129. Memorandum of Discussion at the 271st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 22, 19551
[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting]
1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
[Here follows a briefing by Director of Central Intelligence Dulles on matters unrelated to Indonesia.]
With respect to Indonesia, Mr. Dulles pointed out that things were not going so well there now as they had been until recently. President Sukarno seemed determined to oust the present pro-Western regime. He desired to replace it with a government more amenable to his own views. Mr. Dulles described the defiance of the government’s authority by the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Air Force, and concluded that the line-up had Sukarno, the National Party and the Communist Party on one side, with Vice President Hatta, the Masjumi Party, and the Indonesian Army on the other.
The President inquired whether there was anything that we could do, … . Mr. Dulles replied that President Sukarno seemed to [Page 218] be the key to any solution of the problem, and he wished it were possible for the United States to exert influence on him. Mr. Dulles then described the returns to date in the elections for the Indonesian Constituent Assembly. The Masjumi Party was doing much less well than it had done earlier in the parliamentary elections, although admittedly the earlier returns from Java tended to favor the National Party. Nevertheless, Sukarno obviously had a tremendous hold on the people, and it looked as if he had now cast his lot with a Nehru type of position and would play along with the Indonesian Communists.
The Vice President said that at least we could be sure of one thing. Sukarno was consumed with conceit. He was even worse than Nehru in this respect. The President asked whether he was likely to get still stronger, and would it be desirable to invite him to visit the United States. Secretary Dulles replied that he was not sure that Sukarno would come even if he were invited. The Vice President thought that it was nevertheless a good idea to invite him. Secretary Dulles pointed out that the danger in inviting him would be that he would get us hooked to the Indonesian position with respect to New Guinea.
[Here follows discussion of another matter.]
The National Security Council:2
Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to recent Soviet atomic tests; developments in the Middle East; the political situation in Indonesia; and the forthcoming French elections.
[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]