104. Telegram From the Embassy in the Netherlands to the Department of State1
222. Action Arab-Asian nations in proposing inclusion Netherlands New Guinea item on agenda 10th General Assembly2 will necessitate early determination what position US will take in Assembly discussion matter. Last year our abstention, as Department aware, caused strong adverse reaction Netherlands Government, parliament and public. Dutch found it impossible to square our abstention, particularly after our vote for Britain on Cyprus question3 (where two allies were involved not an ally vs a neutral), with our often expressed concept of partnership between US and allies whether great or small. It was also evident from appreciative comments of Indo officials after UN debate that Indos regarded our “neutrality” as pro-Indo neutrality helpful to them, which of course it was.
New Guinea question was thoroughly ventilated in 9th GA and it is now abundantly clear that there is no prospect foreseeable future of reconciling Indo claim to territory with Dutch determination to keep it. (See my telegram 1061 April 13, 1954.4) It is also clear that no amount UN debate or resolutions will change this situation and that annual consideration on matter will only exacerbate dispute without advancing solution.
In determining our position in this case this year it seems to me that we cannot ignore our obligations and responsibilities as the leader of the free world to take an unequivocal position and not hide behind a cowardly position of abstention. As the Secretary has recently pointed out the policies of Communist countries generally speaking have been based on expediency rather than upon moral principle. It seems to me this is an excellent case for testing the difference. If as I understand there is little doubt that we consider title to New Guinea morally and legally to reside in The Netherlands, if as seems clear it [is] to the advantage of the inhabitants of New Guinea to remain under Dutch administration rather than the incompetent and otherwise well-occupied hands of the new and struggling Indonesian nation, if in addition it is greatly in our strategic interest [Page 178] that the area remain with the Dutch, I feel most strongly we should make our viewpoint clear. If as I understand we agreed … that New Guinea “must under no circumstances fall under Indonesian control”5—and it is obvious that we do—for us to abstain again in the GA would demonstrate a deplorable lack of political courage in the eyes at least of our NATO allies for which high price the dividend of passing Indo amiability seems pathetically small.
If this is true does it not follow as clear as day that we should make our opposition to any resolution on the subject in the General Assembly known forthwith. The one point on which both Cumming and I agreed last year was that discussion of the New Guinea problem in the General Assembly could only serve to increase irritation and bring about further deterioration in Indonesian-Dutch relations. The Department knows what it did to US-Dutch relations. This year the damage done to our position of leadership and prestige with the Dutch and their long memories would not soon be forgotten.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8–1255. Secret.↩
- In a letter of August 10, the representatives of Indonesia and 14 other countries had requested inclusion on the General Assembly’s agenda of an item entitled “The question of West Irian (West New Guinea)”; for text of the letter and explanatory memorandum, see U.N. doc. A/2932.↩
- For documentation on U.N. consideration of the Cyprus question in 1954, see Foreign Relations,, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp. 674 ff.↩
- In telegram 1061 Matthews urged U.S. opposition to consideration of the New Guinea problem by the U.N. General Assembly. (Department of State, Central Files, 756C.00/4–1354)↩
- See Document 90.↩