512. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1
600. Jones informed Lao Ambassador November 25 of reevaluation our policy necessitated by formation coalition government and Parsons’ recall near future participate therein, and gave him copies substantive paragraphs Note handed Souvanna November 23.2 In commenting Jones followed line your recommendation for interim policy set forth Vientiane 849 repeated Paris 189 London 182 Saigon 265 Phnom Penh Bangkok Unnumbered passed CINCPAC. He stressed burden on Lao Government to prove it able effectively control situation and prevent further Communist penetration and ultimate take-over.
Ourot replied RLG thought itself strong enough control Pathet Lao and he would urge vigilance. He knew only way win U.S. confidence was to demonstrate will and ability resist; he confident RLG would resist but result could not be predicted. Expressing gratitude no hasty action would be taken, Ourot said if U.S. acted too quickly its friends in Laos would be discouraged and Communists profit.
Jones said he trusted Ourot’s confidence in RLG would be deserved. He agreed Lao people not Communist but unfortunately one could point to many examples of non-Communist people ruled by small Communist minority. It was our fervent hope experience of Czechoslovakia would not be repeated Laos.
Robertson briefed British Ambassador November 26, giving him substance Note to Souvanna. He also mentioned our concern at recent intelligence reports of withdrawal hard-core PL troops and best equipment to North Viet–Nam. We did not now know, said Robertson, what our decision would be. Since cutting aid would have extremely bad consequences, we would do nothing hasty. Our aid would continue unless and until it clear continuation assistance would only subsidize Communist Government.
Caccia commented U.S. on horns of dilemma: If it withdrew aid it would drive Laos into arms Communists, but if it took no notice coalition it might end up subsidizing satellite.
To British Ambassador’s remark RLG seemed have been careful about Cabinet posts given PL, Robertson replied Ministry Planning, which involved American aid, would provide Souphannouvong with opportunity lobby for necessity accept Bloc assistance. Religion was [Page 1051] favorite Communist post for infiltration and Phoumi particularly bad egg. Robertson added he did not see why Communists would ever keep agreements since by not doing so they always won. In Laos PL held out for three years and ended up with Cabinet portfolios which they never asked for at Geneva.
Caccia recalled there had been talk at Geneva of ceding two provinces to PL but RLG not ready for such step so partition not practical politics.
Concluding, Robertson said we wished British know we not bluffing and if it looked like Communist take-over we would pull out of Laos. Friends like Crown Prince should recognize there grave danger Laos’ sliding into Communist orbit because time might come when we unable continue aid. Congress could only be convinced by favorable RLG performance. At same time we would do nothing to precipitate difficulties by withdrawing aid now.
SEA officers discussed Note to Souvanna, difficulties we face with Congress, and importance RLG performance in applying accords with Counselor Landy November 26, French Ambassador being unable at last minute keep appointment with Robertson. In response Department’s question Landy said Quai seemed be approaching settlement cautiously and appeared feel accords could only be judged as executed. Department stressed it in everybody’s interest help RLG see agreements carried out to its advantage and said we understood French policy was to take active role in implementation phase.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2057. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Byrne, cleared by Kocher and Jones, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, and CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 510.↩