Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

132. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, January 3, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Notes on January 3, 1956 meeting with the Secretary, Ambassador Cumming,²the Undersecretary, C Mr. MacArthur, FE Mr. Robertson, S/P Mr. Bowie, PSA Mr. Young and Mr. Haring

Ambassador Cumming, following a private meeting with the Secretary,³ opened the general meeting by describing the ability to be of influence in Indonesia as it must look to the Soviet Union. He noted that we often see the problem only from that of United States relations but the Soviet Union must feel that Indonesia is slipping away from its capability to be of influence. It was important to note that they are never-the-less not giving up but are working to the extent they can.

New Guinea

The Secretary inquired whether the Indonesians raised the subject of New Guinea. Mr. Robertson indicated that President Sukarno recently said that if we would support him on that issue he could line up Indonesia solidly on the side of the West. Ambassador Cumming said he did not recommend that we change our position of neutrality with regard to sovereignty itself, but he felt that the record of 1949 (RTC) Agreement showed that the two parties agreed to discuss the issue between themselves and he felt that the situation might soon require us to show support for that level of Dutch-Indonesia relations. He said that at the present time the Dutch allege we would be unneutral if we urged such negotiations whereas as the Indonesians see it negotiations were agreed to, and they realize that the United States took some 50 years to negotiate its Canadian border dispute.

The Secretary said he would be talking with Prime Minister Eden and that we recognize the need for emphasizing liberal treatment by colonial governments but that we must do so privately without public show to get them to realize that any other policy makes our other efforts amount to naught. He cited French, Portuguese and Dutch colonial relations as an example. He said he was not sure that we would accomplish anything vis-à-vis our NATO Allies if we were to do something publicly. He said the need is to bring them along to see the urgency themselves. He said the problem among the new Nationalist forces is that they see colonialism as the domination of white people over colored people but are completely undisturbed when it is a matter such, as the Soviets, white over white, or in other cases colored over colored, as he regarded it if Indonesia were to rule over the Melanesians of New Guinea.

He said it was not likely that we could change our position at an early date but we might move forward on a broad front in a matter of months or years.

The Ambassador felt we ought not to go fast on the issue of sovereignty itself but he asked for authority, in the field, to show, for example, how we had helped the Associated States to attain independence and thus demonstrate our purpose. The Ambassador mentioned also the good he believed would come from the Secretary’s taking note at Paris that NATO commitments do not extend to the Far East.

The Secretary endorsed utilizing USIA and our other resources to make known our policy and assistance in bringing about the free and independent States and indicated general approval of the Ambassador’s view. Mr. MacArthur said that he had been doing considerable work in this field already and expected to make use of such evidence in the course of the Secretary’s talks to top leaders in South East Asia. The Secretary said the material should be brought together to show what we had done so he could use it in South East Asia talks.

Sukarno Visit

There was a general discussion about the possible visit of President Sukarno: The Secretary mentioned the NSC Meeting of December 22⁴ and the President’s interest. Ambassador Cumming said he recommended favorably but he knew that President Sukarno wished to be in Indonesia for the beginning of the Constituent Assembly. The Secretary asked whether May would be a good time and the Ambassador indicated that it was completely uncertain but he would think late May or June. The Secretary indicated that the President was anxious to avoid visits when Congress was finishing up its business; he noted also that a later visit might conflict with our political campaigns. The Secretary wondered if another Asian-African Conference might disrupt the plans and Mr. Robertson reported that India, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia all seemed cool to the idea of another Asian-African Conference and it did not now appear it would be held in mid 1956.

Mr. MacArthur said that in planning visits an important consideration was what the visitor would see outside of Washington. He and Mr. Robertson alluded to the great success of the Russian Housing Experts Visit; they saw the life of the ordinary American.

The Secretary strongly emphasized the need for paying more attention to the selection of things for the visitors to see particularly in large industry and in housing.

Ambassador Cumming noted that there were two aspects in his opinion: (1) what the visitor will be impressed by and (2) those things which will provide a favorable comparison to the things which will be set up for him to see when he visits Communist China and the Soviet Union. He noted both the success of Vice President Nixon’s visit in Indonesia and President Sukarno’s impression of the Vice President’s interest in seeing ordinary people in their small homes.

The Secretary said he approved the Sukarno visit in principal. It remains a question of date and so forth which could be considered later. Mr. MacArthur noted the possible advantages to having the Secretary extend the invitation directly if he visited Sukarno as planned during March and the Secretary inquired whether it could wait that long.

Ambassador Cumming said he would like to create a favorable climate about the visit before the Secretary would make his formal invitation especially to avoid the embarrassment of having it extended and turned down. The Secretary approved, providing it was made clear that we may be in difficulty as to the date and that if he cannot come before June it might not work out.

Military and Security

Mr. MacArthur and the Ambassador warmly endorsed our present program of training Indonesian military officers in both the United States and in the Philippines and described it as most useful in Indonesia. Ambassador Cumming said all lines of command in the Army now flowed through officers who had been trained in the United States. The Secretary in closing said he regarded Indonesia as one of the most important areas to our interest and that it was so important we might have to consider very drastic steps if the situation slipped.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.56D/1–356. Top Secret.
2. Cumming was in Washington for several days for consultations.
3. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
4. See Document 129.