Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

113. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 14, 1955¹

Washington, September 14, 1955

SUBJECT

• Western New Guinea

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Richard G. Casey, Australian Minister for External Affairs
• Sir Percy Spender, Australian Ambassador
• Mr. John Quinn, Department for External Affairs
• Mr. F.J. Blakeney, Counselor of Australian Embassy
• Mr. Hoover, Acting Secretary
• Mr. Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
• Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. Horsey, Director, BNA

Mr. Casey opened the discussion by reference to the great political and public importance which his Government attached to Dutch retention of sovereignty over Western New Guinea. Any government which acquiesced in a change would probably fall. This might seem illogical but it was so. The Australians think that they themselves have done a good job in the eastern part of the island and that the Dutch have done good development work in their territory. They treat it as if it were under UN trusteeship, so far as reporting to the TC is concerned. Mr. Casey referred to recent Dutch and Indonesian indications of a more reasonable view on both sides and wondered if they could come to anything, particularly if the issue could be withdrawn from the General Assembly. Otherwise, if not, the Australian position would be the same as last year and they are hopeful that a resolution can be defeated. In any case, they hoped that discussion could be delayed until after the elections when the Indonesians might be more ready to withdraw the issue, or at least it could be put far down on the agenda so that it could not be adequately discussed. Mr. Casey said he knew what our position had been but would appreciate any help we can give if the issue gets on to the agenda.

Mr. Murphy said that we are fully conscious of the importance which the Australians and Dutch attach to this question. He referred to the Secretary’s conversation with Sir Percy Spender on September 1² and said that there had been no change in our position. We continued to hope that as a result of the developing situation in Indonesia something better might develop so that, even if it were inscribed on the agenda, it might not come to a vote.

Mr. Robertson said that all of us who were interested in the problem should exercise our influence to the utmost to bring about bilateral discussions to avoid Assembly consideration or discussion. He referred to the Indonesian Ambassador’s call when he had said that they did not expect us to take a position on the substance of the issue in the Assembly debate but wanted our approval of their proposed procedure of seeking GA approval for peaceful negotiations.³ Mr. Robertson replied that this would not be in keeping with our position of neutrality because whatever positive action we took would be felt by the other side to be unneutral. He emphasized to the Australians that we feel very strongly that we could not do less for the present Indonesian Government which appears to be oriented toward the West than we had done for the Ali Government in maintaining a position of neutrality.

Sir Percy Spender said that an agreement to discuss the issue was exactly what the Indonesians were trying to get the Dutch into for a long time and that it would be equivalent to the Dutch agreeing to discuss with the Indonesians the question of sovereignty. He felt that the idea of bilateral talks played into the hands of the Indonesians. Mr. Murphy and Mr. Robertson made clear that this was not our understanding of the proposed outside discussions and that we understood that it was proposed that there be bilateral discussions of a general character which might include the New Guinea question.

Mr. Casey said that, if the talks failed could we help by letting other delegations know that our view was “this and that” and by this he said he meant he hoped “this and that” would be support for the Australian position.

Mr. Murphy said that what the Secretary had said to Ambassador Spender on September 1 was that if the Australians should run into trouble they should feel free to come to us and that if it were then a question of one or two votes, we would consider whether we could talk privately with a few delegations without compromising our position with Indonesia.

Sir Percy said that the Secretary’s commitment had been much firmer than that. He said that the Secretary had said that it was our common purpose that no resolution come out of the General Assembly supporting Indonesian sovereignty over Western New Guinea. He had expressed concern for Communist infiltration. He said that we could give no blanket agreement but if it was a question of one or two votes, we would do what we could.

Mr. Casey said that it was known now that the vote would be close and he saw no reason, therefore, why we should not proceed at once.

Mr. Robertson said he did not feel the Secretary had made a commitment of this kind and Mr. Murphy read the precise text of the last paragraph of the September 1 memorandum of conversation.

Sir Percy argued that since the Secretary had started his commitment with the statement that he could give no blanket agreement, his following comments, by implication, constituted a limited agreement. Mr. Casey said that that was certainly the way Mr. Spender had reported it in his telegrams.

Mr. Casey again asked that we support the Australian position as far as we could without compromising our international position. He hoped that the conversation between the Secretary and Mr. Spender could be implemented by us at a very early time.

Mr. Hoover referred to the improving trend in Indonesia and said that it was very important not to disturb it and Mr. Murphy again repeated our great sympathy for Australia and the Dutch position. Mr. Hoover mentioned that we would go ahead with plans to offer economic aid to Indonesia in order to encourage this trend. Mr. Casey asked if we had indications that the Indonesians would accept aid and Mr. Hoover said that we did.

During a brief discussion of the importance of avoiding Communist control of Indonesia, as to the danger of which Mr. Casey said that we had been a little more than concerned in the past than the Australians, he said that if they got control over Indonesia they would, of course, get control over Western New Guinea. If this happened, Australian forces in time of war might have to be sent there. They might thus be tied down to an area which we might regard as relatively unimportant. This would prevent them from committing their forces to joint efforts in other areas.

In conjunction with the discussion of whether or not negotiations would provide a solution to the problem, Sir Percy argued strongly that from a legal viewpoint there was no obligation on the part of the Dutch to undertake negotiations. He said the important word in Article II⁴ was “determined”. He said that since the political status of New Guinea had not been determined through negotiations within the year the matter was a closed issue. Mr. Murphy read Article II and the supplementary exchange of notes between the Dutch and the Indonesians concerning the “status quo” of New Guinea⁵ and the phrase in Article II that the question of the political status of New Guinea was to be determined through negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756C.022/9–1455. Secret. Drafted by Outerbridge Horsey. Initialed by Hoover and Robertson, indicating their approval.
2. A memorandum of this conversation is Ibid., 756C.011/9–155.
3. Reference is to a conversation on September 8 between Moekarto and Robertson. (Memorandum of conversation; Ibid., 756C.022/9–855)
4. Article II of the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty; see footnote 6, Document 92.
5. The letters under reference, dated November 2, 1949, stated that the clause in Article II reading “the status quo of the residency of New Guinea shall be maintained” meant “through continuing under the Government of the Netherlands”; they are printed as a part of the Round Table Conference Agreement, 69 UNTS 3.