513. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
928. Department pass CINCPAC for POLAD. This message attempts (1) to explain certain features of recent political events in Laos, (2) to evaluate their impact on Lao political leaders, (3) to indicate their possible effect on future political developments in Laos, (4) to point out how this would affect US policy.
- 1.
Analysis of Phoui–Katay alliance.
Katay–Phoui alliance consummated during spring this year collapsed while Phoui was in US which permitted Souvanna bring to [Page 1052] fruition his plans for settlement PL problem which included coalition government. Fact Katay chose to change his policy when Phoui was absent and nobody among Independents and Nationalists tried reverse trend is indication that alliance did not have deep roots among rank and file of two parties. Once Katay ceased oppose Souvanna’s policy, Independents were isolated in their opposition and rather than seem against national union, they joined coalition bandwagon.
- 2.
Katay’s temporary eclipse and rise of Souvanna.
By helping bring about coalition Katay added to Souvanna’s prestige who has now emerged as leading Lao politician and as “national conciliator”. In contrast rise Souvanna’s political star, that of his leading opponent in Nationalist Party—Katay—eclipsed by stroke last month and by criticism of deputies for callous way he favored southern interest as Minister Economic Affairs. Although power in party, especially southern wing, even if Katay recovers health, he will have long battle ahead to replace Souvanna unless latter voluntarily retires.
- 3.
Forthcoming struggle between conservatives and leftists in Laos.
With coalition a fact situation has changed considerably. Before formation coalition government, US opposed those who favored coalition which we considered and still do as dangerous step in long run. We therefore opposed Souvanna and to lesser extent Pheng Phong Savan while we supported Katay and Phoui who tried keep PL out of government. With PL in problem is now how to get them out again, how to minimize PL influence resulting from their membership in government, how to reduce their influence as legal political party, and how to combat subversive influence of their clandestine wing. Differences between leaders within political parties, for example Katay and Souvanna, is now relatively minor issue. Ali existing political parties and Lao politicians face new challenge from outside: Neo Lao Hak Zat. Lao political parties will eventually have to take sides on issue whether Lao policy should continue pro-western and basically conservative, or pro-neutralist and in favor state planning. Nationalist Independents, and maybe even some Democrats, generally support pro-western policy while Bong’s Santiphab plus deputies to be elected on Neo Lao Hak Zat ticket can be counted on to favor neutralist line—or worse.
Lao politicians beginning to beware of potential threat to their own position and to kingdom itself posed by creation Neo Lao Hak Zat Party. Better informed Lao do not underestimate PL popularity among rural population nor PL discipline which will make Neo Lao Hak Zat best organized political party in country. Ngon Sananikone already discussed this problem with Embassy officer and indicated Nationalists and Independents beginning to study possibilities meeting [Page 1053] this threat. At this stage discussions confined to exchange of ideas. Two possibilities presently under discussion:
- (a)
- Conservative elements in Laos—Nationalist, Independents and maybe certain Democrats might create a “United Front” during election period. This means putting up only one conservative candidate for each seat against Neo Lao Hak Zat or Santiphab candidate. Conservative candidate chosen from either party on basis popular appeal. Purpose United Front is to avoid splitting vote and reduce voters choice to conservative versus leftist candidate. After elections parties would regain their separate status. In this connection Embassy notes with satisfaction that Conservative and well-educated Souvannavong family (with exception maverick Bong) has come to terms with Sananikones in running several family members in areas where they have excellent chance of election.
- (b)
- Faced with serious long range threat from left, separate conservative parties might form one party and then oppose leftist as monolithic bloc. In short, present political parties would be dissolved and one large new party formed. In contrast with United Front idea this new large party would be permanent creation and would continue to function after elections.
- 4.
Under new conditions United States would be able support Conservative Party rather than individual leaders. We are of course not forgetting difficulty of maintaining unity in face sectional and family rivalries. However if issue becomes clearly one of pro-western element versus pro-neutralist opposition, United States will have no difficulty in taking sides. Above all there will be less need for United States to support individual leaders such as Souvanna, Katay or Phoui, who will or at least should be united in opposing common enemy. On contrary, United States will be in position support conservative elements as a bloc. By helping Lao weld together pro-western political bloc without playing favorites among Lao politicians United States will find itself undoubtedly in harmony with Crown and most resident foreign diplomatic missions. British and French Embassy would undoubtedly support such a conservative front. Thai and Vietnamese diplomatic establishments can be counted on to oppose neutralist or even pro-Communist parties. Indians will be only resident diplomatic mission to plug neutralist line for Laos.
To exclude Pathet Lao from cabinet, conservative elements must win in supplementary elections.
Most Lao leaders including Souvanna have indicated that creation government national union was necessity in November this year to bring about PL settlement. After elections however, make-up of assembly may be considerably altered. Assembly will then be split into generally pro-western conservative camp and pro-neutralist opposition. If pro-western bloc cana elect sufficient deputies to control comfortably assembly and invest government reflecting these policies, neutralists or pro-Communist threat embodied by Neo Lao Hak [Page 1054] Zat and Santiphab will have been temporarily parried. Lao politicians have indicated that entry PL into government at this time does not imply they will remain there forever. PL participation in new government to be formed after elections will depend on Santiphab and Neo Lao Hak Zat showing in elections. If elections go smoothly pro-western government should be able to govern bloc despite existence of opposition bloc in assembly, similar to situation presently existing in France and Italy which have communist minorities in assembly.
- 8.
- [sic] Recommendation.
It therefore appears to Embassy that United States can contribute to RLG’s efforts to parry the PL threat over next few months: (1) by helping Lao politicians form strong anti-Communist blocs; (2) by trying reduce to very minimum PL representation in new assembly; (3) by continuing assist build up internal security so that PL will be in no opposition to undermine effectively Royal Government and administration. All this implies need for positive United States role even before outcome of reappraisal. Also as before American dollars are powerful counter in our efforts maneuver effectively both for purposes recommended here and to bring about prior essential success of RLG in implementing RLG PL accords.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–457. Confidential. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.↩