515. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
1025. Department pass CINCPAC for POLAD. During talk with Foreign Minister 18th I raised subject supplementary election. Though I could speak only personally and subject was internal Lao concern I wanted him understand position I was put in by requests by candidates for election [for] USIS assistance in form projectors, films, posters etc. Thus far when such requests reported to me I had taken position that much as we wanted help our friends I could not permit commitments to be made to individual candidates. Phoui would realize position I would be in if one friend asking help to run in say Khammouane Province on Nationalist ticket was given affirmative answer and next day another good friend running as candidate for Independent Party in same place were then to ask for help. USIS might then be put in position helping two friends compete against each other which would benefit only Bong–PL combine and cause our assistance be wasted. I said I did not expect Phoui to reply to this which I would also mention to Souvanna as key figure of Nationalist [Page 1061] Party at this time but I would want my dilemma be understood.
Phoui then said he was continuing hold talks with Souvanna on conservative unity and was still himself plugging for merger of Nationalists and Independents. He said Souvanna had been considering for some time assuming formal leadership of Nationalists but as Katay had not yet been evacuated it was embarrassing take this step now. This also was delaying action either to agree on a 2-party slate of candidates or on a complete merger and subsequent slate representing new party. Phoui then asked if we would be disposed to help Conservative candidates provided agreement was reached to prevent conservatives from competing against each other. I said USIS had made facilities available informally during 1955 campaign, as he recalled, and I was confident that we could do same thing again although my opinion was personal, unofficial and without instructions. Phoui then said he would speak with Souvanna on 20th when he got back from Phong Saly because delay in agreeing on single slate could obviously become detrimental to conservatives chances. He would also thereafter submit an estimate of materials and other assistance needed. I said I would be glad to receive this for such action as we then found it possible to take.
Phoui went on to say that he and his brother Ngon were working actively on election strategy and tactics. While it was necessary to avoid tagging them with political activity he believes means for overseeing campaign and win people in rural areas were to be found in army, auto defense and civic action. He, Ngon, Col. Oudone Sananikone (head of civic action) and others were working up confidential group of insiders in these organizations who would be responsive to central direction from leaders of Conservatives and who would in turn inform them quickly of requirements in various localities.
He hoped we could help with “means” in this regard too. I again said I could tell him personal basis that we regarded auto defense, civic action and Operation Brotherhood as projects of a special nature with high priority and while we too could not admit any political motivation with respect thereto I was hopeful I could get strong support for demonstrated needs these projects. In this context he spoke of proposed augmentation of auto defense to give Conservatives a solid group of activists among populations throughout country and I expressed my pleasure at hearing that such steps were being actively promoted.
Phoui also said that it was particularly necessary to work among youth in rural areas and to that end he and Ngon had recalled Major Sakoun Sananikone from his post as Military Attaché in Phnom Penh. He was active in sports world here and would be given small [Page 1062] office in Defense Ministry to organize this drive which would be activated primarily through augmented civic action organization.
Alluding to recent talk with Vietnamese Minister he said he had asked Duyen for detailed information on tactics used in South Vietnam for beating Communists at polls there. Duyen had already provided interesting ideas and now Phoui was accompanying Prime Minister to Saigon January 2 for primary purpose talking with those in Vietnamese Government best qualified to brief him on election tactics. I told Phoui this was all reassuring to me as we had heard quite a bit of disturbing information including such predictions as that Leftists would sweep Attopeu, Saravane and perhaps Pakse in which areas there apparently was reaction to Katay’s scandalous activity on import licenses. Phoui said everybody was talking about Katay’s misbehavior and this was serious handicap which responsible leaders regretted. He personally thought measures they had in mind and those which would be developed would be successful and would result in real success in elections. We could be sure that danger was realized and that leaders here would do everything in their capacity wage active and effective campaign.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–1957. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Saigon, Paris, London, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.↩