Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

514. Despatch From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

No. 83

Vientiane, December 16, 1957.

REF

• Deptel 603²

SUBJECT

• Lao Capabilities for Countering Pathet Lao Subversive Activities

Summary: The symbolic transfer of authority on November 18 over the two provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly, and the formation of a government with Pathet Lao participation on the following day, marked the end of the primarily military phase of the Communist effort to control Laos. Although the Pathet Lao certainly intend to retain the capability of resuming hostilities in the form of “brigandage” and guerilla operations, overt and clandestine political activity will be dominant for the next few months and perhaps for one or two years. Despite the existence of a large police force with a number of specialized branches, it is the Lao National Army which appears best fitted to counter Communist subversive activities, aided by certain governmental agencies which have either benefited from improved training and facilities provided during the past year (Lao Information Service) or which have been newly created (SIDASP, Civic Action).

Lao capabilities for countering Pathet Lao subversive activities are represented by the following six agencies:

National Police,

Special Police (including the Sûreté Générale and the Special Branch),

SIDASP,

Lao National Army (including Auto-Defense units),

Civic Action, and

Lao Information Service.

1) National Police. The National Police now includes 2900 men, of whom 500 are stationed in Vientiane Province and the remaining 2400 in the remainder of the territory controlled by the Royal Government. The rank and file are largely untrained and frequently illiterate, the officers very generally corrupt, and the organization as a whole is seriously deficient in discipline, coordination, planning, and equipment (it even lacks a central file system). It is probably the weakest of all countersubversive agencies. The Director, Tiao Somsanith, is weak as an administrator and because of the stroke which last month disabled Katay don Sasorith, Minister of the Interior, the Lao National Police is without energetic leadership or effective control. For the time being, the situation might be somewhat improved by placing the police more directly under the control of the Prime Minister.

Training of selected police officers in countersubversive methods has nevertheless been carried on since last June. Twelve officers have now been given training in Malaya, and a full-scale Third Country training program in the Philippines for 90 company-grade is approaching the half-way mark. Each is given a two-months’ course on Communist subversive tactics and effective countersubversion operations and procedures, conducted by Filipino officers and based on their successful experience in combatting the Huks. Thirty officers have now returned to Laos; 15 more will be graduated on February 1, 1958; and the remaining 45 by August. Upon completion of their training, these officers are assigned to provincial headquarters in Laos where they can impart their knowledge to subordinates and apply the methods which they have learned.

The real fruits of these training activities remain, of course, to be seen. Certain local commanders have already shown initiative in arresting and temporarily neutralizing Pathet Lao agents in their districts, particularly in Northern Laos. But despite this spotty improvement over the past year, the National Police, in the present state of its Organization and training, must be considered incapable of neutralizing a well-organized and directed Communist subversive movement.

2) Special Police. The Special Police includes three presently activated sections: The Sûreté Générale, the Special Branch, and the Propaganda Section.

a) Sûreté Générale. The Sûreté Générale, under French advisory direction, is responsible for criminal and political investigations. As such it is the main repository of all police files; but since it is unwilling to open these files to other branches, it cannot be said that there is an effective central files system. It is uncooperative with both the Special Branch and the Immigration Service.

b) Special Branch. The Special Branch, organized in April, 1957, gathers intelligence for the use of the National Police, the ANL, and the Immigration Service, in arresting and neutralizing Lao subversives and in deporting foreign agents. It has identified and broken up PL training centers, including five in Vientiane province. It has not yet unearthed any “foreign” subversive networks, despite the numbers of Chinese and Vietnamese resident in Laos. Except for Vientiane, Xieng Khouang and the northern border areas, its intelligence activities are very weak. A considerable part of its activity is in the propaganda field and is aimed at informing the public and the Buddhist priesthood of the dangers of Communism. Here it has been successful (along with SID ASP and Civic Action) in greatly reducing support in the Vientiane area for Bong Souvannavong’s National Union Party, diverting the allegiance of some 3700 members to the Nationalists. Since the Union Party was in effect the Assembly spokesman for the Pathet Lao, this could be considered a countersubversive success; but in fact the Special Branch has been developing more and more as a propaganda agency and police strong arm for the Katay wing of the Nationalist Party than as a public safety agency. This development may yet be turned to good effect if a United Front of the Nationalists, Independents and some Democrats should be created, thus permitting the Special Branch to function impartially for the benefit of all conservative candidates in the coming supplementary elections. In the meantime, however, and as a result of the recently adopted Amnesty Law and the entrance of two Pathet Lao representatives into the Cabinet, Bong’s followers are reportedly regrouping.

c) Propaganda Section. This division has not been developed to any extent. Its activities are limited to morale-building and dissemination of news within the police force itself. For this purpose it borrows personnel from the Special Branch.

3) SIDASP. The Information, Documentation and Socio-Political Action Service is an executive agency under the Prime Minister with … support. Since this organization is both free of corruption and enjoys the favor of the Prime Minister, it has better capabilities than the police for immediate usefulness. In gathering intelligence it is handicapped by the inaccessibility of police files and by the ineffectiveness of its own documentation division (there is even inter-service friction between the civilians who direct SIDASP and the military personnel who are engaged in documentation). In the past year, however, its capabilities have been increased by a training program …; by improvement in transport, communications and laboratory facilities; by the removal of the incompetent director of its socio-political section; and by improvement of relations with other services. Two new stations have been opened in Southern Laos. Some of the credit for the erosion of Bong’s strength in Vientiane province belongs to SIDASP. A clandestine unit for gathering intelligence and for political action against the Pathet Lao successor party Neo Lao Hak Xat has been proposed …, subject to receiving … financing. In sum, SIDASP has steadily grown in experience and initiative; its equipment has been improved; its operations are expanding; and having the great advantage of … support administered under capable … advisors, it is far less handicapped than other agencies by the political rivalries and personal jealousies which plague the police.

4) Lao National Army. When Colonel Ouane became Chief of Staff in late 1956, ANL morale was low, corruption spreading, desertions occurring in Sam Neua, and Auto-Defense units existed only in Ouane’s own military region. He transferred or gave dishonorable discharges to dishonest officers and imprisoned 15; reorganized the Sam Neua command; set up Auto-Defense units in all four military regions; set up command training schools, including a special school to train officers in improving relations with the population; and reorganized the ANL so as to include “volunteer battalions” with the responsibility of ensuring local security and of creating good relations with the people through Civic Action and by using Civic Action methods. All regional commanders have now initiated Civic Action instruction in their commands, and relations between the military and civil authorities in the provinces have notably improved, in part because the commanders have been instructed to conduct their Civic Action activities (particularly assistance to the people) in the name of the Chaokhoueng, thus enhancing his prestige. The Army Information Service was merged with the G–5 in November and placed under Colonel Oudone Sananikone, Director of Civic Action, with resulting increase in efficiency. Intelligence and psychological warfare training was given to seven ANL officers last Spring. In June the ANL initiated action in arresting PL agents and agitators in Vientiane province; 80 from the Vang Vieng area were re-indoctrinated by the Army Information Service and sent to their homes, where they have since cooperated with the ANL in organizing local Auto-Defense units. The indoctrination has apparently been successful. With the retroactive approval of the Prime Minister the ANL sweep was extended in July–September to Luang Prabang and Xieng Khouang provinces; and in October to the heavily infested Tchepone area on the North Viet Nam border. Interrogations which followed these sweeps have produced considerable information on PL agents elsewhere in the country and with this experience the ANL has been able to improve techniques of interrogation.

a) Auto-Defense Units. “Auto-Defense” is a concept which the Prime Minister enthusiastically embraced in 1956 and which has now developed into reality. As of November 1957 there were over 14,379 men enrolled in Auto-Defense, of whom 9,498 were armed. Units are disposed throughout the country, and naturally vary considerably in effectiveness; but the best trained and equipped are placed in Northern Laos bordering on China and the areas controlled by the Pathet Lao. Auto-Defense strength is as follows:

	Armed	Unarmed
1st Military Region	3512	2630
2nd Military Region	3850	1079
3rd Military Region	1624	886
4th Military Region	512	295
Totals	9498	4881

Where Auto-Defense units have been brought to their greatest effectiveness (as in the Phong Saly Military Subdivision commanded by Major Kham Ouan), each village is guarded by permanent Auto-Defense personnel concealed in fox holes, reinforced at night by roving patrols of three men. The AD personnel in fact compose only the summit of a defense organization which embraces the entire population: the “combat group”, made up of armed men aged 17 to 35; the “observers and reporters”, made up of unarmed men 35 to 45, women and children; and the “delaying group” made up of girls and old men and women. AD personnel are recruited in the first place by ANL teams traveling about the area; the first task of the teams is to establish friendly relations with the villagers, and then to recruit likely AD candidates from among them. Meantime the ANL team is also propagandizing for the RLG and gathering local intelligence. Men chosen for AD are given training on the spot, and the best sent to a special school for command training, ultimately returning to their own villages. The local AD unit thus becomes not only a defense against Pathet Lao marauders and a source of reliable intelligence, but a symbol of the Royal Government’s presence and power.

5) Civic Action. The Civic Action program, which now has eleven teams in the field and seven more whose training is to be completed in January, has been remarkably successful in obtaining the cooperation of villagers, improving health and living standards, and in impressing on the rural population the presence of the RLG and the benefits accruing therefrom. It has top priority in the eyes of both the Prime Minister and the Embassy. Supported by the ANL, it also works effectively with SIDASP; it also is one of the agencies entitled to credit for the extensive break-up of Bong Souvannavong’s organization in Vientiane province, primarily because its activities in village improvement provided a visible indication of the Government’s ability and willingness to help rural communities, whereas Bong’s propaganda had depended largely on criticism of the Government for its indifference. Civic Action has just surmounted a funding crisis resulting from (a) disappearance of Lao Treasury funds earmarked for it and (b) temporary exhaustion of all counterpart funds in consequence of suspension of U.S. cash grants pending clarification of fiscal and import license abuses. Emergency action has been taken to provide immediate funding of Civic Action activities and normal operations are being resumed. If no new crisis develops, the RLG possesses in Civic Action a highly effective anti-subversion weapon which did not exist last Spring.

6) Lao Information Service. During the past Summer the Lao Information Service conducted a successful training course for 30 government officials in Lao civics, the history of the Pathet Lao movement, the dangers of world Communism and public speaking. The course also provided instruction in the logistical side of informational activities: Operation of vehicles, projectors, generators, public address systems, typing and mimeographing machines. Finally, the course included training in First Aid, health and sanitation, because medical assistance to a community ensures a welcome and is remembered gratefully. Graduates of the course are now stationed in ten provinces and others are awaiting entry into Sam Neua and Phong Saly. At the same time the physical facilities of the Service have been improved; Radio Vientiane’s range has been significantly increased by alterations to its antennae, and plans have been prepared for the placement of community radio receivers in rural areas; in various centers official Lao Information Service posts are to be established where news broadcasts from Vientiane may be taken down at dictation speed, mimeographed and distributed. The Information program as a whole appears to have been carefully and imaginatively planned; it is now being vigorously pushed.

In conclusion, it seems clear that the Lao Government has now at its disposal various agencies with trained and experienced personnel (although still limited in numbers) with which to meet subversive activities and which scarcely existed twelve months ago. To obtain maximum effectiveness from the material at hand, better coordination among them is essential. Of utmost importance is vigorous and intelligent direction. At the present time, it appears that only the Prime Minister has the prestige necessary to bring this about. In consequence, no opportunity to impress this upon him should be lost.

J. Graham Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–1657. Secret. Drafted by Bacon.
2. In telegram 603, November 27, the Department requested the Embassy’s views on the effect of Katay’s illness on antisubversive measures and information on Royal Lao Government capabilities to enforce the accords with the Pathet Lao to its advantage. (Ibid., 751J.00/11–2757)