Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

99. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, March 15, 1956—5 p.m.

1191. Saigon pass Kenneth Young. Department pass Defense and CINCPAC. Reference Embassy telegram 1166 repeated priority Bangkok 615, Paris 128, Saigon 285, Phnom Penh 103,² Embassy telegram Bangkok Tosec 623 repeated Department 1178,³ and Saigon’s 343 to Vientiane repeated Department Secto 49.⁴

Secretary’s message was delivered to Crown Prince this morning just before he took off for Luang Prabang to consult King on political crisis. Message will be most helpful and, as appears below, was extremely timely.

I called on Savang early this morning, before authorization deliver Secretary’s message received. After examination political situation (reported elsewhere), he launched into earnest discussion Lao relations with France, US and SEATO, expanding and sharpening points made Embassy telegram 1166.

Prince declared that, in view French policy in Indochina since Geneva, recent declarations French Foreign Minister and rapid withdrawal FEC, it is doubtful France is either willing or able perform her treaty obligation to defend Laos if latter is attacked. Prince intends ask new government to pose this question explicitly to French Government. If answer is negative or equivocal, it will be necessary for Laos to obtain in other quarters more definite assurances re its security. Laos is, of course, in SEATO “treaty area” but Prince is not sure what this means in terms of concrete effective aid in case of attack. “Is SEATO”, he inquired, “more than a name?”. French are in it “to talk”; British to protect their own interests; its effectiveness re Indochina states depends on what US, Philippines, Thailand and Australia are willing to put into it. If Laos is to continue on its present course, and particularly if it is to engage in more active auto-defense operations in two northern provinces, it must have more explicit assurance that it will be supported militarily, economically and diplomatically. Otherwise, in view its extreme vulnerability, it would have no alternative but to follow path of Sihanouk into neutralism. I replied:

(1) SEATO was established primarily for security of Southeast Asia and US is determined it shall perform that role effectively; we have just reaffirmed our full support at Karachi.

(2) SEATO military advise we have been actively preparing plans to meet all contingencies. In view fact that Laos not SEATO member, we have felt bilateral Lao-Thai military conversations best means coordinating Laos with SEATO planning. If this method does not prove fruitful, others must be found.

(3) Operation Firm Link demonstrated speed with which SEATO members could act in military field in case of emergency.

(4) We have recently offered and are supplying special aid for auto-defense in addition our regular support Lao Armed Forces.

(5) Fact Viets and Chinese Communists have not behaved more aggressively toward Laos and concentration their propaganda on US presence here show their awareness firm US support of RLG.

(6) Our economic aid program has been seriously delayed by preoccupation Lao Ministers during past five months with electoral campaign and formation government. As soon as new government installed we are ready move forward full-steam.

Finally, I inquired what specific additional assurance Prince thought desirable or necessary. Savang replied he would not wish to be precise until new government had taken office and French had been queried re their intentions. At that time he would wish to proceed with this matter. Laos desires close cooperation with Thailand but does not wish to fall into position of dependence or inferiority vis-à-vis Thailand. In response to my query, Prince said it would be premature for Laos to join SEATO at this time.

We concluded by agreeing I should raise this matter with Secretary and his principal advisers at Tokyo⁵ and we should resume our conversation upon my return.

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/3–1556. Top Secret. Repeated to Taipei, Paris, Bangkok, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.
2. Document 96.
3. Document 97.
4. See footnote 4, Document 97.
5. No record of consultations held by Yost with the Secretary on this subject during the latter’s stay in Tokyo (March 18–19) has been found in Department of State files.