Office of the Historian

98. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1

Kabul, March 15, 1956—11 a.m.

1007. Beirut for Milliken. Embassy fears re Afghan reaction to SEATO support for Durand Line (Embtel 9582) have thus far been borne out only to limited degree. Pro forma public protest has been issued (Embtel 9923) placing RGA position again on record and condemning SEATO declarations as “worthless”. In official talks with us, both Foreign Minister Nairn and Deputy Foreign Minister Maiwandwal have expressed RGA unhappiness. While Maiwandwal stressed that Pakistan-Afghan relations have “worsened” and USG and SEATO have “played into Soviet hands” Comm[?] Naim was remarkably restrained and seemed most pained by what he considers totally unfounded implication that RGA is potential aggressor (Embtel 10034). Of immediate importance Naim indicated King-President visit may still materialize, although in Embassy’s opinion RGA may delay sending invitation or project may founder if RGA fails to send representative to Republic Day ceremonies at Karachi (Embtel 9815).

Afghan reaction against SEATO and particularly USG was moderated by fact that Durand Line support represented united step by all SEATO powers and British through previous Eden statement were considered by Afghans as chief culprits (Embtel 981). Even deeper is hopeful sign that top RGA leaders may realize RGA has gone about as far as it should go in associations with Soviets and drastic reaction to SEATO might seriously damage remaining precious ties with counter-balancing West and USG. This realization appears be climax to period of increasing Afghan worry because USG failed rush in with frantic responses (competitive millions) to Bulganin–Khrushchev coup and has unnervedly continued on business and friendship as usual basis. From Naim impression was gained that RGA appreciates [Page 209] cold war aspects of its dispute with Pakistan at least to point of not wanting to get caught in cross-fire as was Korea.

In view of foregoing, Embassy considers time propitious for some gestures encouraging RGA on road. Menderes6 visit would be most timely (Deptel 1482 to Ankara7) and it should be accompanied by invitation for Daud visit Turkey (preferably after his Moscow visit). Also helpful would be initiation of discussions with RGA re specific USG economic assistance projects—airline and Kabul-Tour Kzam road (Embtel 10068). Such gesture on our part could be useful in encouraging materialization King-President visit.

Meyer
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/3–1556. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Karachi, London, Ankara, Tehran, New Delhi, Beirut, Dhahran, and Lahore.↩
  2. Dated March 6, not printed. (Ibid., 689.90D/3–656)↩
  3. Dated March 12, not printed. (Ibid., 689.90D/3–1256)↩
  4. Dated March 14; it reads in part: “In particular, he [Naim] felt SEATO communiqué implied Afghanistan would be aggressor, when in fact RGA has repeatedly declared that it has no aggressive nor expansionist designs on Pakistan or any other neighbor. While continuing to recognize Durand Line is Afghanistan boundary, he said, RGA will not consider it boundary of Pakistan unless people on other side Durand Line can express themselves on matters. He reiterated that RGA would be satisfied with some sort of ‘political identity’ for Pushtuns within Pakistan sovereignty.” (Ibid., 790.5/3–1456)↩
  5. Dated March 10, not printed. (Ibid., 790D.02/3–1056)↩
  6. Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister of Turkey.↩
  7. Dated March 10, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 682.89/3–856)↩
  8. Dated March 14, not printed. (Ibid., 661.8994/3–1456)↩