Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

66. Telegram From the Embassy in Australia to the Department of State¹

Canberra, August 11, 1955—4 p.m.

53. In conference at Prime Minister’s office at his request August 10 he gave me his copy Radford’s letter July 28² to Spender including enclosure. Prime Minister expressed concern re its possible inconsistency with assurance which Prime Minister had received in Washington. Prime Minister had on his desk lengthy report from Casey respecting Radford’s letter from which he read portions which described letter as not in accordance with Washington discussions. Prime Minister also had before him his speech to Parliament of April 20, 1955 and read me portions relating to his assurances in Washington (see Embassy despatch 463, April 21³). Prime Minister said tenor of Radford’s letter had been forecast to External Affairs by an earlier report from Spender quoting information which Herries⁴ had recently received in Washington.

Prime Minister’s concern presumably relates to assurances from the President reported Deptel 211⁵ that “we were prepared to discuss military details in appropriate forum to be determined in further US-Australian discussion. Carney referred to work already done in five power military talks”, and also phrase in agreed statement reported Deptel 214⁶ “I was informed that though the tactical employment of forces was a matter which would have to be worked out in detail on the services level, the US considered that such effective cooperation was implicit in the Manila Pact”.

I said that while I had not previously seen the Radford letter and have not seen Australian memo on ANZAM planning referred to in it, I did have in mind our reports of conferences the Prime Minister had in Washington and also Prime Minister’s statement in Parliament of April 20 and that they seemed to me quite consistent, but that so also did Radford’s letter.

Prime Minister said that perhaps we had in mind channelling further discussions through ANZUS and said that he was aware of politically sensitive situation among other SEATO powers, and suggested that it was always possible to have a UK representative standing by at time of ANZUS conference. I made no reply to that and particularly avoided any indication of approval of latter suggestion. He did not refer to five power military talks nor did I. (US Army Attaché in Australia Colonel Milner reports that in conferences he had with Australian Brigadier Daly, who assisted Australian Military Adviser Sir John McCauley⁷ at July 1955 meeting of SEACDT military advisers at Bangkok,⁸ Daly advised Milner that Bangkok conference was considered highly successful by Australian delegation. Daly’s only qualification being that the test of results of that conference would occur at January 1956 meeting of military advisers at Melbourne, at which time Australians believe Manila Pact nations will be requested to accept concrete military obligations.)

Prime Minister said he was leaving for Melbourne and will return Saturday, August 13. He asked me to study Radford letter further and discuss it with him again Saturday or Sunday. I inquired whether there was anything he specifically wished me to do meanwhile. He answered no. Please send instructions if any particular line desired; otherwise will maintain principally listening attitude. I also have in mind and may mention that when Prime Minister conferred with Secretary March 15⁹ and in discussions later between Tange and Merchant (see Deptel 216¹⁰) import of Radford letter had already been forecast.

Probably Australians may intend to pursue this further at ANZUS council meeting. Casey sent word to me few days ago requesting earlier date for that meeting but withdrew request upon ascertaining Secretary’s plans.

Australians desire for more active participation in joint military planning is, of course, familiar theme. The Malayan phase is related to the sensitive political nature (Embassy despatch No. 12 July 13¹¹) of Australian troops for Malayan issue in Australian domestic politics, particularly as aggravated by UK General Churchill’s recent unfortunate statement that Australian troops can be used “anywhere in Southeast Asia”. Australian Government is under constant attack on this issue by Evatt,¹² leader of opposition, who although engaged in serious controversies within his own Labor Party, shows present prospects of maintaining control of party. There is much discussion possibility government calling general election within next few months. The sending of Australian troops to Malaya might be an important issue. Hence Menzies perhaps fearful of political accusations that his assurances to Parliament on April 20 were not justified.¹³

Peaslee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/8–1155. Top Secret; Priority.
2. Supra.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 743.2/4–2155)
4. Rear Admiral D.H. Herries, Principal Military Adviser to Ambassador Spender.
5. Telegram 211, dated March 16, contained a summary of the Menzies–Eisenhower conversation held on March 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.4311/3–1655) For a memorandum of the conversation, see Document 33.
6. Dated March 22, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.4311/3–2255) For text of the statement, see the enclosure to Document 37.
7. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of the Air Staff.
8. Meeting held July 6–8. A copy of the “Report by the Military Advisers to the Council of the SEACDT”, dated July 1955, is the enclosure to despatch 29 from Bangkok, July 15, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/7–1555)
9. See Document 34.
10. Dated March 23, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.4311/3–2355) Regarding the Tange–Merchant conversation on March 18, see Document 36.
11. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 743.00/7–1355)
12. Herbert Evatt.
13. In telegram 48 to Canberra, August 12, drafted in BNA and signed by Dulles, the Department replied as follows: “Department considers line you have taken and propose to take in future talks with the Prime Minister on planning matter to be entirely proper. Continue maintain in so far as possible sympathetic listening attitude, matter will no doubt arise in September 24 ANZUS meeting for additional airing.” (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/8–1155)