Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

114. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, September 17, 1955.

SUBJECT

• West New Guinea and the General Assembly

Discussion

You will undoubtedly be subjected to great pressure in New York from the Australians and the Dutch to lend them a covert hand in winning votes to their side in the General Assembly. I urge a strict adherence to our established policy of neutrality as we strongly feel that any deviation would impair new opportunities opening up for us politically in Indonesia.

At a meeting of the Assistant Secretaries with Mr. Murphy on September 9, Mr. Wainhouse noted that(1) the vote in the UNwould probably be close, (2) the Australians would try to get us to act on their behalf, and (3)IO had learned that the Dutch and the Australians last year had used the Israelis (who are piqued at the Indonesians for their close cooperation with the Arabs) as intermediaries to influence some Latin American countries to shift their votes against Indonesia. All participants in this meeting agreed that we could not hope to be of influence in a “private manner” on behalf of Australia or the Netherlands without having our position become a public one detrimental to our interests in Indonesia. It was also agreed that, in view of the moderate approach of the present Indonesian Government, we should tell the Dutch they might find some formula upon which to negotiate with the Indonesians. Mr. Merchant met with the Dutch Chargé on September 13.

We have consistently refrained from taking a position on the substantive arguments presented by both the Netherlands and Indonesia. However, we can always point to the fact that these Governments did agree on December 27, 1949, as part of the Round Table Conference Agreement, in Article 2 of the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty “that the political status of New Guinea (shall) be determined by negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia.” Therefore, we also agreed in the meeting with Mr. Murphy that we should not get in the middle of the dispute or extend good offices, that we should remain completely neutral on the substance of the issue, but that we should do what was in our power without compromising our position to encourage bilateral negotiations.

During the past week, the Indonesian Foreign Minister has told us that they have asked the Dutch to negotiate on “outstanding issues”. He asked that we tell both parties, without impairing our position, that it is our hope that they would enter into negotiations on all matters outstanding between them. He said he contemplates the formula of “means of lessening tensions over Irian” to cover that part of the negotiations and that thereunder, “both parties could preserve their Irian positions”. The Foreign Minister will be in New York for the General Assembly, and wants to see you.²

The Australians may press you even harder than the Dutch to have the United States use its influence with some delegations to vote for the Dutch position. Casey and Spender will insist on this if the voting is to be closely contested.

If we should be any less neutral toward the present moderate and friendly Indonesian Government than we were toward the Ali Cabinet, we could be sure of alienating it at a time when all our reports indicate an unprecedented warmth and desire to improve relations with us and other countries of the Free World, including the Netherlands and Australia³ in particular. Any move by us to influence even one or two delegations would be known by the Indonesians immediately. With the new Cabinet becoming more and more close to us, and with elections scheduled in Java and Sumatra for September 29 and other places during October and November, our change in tactics could cause serious misunderstanding in Indonesia and impair the favorable turn of events. It is to the advantage of the U.S., the Netherlands, and Australia now to capitalize on the changing attitudes in Djakarta.

Recommendation:

Therefore, I strongly urge that we do not become involved in the voting maneuvers, even if the margin of votes is slim.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.56C/9–1755. Secret.
2. Secretary Dulles was in New York September 19–23 for the opening of the U.N. General Assembly session; no record of a conversation between him and Anak Agung in New York has been found in Department of State files.
3. Cumming had reported in telegram 664 from Djakarta, September 15, that Anak Agung told him that the Indonesian Government was interested in negotiating a treaty of friendship with Australia and had asked if the United States would broach the subject with the Australian Government. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/9–1555) Robertson mentioned Indonesia’s desire to improve relations with Australia at an ANZUS Council meeting on September 24.