Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

120. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, October 27, 1955—5 p.m.

1006. No distribution outside Department. For YoungPSA. Your letter October 8² only received yesterday and our telegrams despatched meantime indicate day to day development my views in this still unsettled situation. Considerations my telegram 1782³ generally still valid with obvious changes detail and emphasis result changed conditions since mid-April.

In my view Masjumi, NU and PNI coalition would be desirable from standpoint our interests and development reasonable equilibrium major non-Commie political forces which have become more clearly apparent since September 29 elections. This would be especially true if balance of power within PNI can be shifted from left to right wing. Purely Moslem government, i.e., Masjumi–NU coalition would inevitably tend towards Islamic state concept, throwing powerful nationalist influences into unhappy fellowship with Commies. Many PNI, even those who have been sympathetic with left wing, are shocked by, to them, unexpected voting strength of PKI. As you will have noticed from my telegrams, I have deliberately refrained from any contact with even friendly political leaders since elections except where necessary to conduct business with present government. … I have been awaiting auspicious opportunity embark on a delicate exploration of views of Masjumi and PNI leaders. Regarding collaboration between those two parties, NU and such minor parties as Parkindo, which although previously lined [aligned?] with Masjumi lately has shown indication of moving towards collaboration with right wing PNI. Quite frankly, one reason for delay, aside from waiting for my own hunch as to opportune time, has been absorption with our unusual influx of official visitors. As initial step, few days ago made appointment see Natsir next week and will follow this up with other PNI expressing desire talk to me.

I believe such explorations fall within framework our NSC policy.

Further elaboration foregoing views will follow but meantime would welcome your views as to desirability my carefully exploring possibility exercise our influence in trying bring Masjumi, NU and PNI together. Will be long drawn out and perhaps dangerous task but one well worth while, incurring some risk.⁴

Cumming

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/10–2755. Secret.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. Document 93.
4. In telegram 786 to Djakarta, November 7, the Department replied that exploring the views of non-Communist leaders was definitely within the framework of NSC policy. Before guidance could be determined, however, more information was needed, especially concerning the character of the PNI and Masjumi post-election leadership, the orientation and attitudes of NU leaders, and whether the non-Communist parties determination to exclude the PKI was strong enough to override their differences. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/10–2755) Numerous reports from the Embassy concerning Indonesian political developments during the next few months are Ibid., 756D.00.