Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

65. Letter From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Australian Ambassador (Spender)¹

Washington, July 28, 1955.

My Dear Mr. Ambassador: At my request the Joint Staff has given careful consideration to the purely military aspects of your memorandum on ANZAM planning for the defense of Malaya² and I have attached their comments to this letter.³ In regard to the broader problems posed in your memorandum and discussed with you and with Prime Minister Menzies, my personal views follow.

It is noted that your memorandum deals almost exclusively with the defense of Malaya, a contingency which implies the loss of the rest of the Southeast Asian mainland. While it is militarily wise to plan for contingencies, I believe that at this time the larger aspects of the defense of Southeast Asia as a whole (Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam) should be given priority. In other words, I feel that the defense of Malaya lies to the north, and further, that the greatest threat to Malaya stems from internal subversion rather than from overt external aggression.

Therefore, I feel strongly that the planning efforts most likely to result in a successful defense of Malaya are those directed toward maintaining the security and sovereignty of those countries to the north of Malaya; Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. Subsequent to such planning it would then be appropriate to direct our efforts toward contingency planning for Malaya.

Now in connection with planning for the defense of Southeast Asia as a whole, and the proposal in your memorandum to conduct Four Power consultations for this defense, I consider it most inappropriate to conduct such consultations outside the framework of the SEATO. I am sure you are aware of the implications of such actions, should they become known, on the future meetings of the Military Advisors of the Manila Pact. Therefore it is my view that we should not engage in planning for the defense of this area without full representation of all the signatory powers.

In regard to further and more detailed coordination of contingency planning for the defense of Malaya, I not only consider that the present ANZUS planning machinery is adequate for this purpose, but that it is the only planning organization which can function in this field without considerable political repercussions.

Another question posed or implied in your memorandum is the matter of U.S. support in meeting force deficiencies and in the field of logistics and infrastructure requirements. Concerning force deficiencies, Mr. Dulles’ remarks to the SEATO representatives set forth the U.S. position in this matter.⁴ He stated in essence that the responsibilities of the United States are so vast and farflung that we believe we would serve best not by earmarking forces for particular areas of the Far East, but by developing the deterrent of mobile striking power plus strategically placed reserves. As to the provision of support in the field of logistics and infrastructure, I am sure you are aware of statutory provisions governing the matter of such assistance. Formal government to government negotiations would be necessary. It is my personal opinion that the U.S. would only consider such aid in relation to defense of the Southeast Asia area as a whole, and providing that it could be fitted in to our world-wide aid requirements.

I would appreciate your holding this correspondence in strict confidence.

Sincerely yours,⁵

Enclosure

In the absence of detailed plans, detailed comments on the military aspects of the memorandum cannot be furnished. General comments follow:

a. The subject plan does not assess any allied military action that would take place prior to the Songkhla operation. Although this assessment is lacking, the force requirements in the plan appear reasonable for the conditions stated.

b. The Songkhla position being near the Malayan border could be quickly reached by Commonwealth troops stationed in Malaya. However, a defense line at the Kra Isthmus would be shorter than one across the Peninsula at Songkhla and would preserve more territory for the free world. The Kra line was determined by the Five Power Planners to be the best final defensive line.

c. It is noted that the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve would be composed of forces positioned in the Manila Pact area where they would serve both as a deterrent to further aggression and as a nucleus of additional forces if required. However, these forces should not be allocated from Commonwealth forces presently in Korea where their presence as part of the forces of the United Nations Command serves even more as a deterrent to Communist aggression.

d. Whether or not the United States would use atomic weapons in the event of overt Communist aggression in Southeast Asia would depend on the circumstances prevailing at the time. In this regard the military position, disregarding political considerations, was quite appropriately stated in the Final Report of the Five Power Military Conference of June 1954.⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/7–2855. Secret. Attached to a covering note dated July 28, not printed, to Robertson from Rear Admiral T.J. Hedding, Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, Joint Staff.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. Printed below.
4. See Document 18.
5. Printed from an unsigned copy.
6. Dated June 11; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XII, Part 1, p. 554.