Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

137. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, February 17, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Ambassador van Roijen’s Call to Discuss Failure of Geneva Talks:² February 17, 1956 at 3:00 P.M.

The Counselor of the Indonesian Embassy³ called on February 14 to provide us with their views on the failure of the talks at Geneva. A memorandum of conversation is attached. (Tab–A)⁴ The Netherlands Ambassador will probably enlarge on his remarks made to you on February 10. (Tab–B)⁵

In essence the two positions are as follows:

Dutch

1. When negotiations were interrupted on January 7, sufficient agreement on the items in the four point agenda had not been reached to permit one final meeting to formalize the accomplishments of talks up to that point.

2. It was understood by both sides that until complete agreement had been reached on all points of the agenda, it would be considered that no agreement had been reached.

Indonesian

1. Areas of agreement had been reached on all points of the agenda, and areas of disagreement were also defined. The conference was recessed for consultations with their respective governments, and for the Dutch Government to decide whether to accept or reject the Indonesian compromise proposals on the points of difference. The Dutch delegation had accepted ad referendum even the Indonesian proposal for a statement on the New Guinea question.

2. It was not understood that until complete agreement had been reached on all points it would be considered that no agreement had been reached.

It would be difficult and probably counterproductive for the United States to attempt to lay blame on one or the other party for the failure of the talks. The Dutch were apparently determined that they would get from the Indonesians firm commitments on the Dutch prisoners problem. They were well aware of the internal political difficulties being experienced by the Harahap Government, and were concerned that the present and incoming Parliaments might accept concessions made by the Dutch and reject concessions made to the Dutch. (They went over the head of the Indonesian delegation to raise this subject with the Indonesian Government, which greatly irritated the Indonesians.) While as far as is known no dispute has thus far arisen over provisions of the Union Statute and the Financial and Economic provisions of the Round Table Conference agreement, the Dutch apparently felt it was necessary to protect their future position by obtaining an arbitration agreement or by obtaining agreement to refer disputes to the International Court of Justice. (Indonesia is not a signatory to the ICJ statute.)⁶ Finally, the Dutch were unprepared, for their own internal political reasons to modify their position on West New Guinea even to the point of an ambiguous statement implying that the question of sovereignty would be discussed at a later date.

The Harahap Government, for its part, was under severe domestic political pressure to obtain from the Dutch at least as much as the former Government obtained in negotiations in 1954. The Government also was under attack for the concessions which were made to the Dutch on the prisoners problem such as the release of the Dutch constable Van Krieken and the admission of the Dutch lawyer Van Empel, and did not have sufficient popular support to satisfy completely Dutch minimum demands on this problem.

Whatever the rights and wrongs of the narrow and relatively unimportant Geneva talks problem, both ourselves and the Dutch will suffer from the consequences in Indonesia. The moderate elements which both we and the Dutch would like to see in the ascendancy have been discredited and weakened, and the chauvinists and extremists have been strengthened. The Masjumi, the only major, outspoken anti-Communist party, has been isolated from other Moslem and non-Communist elements around which it is hoped a coalition excluding the Communists would be formed, and the moderate elements, to prove their patriotism and to salvage their reputations, have been obliged to adopt more violently anti-Dutch positions.

The Netherlands Ambassador in commenting on the effects of the abrogation of the Union Statute⁷ and the possible unilateral abrogation of the Financial and Economic Agreements,⁸ may raise the question of the adverse effects which these actions will have on American and British, and on the foreign investment climate in general, as well as Dutch foreign investment. These agreements have in effect given Dutch business a privileged position in Indonesia, and it is difficult to determine at this time what immediate effect, if any, abrogation would have on American business. PSA/E and the Embassy will be asked for their views on this question.

Recommendation:

I suggest that you make no substantive comment on Ambassador van Roijen’s statement, and express only our regret that the Dutch and Indonesians have not yet been able to resolve their differences between themselves.⁹

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D/2–1756. Confidential
2. The Dutch-Indonesian negotiations in Geneva had resumed on February 7, but concluded without reaching an agreement. For texts of the statements made by Foreign Ministers Anak Agung and Luns at the final session on February 11 and the joint statement issued by the two delegations on that date, see Anak Agung, Twenty Years, pp. 155–157.
3. Sujono Surjotjondro.
4. The tabs were not attached to the source text. Tab A, a memorandum of conversation by Francis T. Underhill of PSA, dated February 14, is in Department of State, Central File 656.56D/2–1456.
5. Tab B, a memorandum of conversation by Underhill, dated February 10, is ibid., 656.56D13/2–1056.
6. Statute of the International Court of Justice, attached to the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; for text, see 3 UST 1153. Article 93 of the U.N. Charter states that all U.N. members are ipso facto parties to the Statute.
7. The Union Statute, which established the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, was one of the constituent agreements in the Round Table Conference Agreement; for text, see 69 UNTS 3. The Indonesian Government’s decision to abrogate the Union Statute was announced by Prime Minister Harahap on February 16; the text of his statement is printed in Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1956, pp. 752–755.
8. The agreements under reference were attached to the Union Statute and were among the constituent agreements of the Round Table Conference Agreement; for texts, see 69 UNTS 3.
9. Robertson followed this recommendation in his conversation with Ambassador van Roijen, recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Haring, dated February 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/2–1756)