Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

119. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, October 7, 1955—6 p.m.

846. While it still early to draw conclusions on outcome of elections for Parliament, I feel enough information now available to permit preliminary discussion of possible future political developments.

Sufficient returns now in to establish certain trends, although it may well be several months before final official figures are announced. Following analysis prepared with … senior Embassy officers through whom I have maintained contact with several leading political figures during this period when I have felt it wise to stay somewhat in background myself. It forwarded with aim providing Department and other government agencies with our speculations during period when political character of new Indonesian Government assuming form.

There no question that results are somewhat disappointing from our viewpoint and that of our most reliable friends here. It now appears Masjumi will not, as was hoped, obtain enough seats in new Parliament to give them a commanding voice in formation new government and its policies. PNI has made stronger showing than even party itself expected and its members are making claims of sweeping victory. Some newspapers and our younger and more mercurial contacts also jumped quickly to this conclusion and have been predicting dire consequences.Masjumi leaders, however, who themselves admitted shock at early returns which showed them far behind in East and Central Java have recovered composure and are not yet conceding plurality to PNI. As reported in Embassy telegram 830² latest returns justify this calmer attitude. It looks at present as if standings will be so close that definitive determination may have to await the final allocation seats by Central Election Committee, after recounts, reballoting and possible assignment seats to minority groups.

Nevertheless, it now clear there will be four major parties, PNI, Masjumi, NU and PKI and that any Cabinet will have to obtain the support of at least two of them to get Parliamentary approval. Small parties (Parkindo, Catholics, IPKI, PSI, PSII, et cetera) may together obtain 10 percent seats. Influence these parties outside Parliament, in army, civil service and press, will continue in future but not to former extent. Majority small parties closer to Masjumi than any other of Big Four and association has been deepened during opposition Ali Cabinet as well as cooperation in present government. Minor parties therefore will in effect extend Masjumi strength.

While possible combinations will depend some extent on exact number seats each party finally obtains, most likely combinations and factors affecting them would appear to us as follows:

Most favorable combination from US viewpoint would be Masjumi–NU–PNI coalition leaving only PKI and its affiliates in opposition. There are number signs that people within each of these parties are working for such coalition. … Merdeka editorial October 4 came out in favor of such a combination and we believe that in this case paper speaks for large number of PNI party members led by Wilopo³ who have become alarmed at consequences of close association with PKI. There are also a number of factors hindering such a combination. Masjumi’s strong emphasis on corruption in Ali-Arifin⁴ government did not improve its already strained relations with PNI. An American newspaperman reports that Ali jubilant at PNI’s strong showing and he may be somewhat vindictive. Whether older, more leftist faction of PNI will win control of party chairmanship vacated by Sidik’s death or permit younger, moderate elements to emerge, may well determine whether Masjumi–NU–PNI coalition will come into being.

Our opposition to former PNI government was based on its softness toward domestic and international Communism not on any basic dislike of nationalism as such; a sincere coalition of genuine non-Communists would deserve our support.

Another possible combination would be Masjumi–NU coalition which with support Christian and any other small parties might be able to squeeze out a bare majority. While such a government would probably be inclined towards friendliness to US and anti-Communist it would tend to drive nationalist elements which have proved by this election that they have considerable popular support into collaboration with PKI. Both NU and Masjumi have already recognized the danger in such a situation and are likely to try to avoid it.

Third possibility which like the second will depend upon the exact distribution of seats but which growing remoter as outer island returns come in is PNI–PKI coalition with religious parties forced into opposition. This combination appears unlikely in view of genuine fear of PKI on part of many PNI members, which has undoubtedly been increased by strong showing PKI in elections. Evidence of this fear was apparent in Suluh Indonesia editorial October 5 advising army, which has not yet voted, to cast votes for any party but PKIwhich it described as representative of foreign power and suggested PNI, NU or Masjumi. Moreover, direct participation by PKI in government might influence army and other strongly anti-Communist elements toward direct action which, however, would be more difficult now after elections have been held then in June or July.

Fourth and quite possible alternative to PNI–Masjumi–NU coalition is PNI–NU grouping with support but not participation PKI. This would mean return to Ali–Arifin policies of theoretical neutralism toward Communism, both internal and external, which in effect was most favorable for PKI development and would have most serious long-range implications. It is, unfortunately, by no means impossible that such a coalition will come into being if Masjumi and PNI cannot reach a working agreement, for NU is now strong enough to sustain its claim to represent island in such a cabinet and PKI is probably shrewd enough not to exact blackmail for its support in initial period.

It is clear from above NU is key position and Masjumi already making strong bid for its cooperation on basis Moslem unity as can be seen from Natsir statement reported in Embassy telegram 840.⁵ It is significant that Natsir has now come out strongly for Masjumi–NU cooperation toward which Sukiman⁶ has been working for some time (see my telegram 2215 of May 16⁷).

There are reports from several sources that NU somewhat bewildered with its newly discovered strength. My colleagues, including the Moslems share my own lack full knowledge about this party whose leaders have had almost no contact with foreigners. NU evidently lack both articulate spokesmen and defined political program. It apparently based on conservative village outlook and religious orthodoxy. There is obvious basis for future association with Masjumi interaction of which may have interesting consequences. At same time nature of NU makes party vulnerable to parochial influences and maneuvers of “Hadji” Sukarno as well as “Bung” Karno.⁸

… stated that NU is seeking Vice President Hatta’s advice and guidance on political matters. If true, this is hopeful sign, for Hattacan be counted on to encourage moderate nationalist-religious coalition as he has done in past.

President Sukarno will also again play an important part in determining complexion and policies of new government and his attitude has not yet been made clear. Strong showing of PNI will be interpreted by Sukarno as vindication of his thinly veiled support for PNI and will restore some of the authority and prestige he lost in 27 June incident.⁹ There are some indications that he has been somewhat alarmed at strength PKI but it too early to tell whether he will be able to resist temptation to settle old scores with Masjumi and army leaders and to urge return to Ali–Arifin government and policies.

Importance of Sukarno’s attitude during forthcoming period of negotiating future coalition increased by fact Hatta leaving October 24 for visit India and plans to be abroad one month.

In foregoing discussion we have attempted set forth possibilities as accurately as we can and as we see it today. Although foregoing is tentative I believe it sufficiently supported by available information to be used for staff planning on US attitude these contingencies but continue urge restraint public comment from Department.

Cumming

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/10–755. Secret.
2. Dated October 6, not printed. (Ibid., 756D.00/10–755)
3. Wilopo was Prime Minister April 1952–June 1953.
4. Zainul Arifin served in the Ali Cabinet as Second Deputy Prime Minister and later as Deputy Prime Minister.
5. Telegram 840 from Djakarta, October 7, reported that Natsir had declared in a press statement of October 4 that any success gained by the Masjumi, NU, and other Moslem parties meant that the position of Islam in Indonesia would be strengthened. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/10–755)
6. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, former Prime Minister from 1951 to 1952, was the first deputy chairman of the Masjumi Party.
7. The telegram under reference reported a conversation between Sukiman and Cumming on May 14, in which Sukiman commented on Indonesian domestic politics and U.S.-Indonesian relations. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–1655)
8. Sukarno was “Hadji” Sukarno by virtue of his pilgrimage to Mecca and “Bung” (Brother) Karno by virtue of his role as revolutionary leader.
9. Reference is to the Chief of Staff crisis, which began with the installation of General Utoyo on June 27.