Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

103. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State ¹

Djakarta , July 24, 1955—3 p.m.

218. Formal Cabinet announcement that it will return its mandate to Hatta ² this evening opens the epilogue of the Ali government and is an appropriate moment for an appraisal of C/S crisis and downfall of Cabinet. The government maintains with tendentious documentation that the essential reason for its collapse is its inability to compromise further with the army’s attempt to over-ride the authority of a parliamentary democracy. Many of my colleagues fully accept this plausible but to my mind incomplete and superficial argument. Some consider the Cabinet collapse as a depressing reflection on the viability of the Indonesian nation; others as debilitating blow to the development of parliamentary traditions. I do not think that the political facts fully support the government’s case or warrant my colleagues’ pessimism based largely on the premise that Ali Cabinet was representative of the political forces in Indonesia and that it would have been possible to counter its baneful influences and unseat it by strictly constitutional means.

There are in fact three elements in the situation:

• First, the army: In 1951 professional officers displayed dissatisfaction with role assigned to army and its relationship to political direction in post-independence Indonesia. Hot-headed younger elements were joined on October 17, 1952 by some senior officers in rash attempt to force government to its terms.³ In late 1953 the continuing dissatisfaction of army caused Sukarno to give assurance that he would respect army interests to Terrcomm, who by then had generally associated themselves in a responsible way with army grievances. Failure to settle October 17 affair by government and distrust of Minister Defense Iwa led senior army officers to take initiative at Jogja February 1955 Conference. However government was able to suppress the pressure from army by associating itself with proceedings at Jogja. But in ensuing period when attentions of country were fixed on Asian-African Conference as well as economic deterioration, Iwa attempted to engineer some further changes in command with aim of weakening professional homogeneity of army officer corps. When these intrigues received backing of Ali and Sukarno, present C/S crisis broke out. Appointment of Utoyo was regarded by army as violation of understanding reached at Jogja.

  Had army accepted orders of government, orders which we believe civil figure most respected by army, Hatta, did not approve, army solidarity would have suffered serious blow and Terrcomm probably would have looked increasingly to their own interests and in the process might have developed into war lords.

• Second, Ali government: In months prior to C/S crisis government permitted itself to concentrate on foreign policy to neglect of seriously deteriorating economic situation. Prestige brought by Asian-African conference was used to stifle demands for measures to check inflation. Even segments of pro-government parties had become increasingly unhappy.
• Third, drift toward Communism: There is growing dissatisfaction with imitation of Communist ideology and methods of political agitation practiced by Ali–Sukarno, as well as with cultivation of relations with Red China at a forced pace and the clumsy handling of Indonesian relations with Western countries all of which were obstructing a settlement of Indonesia’s outstanding economic problems and the achievement of a stable, non-Communist political system. There has been feeling that Ali and Sukarno, like Mossadeq,⁴ had fallen too far into habit of collaborating with Communists in belief felt collaboration most expeditious way to achieve sincerely held nationalist aspirations.

The C/S crisis therefore was in my opinion not only the result of long-standing, just and uncorrected grievances on the part of a powerful and responsible segment of a society’s government in process of development of its own political system; it was also the catalytic agent which brought together moderate and anti-Communist forces increasingly uneasy over Ali Cabinet policies.

With regard to the future development of the Indonesian state, while army’s behavior is not strictly lawful, it can be considered fan-play in present Indonesian political system with its appointed Parliament, virtually self-appointed President and provisional Constitution. The army, in fact, has shown great restraint and consistency in pursuing its objectives and has refused, so far, to seize power which lies within its grasp. In a newly established country such as this, such behavior is a healthy sign.

I believe that the departure of Ali from the scene and the lessons of the C/S crisis will serve to bring Indonesia back on an even keel and make possible forward movement in contrast to the slipping and drifting of the past period.

Cumming

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/7–2455. Secret.
2. Sukarno was out of the country.
3. Regarding the “October 17 affair”, see telegram 738 from Djakarta, October 20, 1952, in Foreign Relations,, 1952–1954, vol. XII, Part 2, p. 332.
4. Mohammad Mosadeq, Prime Minister of Iran, April 1951–August 1953.