Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

64. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, July 27, 1955—5 p.m.

252. SEATO Council Representatives met this morning consider proposed revised draft communiqué re Lao situation as submitted by us (Deptel 241, July 21²).

France, Pakistan and UK opposed issuance any communiqué. Australia, New Zealand (represented by UK), Philippines and Thailand prepared accept. In light opposition three members French chairman considered Council Representatives lacked authority issue communiqué.

UK Representative³ expressed view communiqué would add neither to prestige nor security SEATO and that communiqué issued July 18 (Embtel 159 July 19⁴), coupled with subsequent public statements by Thai Foreign Minister and Laotian Prime Minister, adequately covered situation since no further attacks had materialized and “restraint” represented best course.

French chairman acknowledged gravity Lao situation and fact provisions Geneva Accords have not been carried out.

French perplexed by difficulty drafting communiqué which would not on one hand seem place total responsibility on Pathets and thereby appear intervene in Laotian internal affairs or, on other hand, refer participation Viet Minh of which inadequate proof existed at this moment. While not optimistic concerning outcome current Lao Government-Pathet negotiations with participation ICC he considered highly undesirable take any SEATO action at this time which would tend “internationalize” issues and thereby provide opportunity “internationalization” by Communist powers. He considered communiqué July 18 substantially met original Thai request for exchange views and that it only natural powers having obligations under Geneva Accords should approach situation in somewhat different manner from those which do not.

Pakistani objections appeared not too firmly held and if objections British and French could be overcome I suspect Pakistani concurrence would be forthcoming. New instructions from Karachi would be required however. Thai Representative stated communiqué still highly useful and though prepared accept proposed draft he would prefer add language at end of first paragraph stating “Thai Representative explained that according reports reaching his government these attacks were result Viet Minh intervention.” Failing acceptance such proposal his government prepared make unilateral statement along these lines subsequent to release communiqué. Through such statement his government hoped show clearly no intervention Lao affairs involved and thereby meet Katay’s position (Embtel 214 July 23⁵).

For the record and particularly for benefit our Asian friends I strongly reiterated US position along following lines. Referring at outset to statement by UK Representative I observed I had never known an international body to show more “restraint” than present Council Representatives. I then pointed out:

1. Situation in Laos dangerous and gives no indication improvement despite months negotiation.

2. Highly important situation receive full international publicity.

3. Communist world must understand seriousness with which SEATO regards situation.

4. Communists can only be encouraged by inability SEATO agree even on most innocuous lines action.

5. Inaccessible geographical location and difficult political situation indicate Laos likely remain fertile field Communist activity.

6. Spectacle SEATO weakness not calculated increase confidence Lao Government in SEATO.

Council Representatives subsequently approved pious statement proposed by French chairman (merely for minutes) stating exchange information and views re Laos had been profitable and had demonstrated necessity following closely developments there.

Comment: In final analysis I consider British responsible frustration our efforts. French chairman informed me he authorized concur rather [than] constitute sole opposing vote, but denies having received instructions along lines Paris 381 July 26 to Department⁶ (received here only after meeting adjourned). Pakistani position probably attributable to UK.

Nevertheless, I believe our labors useful in that (1) some international publicity re Laos resulted, (2) British and French somewhat sensitive and embarrassed at obstructionist light in which they have appeared and consequently more likely acquiesce when future circumstances may demand prompt SEATO action.

Peurifoy

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/7-2755. Secret. Repeated to Vientiane, Paris, London, Karachi, Manila, Wellington, Canberra, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.
2. Supra.
3. Ambassador Gage.
4. See footnotes 2 and 5, supra.
5. In telegram 214, Peurifoy reported in part: “I have just been informed Prince Wan discussed with Katay proposed new communiqué following council representatives meeting this morning. Katay again apparently takes position failure refer Viet Minh gives communiqué appearance intervention Lao affairs.” (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/7–2355)
6. In telegram 381, repeated to Bangkok as 2, the Embassy in Paris reported learning from the Foreign Ministry that the French wished to make certain changes in the draft communiqué (text in telegram 241, supra) and that these changes had been coordinated with the British. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/7–2655)