Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

505. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, November 15, 1957—5 p.m.

812. Department pass CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference Embtel 798.²

(1) This message, written on assumption coalition government will be invested, intended help Department develop course of action during period of reevaluation which presumably commences concurrently with that of implementation of military and civil accords (up to two months).

(2) It has long been evident that in Laos there are three principal threats to ability of United States continue its massive support of country: (a) accommodation to Communists to point where our aid might appear be aiding them more than free world, (b) subversion of country and (c) misuse of aid funds. Point (a) is now of major and immediate concern; (b) is continuing threat which may be aggravated by PL settlement; and (c) had been for some months an acute problem which we may now under new circumstances have better chance of solving satisfactorily as set forth below.

(3) Analysis here must naturally take into consideration not only agreements themselves and our appraisal of them but also historical comparison of situation now and earlier when Souvanna first set in motion plan of settlement based on accommodation to Pathet Lao.

(4) It has taken Souvanna sixteen months bring about settlement since Souphanouvong agreed in July 1957 [1956] to negotiate. I believe intervening months have seen substantial changes in Laos (for many of which United States can take credit). Numerous assets have been developed or created such as auto-defense, Operation Brotherhood, civic action and their value in period ahead may be greater than before. ANL has developed further, particularly with respect to ability and acumen of key senior officers like Colonel Ouan. Intelligence, counter-propaganda and counter-subversion agencies (G–2, SIDASP, etc-etc) are now reorganized and active. More important most of Lao elite are now profoundly suspicious of PL having had their attention repeatedly called to their true motivation, duplicity, Communist-type tactics, etc etc. Souvanna perhaps excepted, elite are now accepting settlement in spite of this knowledge and with some appreciation of risks involved because appeal of national unity is irresistible. Yet only year ago comparatively few had realistic view of PL. Attitude of ANL leaders to military agreement is case in point. They consider it challenge to their professional competence, are determined to outwit and thwart PL and are confident they can do so. Accord with which they have to work is fairly detailed, containing many specific safeguards, also loopholes which they mean exploit for RLG advantage. It and political agreement particularly (thanks to United States critique of Tane text—Embtel 694³) are more favorable to RLG than texts of several weeks ago (as is joint communiqué also). Ten months ago when coalition was narrowly averted there were no such texts at all and no safeguards of any consequence. It is evident therefore that reappraisal of our policy takes place in circumstances quite different than it would have if it had been necessitated by coalition based on December 28 Declaration.

(5) Two basic facts have not changed. Laos is still an important buffer area. Second, it is just as true as ever that termination of United States aid to Laos would mean that sooner or later, probably sooner, Laos would slip under control of Communists with, of course, major repercussions for Southeast Asia and for United States in area. It is, of course, a PL objective to eliminate United States influence. It thus appears to us here an inescapable conclusion that we must not terminate our efforts in Laos at this stage. I would thus like to conceive of reevaluation as requiring primarily decisions as to how we adjust to new situation not as to whether or not we now abandon Laos. In a sense it should be reevaluation based on our estimate of events over next several months not on past events. By same token any decision continue help here should be provisional and for testing period not for indefinite number of years ahead as we have hitherto assumed.

(6) I thus believe our courses of action can be projected only few weeks or months ahead and dependent on developments during this testing period. However, they must affect one major change in our posture. After working for nearly year and a half in opposition to Souvanna’s leadership of RLG (to point where continuance of such efforts would be sharply counterproductive) we must now shift to position of working with that leadership unsatisfactory as it is. This is all more true with disappearance of Katay from position in which we used to conceive of him as staunch pro-American, anti-Communist leader. In sum if we are to have any hope of keeping Laos out of Communist control we must work constructively for success of present settlement advising and helping within measure of our capabilities. I think our capacity to influence leaders here would grow appreciably under such positive conditions. … Recently allies concluded we had bought all time we could and gained all improvements possible and that tide toward unity could no longer be stemmed at any cost. Thus in final weeks of our effort to prevent coalition we stood alone. I believe that instead working in isolation, working with allies will also enhance our capabilities in period ahead.

(7) Yet another consideration indicates maximum US influence here is needed over months ahead. RLG late in 1956 made agreements which Assembly casually approved in May 1957 and which call for diplomatic relations with all countries requesting and acceptance of aid when offered unconditionally. Our withdrawal from Laos would result in speedy implementation of those agreements; our continued presence may serve to stave this off. Even RLG doubts as to outcome of reevaluation our policy may increase risk of acceptance bloc aid. We must assume Souphanouvong who last February sought make acceptance Chinese aid by RLG a condition of PL agreement to settlement, will work on Souvanna and RLG once he is member thereof. He will press for acceptance bloc aid both to increase bloc influence and to decrease ours if he cannot cause us to withdraw altogether from Laos. Should remember also that last spring ChiCom aid rejected for fear it would cause cut in US aid. Now however, if there is already fear US aid will be cut case for acceptance bloc aid looks quite different.

(8) This then is background against which reevaluation must be worked out and also direction we believe it should take. Pending reevaluation results we have paid ANL November funds due tenth and requested authority release RLG working funds (Toica 415⁴). Thus no politically significant grant or withdrawal of aid need occur until about four weeks from now. All members country team alerted to make no new significant commitments indicative of long term support of Laos and to consult me on borderline problems this nature. Staff members, if queried re US reactions, are to say Ambassador has kept Prime Minister and Foreign Minister informed, US viewpoint well-known and they cannot speculate on future Washington decisions. Tempo of monetary reform negotiations has been deliberately slowed for same reason namely avoidance of prejudging reevaluation. (See however paragraph (9).)

(9) Next step would appear to be notification to RLG of reevaluation if coalition government invested. We believe this should be timed for day after investiture and should take form of note to Prime Minister. Substance might be reference to letter of November 13, 1956, statement that one of conditions requiring reevaluation had occurred and that in view my familiarity with situation in Laos, was being recalled to participate. Departure would be delayed for week or so enable me obtain as much concrete information as possible on RLG measures for practical application of all aspects of accords. Results reevaluation would be communicated as soon as possible but in view need consult with Congressional leaders no precise prediction possible. Finally, in same or separate note it should be stated that irregularities in use of aid as well as difficulties arising from current exchange rate problem constitute separate problem which will affect feasibility obtaining future aid appropriations. Therefore US Government considers it essential that monetary reform negotiations be pushed to conclusion with resultant understanding to be implemented contingent upon broader US decision which will be communicated on return to Laos of Ambassador or before.

(10) Decision to recall me will of course alarm not only RLG but our allies. Believe therefore they should be carefully briefed and requested use their influence if necessary with RLG to prevent latter from taking rash or hasty action which might prejudice situation further such as acceptance bloc aid. Consideration might also be given to my telling one or two top Lao that my participation in reevaluation should not be regarded as necessarily ominous sign. Rather it should be considered as indication all possible being done to document case for continued US support of Laos in spite of developments which have raised doubts in US as to feasibility obtaining aid for Laos in future as well as doubts utility committing such funds here if obtainable. At same time it could be indicated that assuredly Lao performance will be necessary to indicate Laos earning its passage.

(11) Alternate for procedure proposed paragraph (9) would be formal note advising RLG that reevaluation would commence sixty days from date formation coalition government and that I would be recalled at that time to participate therein. Under this procedure I would stay here during entire implementation period of military and political agreements. Advantages of this timetable are:

a. Postponement of reevaluation until agreements carried out and making reevaluation partially dependent upon manner agreements are executed would constitute an element of pressure upon RLG to insist upon most favorable execution agreements.

b. My presence here during this critical period would serve as a manifestation of continuing United States interest in preservation of Lao independence. Furthermore it might give me opportunities to influence course of events and cope with issues as they arise.

c. Final reevaluation in Washington would be aided by availability tangible results of proposed settlement and would permit determination whether RLG has demonstrated “a will to resist internal commie subversion and to carry out a policy of maintaining its independence”. Such determination at earlier date would need be conjectural.

d. My return at the present time for avowed purpose reevaluation could expose us to possible criticism from allies and RLG (especially elements friendly our cause such as Phoui) that we are prejudging issue without giving RLG time to demonstrate ability to preserve country’s independence.

e. My presence here would serve to strengthen posture of other American agencies in their efforts to assist RLG in absorbing PL elements under conditions most favorable to Lao and to United States security interests. PEO for instance, must give ANL certain logistic support if latter to have reasonable chance handling PL integrees successfully.

f. If coupled with presentation of formal note fixing date for my recall, would be difficult interpret my presence here after coalition formed as condonement thereof or as indication we were bluffing over past year.

Disadvantages of postponing reevaluation for sixty days are:

a. November 13 letter stated reevaluation might be necessary if coalition took place. This alternate proposal, however, would be reevaluation not after coalition but after “settlement” which we consider dangerous and of which we disapprove.

b. Postponement reevaluation would be interpreted as highly favorable to RLG, diminishing risk of eventual consequences and removing, not augmenting, stimulus for vigilant and energetic RLG implementation. It would also lessen impact of future warnings and let down those such as Crown Prince who expected us take tough line.

c. Reevaluation based on settlement of Pathet Lao problem, results of which may be considered satisfactory but mistakenly so by RLG, would be more invidious to Lao than reevaluation now when PL widely suspect. Some facts may still be conjectural even after sixty days; my presence not essential ascertain facts of implementation either now or after sixty days. As they become available Embassy can report promptly.

d. General impression created by postponement may be one of weakness not strong adherence to principles enunciated.

(12) On balance I prefer paragraph (9) course at moment but subsequent events might modify this view; both courses seem to me to have advantages. My preference for (9) is based in part on assumption it would be advantageous me be on hand Washington and attempt make case for continued support of Laos sooner rather than later. Hope comments and instructions may be forthcoming in time for me deliver United States position promptly to RLG after expected investiture coalition government. Date extraordinary session still unknown but more likely convene eighteenth than sixteenth.

USIS, USOM chiefs concurred in draft.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751].00/11–1557. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok.
2. See footnote 3, Document 501.
3. Dated October 31, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–3157)
4. Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, ICA Message Files: FRC 59 A 2458, Box 78, Vientiane)