33. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, March 14, 19551
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- The Secretary of State
- Robert G. Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia
- Sir Percy Spender, Australian Ambassador
- Admiral Robert B. Carney
- Livingston T. Merchant
After a few opening exchanges the Secretary, who had just arrived from a hearing before the Senate Finance Committee testifying on HR l,2 commented that it had been a difficult session and that there was considerable opposition to the Bill in the Committee. The President indicated that this was probably the most difficult legislation that the Administration had attempted to put over. He was coming more and more to the belief that a political leader was far more of the teacher of his own people than a negotiator with foreign countries.
The Prime Minister agreed and said that timing and developing public opinion were probably the most difficult of the statesman’s arts. It was usually not difficult to reach a decision as to what was right to do.
The Prime Minister then opened his exposition by stating that the London meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers had been useful but that he assumed the President was fully informed concerning its results. He then turned to Southeast Asia which he said was of great concern to the Australians. The Australians were contemplating assuming an obligation regarding Malaya. He said that Malaya had been lost in World World II and that if it were lost again in another war it would be lost for good. He spoke of the fact that [Page 64] there had been talks among the UK, New Zealand and Australia on the subject of the defense of Malaya. Australia does not normally send its troops abroad in peacetime. They were planning on sending two divisions for the defense of Malaya and to achieve this it was necessary for him to alter “the homekeeping view of Australia in times of peace.” There was general military agreement that the Kra Peninsula was the place to hold and that it could in fact be held. This however would require close air and naval support to which Australia could and would make a contribution as would the UK. He hoped, however, though he was not asking for any specific commitment, that the U.S. would help in the air and on the sea. He said he understood the fluid concept of the U.S. with its emphasis on strategic striking power. He would, however, meet with great political difficulty at home unless he could say that all that Australia would do would be done in cooperation with the Manila Powers including the U.S. and then go on to say that he had reason to believe that the U.S. would help in the air and on the sea. Mr. Menzies said we all must satisfy ourselves as to the importance of Malaya. Australia looked up through New Guinea, which it considered vital, to Indonesia where they saw a weak government and a country in disorder. He had no doubt that the loss of Malaya would result in a rapid Communist control of Indonesia and New Guinea.
The President interrupted to say that there was no need to persuade us of this view of the importance of Malaya. In 1953 he had urged that those countries concerned get together on the defense of Indochina because of the chain effect that a defeat in Indochina would cause throughout the area. We accepted the importance of that general area on both political and strategic grounds. The thing to do was to discuss the problem in terms of military planning. The U.S., of course, has extensive commitments around the world. It is our purpose, however, to support strength where strength exists. He doubted that there would be any great difficulty in reaching a satisfactory understanding on this point. The President then inquired of Admiral Carney where the proper forum would be for such discussions. The President indicated that he thought in such matters it was important to work in a group which included our Asian allies, notably the Manila Pact.
Admiral Carney indicated that it had already been discussed at great length in the 5-power talks.3 He added that there was general military agreement on the strategic importance of the area and on the need to defend at the Kra.
[Page 65]The Prime Minister said that he would put his people in touch with ours in whatever forum might be suggested.
The President observed that the ideal situation was a homogeneous ground air and sea force which could then be supported by a mobile strategic reserve.
The Prime Minister then said that on his return he was going to advise the Cabinet to put into effect compulsory service for outside Australia. This was a major revision of their habits but for all he knew Australia would have obligations around Formosa as well as in Malaya.
The Secretary interjected with a suggestion that the Prime Minister before his departure put down on paper what he wanted to be able to say to his Parliament when he gets home on the matter of U.S. participation in the defense of the area. It would then be possible for us to go over it to see if it could be reconciled with our existing policies and strategy.
The President inquired what forces the British had in Malaya.
The Prime Minister replied that it amounted to about two divisions. The plan is for the Australians to put up two divisions and New Zealand one. Australia had not yet formally accepted this obligation but expected to within a day or two after his return. He then went on to say that Australia’s problem was not good manpower for the Army but the shocking deficiency of equipment.
The President inquired if present equipment was of British origin.
The Prime Minister said yes but that this raised the problem of the availability of this source of supply should war come. Although Australia manufactured a sabre jet with an Avon motor, anti-aircraft and 25-pounders, as well as machine guns, small arms and ammunition, it did not have the manpower or industrial resources to meet all of its equipment needs. It therefore wished to raise now the question as to whether or not it would be possible to get on some terms with the U.S., which had done so much to help other Allies arm, which would enable them to work out the equipment deficiency. He asked the President if that possibility was excluded.
The President replied that he would like to know exactly what the problem was and exactly what the Australian proposal was. The fact or the deficiency was news to him but as he understood it Australia was not looking at the problem. He was anxious to avoid, however, any possibility of later misunderstanding as to what we might be able to do. The Prime Minister asked if then the possibility of assistance was not excluded.
The President replied we would be glad to look into it. He felt that something could be done and would be glad to talk about it.
[Page 66]The President then said that he believed on the points discussed that there was general harmony between our thinking though working out the answers to practical problems and arrangements was needed. The President said he felt he must ask all our friends to agree that there was no possibility of compromise with the Chinese Communists. They have made no contribution whatsoever to peace in the existing situation. All they gave were insults, and we were approaching the point where we cannot give up another inch. He referred to their outrageous and illegal holding of our flyers.
The Prime Minister observed that he believed in drawing a line in a situation like this. The President then said it was not perhaps necessary to draw a sharp geographic line. It was important that the line be drawn morally and spiritually as well.
Mr. Menzies observed that there were many misunderstandings abroad concerning our policy on Formosa. Some say that to defend Formosa means to prop up the Chiang Kai-shek regime whereas to him to defend Formosa is to defend freedom.
The Secretary said that from his travels he was impressed with the fact that most countries disagreed with our policies only in details. Under these circumstances it is necessary to subordinate details to larger policy. He wondered where Australia and others would be if the U.S. lost all of its interest in Asia and the Far East. He then turned to Indonesia which could be lost without the prior loss of Malaya. He felt that we must be prepared to put into effect quickly a rough policy in Indonesia if the country began sliding under Communist control.
The President said that he believed the Secretary and the Prime Minister should talk further on this matter of Indonesia during the Prime Minister’s present visit.4
The talk then ended with the Prime Minister saying that he had told Mike Pearson5 a few days ago in Canada that often it is helpful to start at the end and then work backward. If the U.S. gets involved in a great war, are the Canadians out of it? Is Australia out of it? Of course not. Both would be in. In this circumstance it was important that both of them carry their publics with them in a healthy attitude and this could not be achieved if the public had been confused and corrupted by continuing emphasis on minor differences in their policy and that of the U.S.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 797.00/3–1455. Secret. Drafted by Merchant.↩
- A bill to extend the reciprocal trade legislation for 3 years which had already passed the House of Representatives.↩
- For documentation on the conversations held on several occasions between military representatives of Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 15 ff.↩
- See the memorandum of conversation, infra.↩
- Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.↩