Office of the Historian

510. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

Vientiane, November 20, 1957—6 p.m.

849. Department pass CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference Embassy telegrams 8442 and 812.3

(1)
By entering into military and political accord with PL on terms which include participation PL in government and which in our view do not adequately protect RLG security and independence, RLG has taken step which compels us to re-evalue utility continued US aid to Laos.
(2)

However much we deplore action RLG and Assembly have just taken, cannot begin immediately to phase out US aid, for in so doing we would present to PL on silver platter one of their prime objectives RLG drastic reduction Western influence and Western economic and military support in Laos.

Achievement of foregoing objective by PL would open way to accomplishment immediately succeeding objectives: (a) to obtain aid from bloc countries; (b) to open diplomatic relations with same; (c) to obtain substantial rather than token representation in Assembly.

(3)
It follows from (2) above that re-examination should not be based exclusively on situation of Laos on day coalition government is formed, but on succeeding developments which indicate whether RLG has will and ability to apply accords in manner justifying hope that it will succeed in gambit it has chosen.
(4)
Re-evaluation must not be hasty; it will require weeks and probably months before sufficient evidence is at hand. In fact, definitive test of RLG’s efforts will probably be supplementary elections, to be held about March 19. Any decision taken prior thereto must be provisional.
(5)
Therefore, until final decision based on our re-evaluation has been reached, US military and economic aid should not be reduced; indeed present efforts to make present aid programs as effective as possible should be continued. There will even be need to increase logistic support for ANL to enable it to cope with extraordinary problems [Page 1048] it must now face in handling its integrative responsibilities. A contrary course adopted by US would jeopardize RLG’s ultimate success.
(6)
On other hand, we must not permit RLG to assume that US will continue aid throughout interim period regardless of RLG’s performance, or that US will bail out Laos once more if RLG heavily defeated in elections.
(a)
This might be beyond our capabilities.
(b)
Assumption continuance aid at any price would encourage Lao to let things drift.
(c)
Congress may refuse us the means; justification for continued funding admittedly poses difficulty and we believe exceptional problem.
(7)
Hence re-evaluation in sense favorable to RLG would have to be justified by proofs furnished by RLG itself that it is attacking problems of integration with energy, intelligence, and reasonable hope of ultimate success. US should examine these proofs with sceptical but not jaundiced eye. US will expect be permitted to test their authenticity by checks made by its own agents, where desired. Meantime, RLG can hardly undertake new departures in its foreign policy which would permit further Communist penetration of country—such as acceptance of Chinese or Soviet aid, establishment of diplomatic relations with bloc countries, et cetera.
(8)
Foregoing is recommendation interim policy pending re-evaluation. Suggest further that substance paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 7 be reflected in our contacts with key Lao and allies prior my return to US. Would appreciate Department’s reactions soonest.4
Parsons
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2057. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok.↩
  2. Telegram 844, November 20, contained the text of a note which Parsons planned to deliver to Souvanna Phouma when the Assembly adjourned. (Ibid., 751J.00/11–2057) The text of the note as delivered on November 23 is attached to a memorandum by Byrne, November 25. In the note the Embassy referred to the November 13, 1956, letter and observed that one of the eventualities envisioned in it, Pathet Lao participation in the government, had become a reality. Therefore the United States was reexamining its policy toward Laos and the Ambassador was returning to Washington to take part in the reexamination. (Ibid., 611.51J/11–2557)↩
  3. Document 505.↩
  4. See telegram 571, Infra.↩