69. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, Joint Staff (Hedding)1
The Minister for External Affairs of Australia, Mr. Richard Casey, accompanied by the Ambassador of Australia, Sir Percy Spender, called on Admiral Radford this afternoon and their conversation lasted about an hour. Rear Admiral Hedding was present during the conversation.
[Page 132]In general, the conversation concerned itself with Australia’s concern, as expressed by Mr. Casey, as to future military arrangements and how to plan for a “hot war”. He was particularly concerned as to the size of the armed forces that should be planned for and as to their possible deployments, “how large” and “where would they be used”. As he stated, this has political implications and might become a political issue. Mr. Casey stated that the “Malaya Proposal” was in the nature of a “feeler”, and felt that the U.S. was “not happy” about the proposal.
Admiral Radford replied that he was not “unhappy” about the Malaya Proposal and restated his previous views as expressed to Prime Minister Menzies and as contained in his letter to Sir Percy Spender,2 that the defense of Malaya lies to the north, that priority in planning should be given to this area (Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam). Further, that the greatest threat to Malaya stems from internal subversion rather than from overt external aggression. Planning for the defense of Southeast Asia as a whole must be conducted within the framework of SEATO. As to force deficiencies in this area, the United States can serve best by developing the deterrent of mobile striking power plus strategically placed reserves rather than by earmarking forces for particular areas. In regard to the provision of equipment and infrastructure, this is a matter of formal government to government negotiations and must be related to the defense of the area as a whole and to world-wide aid requirements.
In regard to planning for a “hot war”, Admiral Radford stated that it was more difficult to plan for or prepare for “limited wars” than for a global war since the latter is an “all out effort”, whereas in situations less than global war it is most difficult to determine what action must be taken, “how much is enough”, “how large” and “where”. Military planners cannot give exact answers to political questions or determine precisely how to meet the many and variable conditions that may develop in situations less than global war.
In regard to the specific problem confronting Australia, Admiral Radford stated that Australian forces should be designed to meet their Commonwealth responsibilities and to be available to meet SEATO responsibilities. These forces should be mobile forces, designed for operations in the general Southeast Asia area, supportable within their economic capabilities and for the “long pull”. They should be backed up by an adequate Reserve Program designed to support transition into a global war.
Admiral Radford felt it was desirable for these forces to support the Malayan situation both as a means of training the forces and to establish an “overseas” concept. These forces should be available to [Page 133] SEATO and not be indefinitely tied to Malaya. With respect to the specific types of mobile forces, he felt these forces should be tailored to the area. Also, it might be well for Australia to develop their own concept of “mobile” forces.
Sir Percy Spender asked about equipment for these mobile forces, and as to infrastructure to support their operations. In regard to equipment, Admiral Radford felt that in the event of an emergency in the SEATO area, that arrangements could be worked out for the provision of equipment for Australian forces made available to SEATO. However, the matter of MDAP equipment for Australia must be related to the requirements of the whole area as well as global requirements. Concerning infrastructure, Admiral Radford stated that the U.S. should not provide this type of aid, even though arrangements might be made for MDAP equipment.
Mr. Casey asked if the present ANZUS machinery was adequate. Admiral Radford replied yes, further that it really had not too much to do at present. In reply to a question as to the possible full-time assignment of a senior military representative to Melbourne, Admiral Radford replied that he did not consider such an assignment to be desirable. However, it might be possible to have a member of CINCPAC’s staff visit Melbourne perhaps a couple of times a year for short periods.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/9–1455. Secret. Also circulated as TAN Ref 2/51 in the Reference Paper series assembled in preparation for the ANZUS Council Meeting. (Attachment to a note dated September 22 by J. Stewart Cottman; ibid.. Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 552)↩
- Document 65.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩