam⁶ and “with full heart” joined in government efforts to repress Darul Islam activities. He vehemently denounced “activist” Communists and “activist” Moslems. Both of them, he said, were “enemies of a united Indonesian people”. He repeated his well-known opposition to a theocratic state and quoted Jefferson on the subject of freedom of religion and separation of state and church.

Replying his question as to American reaction such a coalition, I said that in my personal view a coalition of all Islamic parties with PNI would be accepted in United States as union of two major forces in Indonesian political life counteracting third major force, namely, Communism. He asked whether United States were anti-nationalist (which I interpreted as meaning anti-PNI) and I said that we definitely were not but that he must agree that during 1953–55 PNI-led government did little if anything to keep American-Indonesian relationships warm. He said there was a single reason: “Irian”. I said that nothing but misunderstanding and distrust could arise out of situation wherein one of two basically friendly countries over-emphasized single subject no matter how important, on which views of the two countries disagreed, to detriment other subjects. In this phase of the conversation I made very clear, however, that while I was unhappy over the attitude of the Ali government towards United States, Indonesian press reports that we were opposed to PNI were unfounded (see my telegram 1144⁷).

(3) In referring to his anti-colonial and anti-imperialist “struggle” Sukarno spoke firmly but without heat regarding breakdown of Geneva Indonesian-Dutch negotiations and said that regardless of party all Indonesians would support unilateral termination not only union but economic and financial provisions RTA. Responding his request for my personal views I said that unilateral termination of economic and financial agreements between any two countries was bound to create uncertainty regarding the denouncing country’s attitude towards all foreign investments and economic relationships; that while it would be improper for me to comment specifically on a dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia, I felt it was very important that in handling denunciation of the financial-economic arrangements Indonesia take care to make clear to world and especially to United States that denunciation was not prelude to further action against foreign investments generally. He said with emphasis that all that he had in mind was to remove special position which Dutch enjoyed in Indonesia and equal treatment of their economic interests to that accorded other countries. I regard this statement as of some importance.

Sukarno looked well and had none of nervousness of manner or unhealthy physical puffiness which some of my colleagues profess to have noted in talks with him within the past few weeks. He was cordial personally and friendly in all references to the United States except with regard to our attitude on Irian and on this he was more disappointed than angry. He did not refer nor did I in any way to the possibility of his visiting the United States.

Cumming

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/2–2056. Secret.
2. Telegram 1923 from Djakarta, February 17, reported that Cumming was to see Sukarno on February 20. (Ibid., 123–Cumming, Hugh S., Jr.)
3. Telegram 1357 from Djakarta, December 9, 1955, transmitted a press report of a speech by Sukarno, in which he had reportedly declared that the nationalist, religious, and Marxist segments of the Indonesian people should cooperate and that no one of the three groups should be ignored. (Ibid., 756D.00/12–955)
4. Telegrams 1665 and 1739 from Djakarta, January 17 and 25, reported that in a January 15 speech Sukarno had called for national unity, including the Moslem, Nationalist, and Communist Parties. (Ibid., 756D.00/1–1756 and 756D.00/1–2556)
5. Telegram 1460 from Djakarta, December 21, 1955, reported that Sukarno had told Cumming in a conversation that morning that in asking for cooperation between nationalist, religious, and Marxist groups, he had in mind only “cooperation for interests of Indonesia in completing its fight for independence” and did not refer to participation in the government. (Ibid., 756D.00/12–2155)
6. The Darul Islam was an organization of armed insurgents who advocated making Indonesia an Islamic state.
7. Telegram 1144 from Djakarta, November 11, 1955, reported that during a conversation with former Prime Minister Ali, Cumming had made a point of declaring that rumors of U.S. opposition to the PNI were without foundation and that the United States “was not pro or anti any Indonesian political party except Communists and did not meddle in Indonesian political affairs.” (Department of State, Central Files, 757D.13/11–1155)