Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

509. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, November 19, 1957—5 p.m.

840. Department pass CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference: Deptel 541.² On morning 19th I requested audience with Crown Prince which immediately granted for 10 a.m. Having once before told Savang I would be recalled if coalition went through, I interpreted final sentence reference telegram as permitting me discuss this subject today.

I told Savang we understood Assembly would approve RLG–PL accords³ (by investing coalition government) that we considered them excessively risky and that their application therefore was of obviously critical importance. In light rapidly evolving situation I wished tell him in advance US reaction and instructions which I would carry out by note to Souvanna after anticipated Assembly action.

Reminding him that I had once told him I would be recalled in event coalition I said Department had now given me firm instructions to this effect. We would during ensuing policy review enter into no new commitments but I had, subject to possible later instructions, advised PEO continue logistic support and aid ANL in any way possible in its efforts apply military accord.

… Savang considers it probable Assembly will approve accords which he considers nonenforceable. He believes almost immediately ANL will uncover bad faith of Pathet Lao in cacheing rather than delivering all arms, in obstructing takeover in north and in other ways. He believes—rather wishfully I fear—that when Deputies here see that Pathet Lao perpetrated fraud on RLG Souvanna will be overthrown and sound policies established.

In apparent contradiction to foregoing Savang also said accords would be means of getting rid of ICC and Chinese-Vietminh interference which he said would at least be important gains from present situation.

Savang went on say it important to unveil (devoiler) Pathet Lao quickly because in present state of mind Lao people will be all too easily taken in by Pathet Lao tactics, seeming loyalty, ostentatious reverence at pagodas et cetera, et cetera. While PL will make point of doing everything which loyal Lao do, in their minds it is only means to end of Communist control.

With reference my departure date Crown Prince appeared believe situation would evolve so rapidly we would have clear indications trend events within two weeks (this seems to me over-optimistic). … he said we should aid ANL for short while but they must be made realize where their help came from. I said these matters would require most careful consideration in Washington including relationship Laos situation to broader picture including reactions our allies. He said his own views have been developed in this broader context but he worked always on simple premise Commies must be opposed. We could count on him and others here to prevent any resort to Chinese aid should that be attempted as result of United States cutting aid. Cambodia was example of difficulties easy acceptance Chinese aid provokes. Population there was now dissatisfied and Sihanouk, who knew he had made mistake, could not make up his mind to return home.

Savang also took note on his initiative of misuse of aid funds and said it was necessary for Laos have sound financial policy. Value of kip meant nothing. If free, country could always manage survive.

I emphasized to Crown Prince our need for accurate and full information during period ahead. I said we enormously appreciated opportunity to confer with him and I hoped he would be willing receive chargé in my absence. Savang said he would be glad to.

Comment: While it is difficult to distill Savang’s current program out of this typically diffuse conversation, I believe he 1) expects accords to be approved, 2) feels certain they will break down, and 3) desires United States take extremely tough line in belief this will both ensure breakdown and bring home to all Lao their dependence on United States and therefore necessity of following anti-Communist line which he and US believe in. As Crown Prince’s predictions have not always worked out I believe that while fully agreeing with his analysis of danger we should defer action on his prescription until situation has evolved to point where we can see our way more clearly. Moreover note to Souvanna on my recall should suffice for present.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1957. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok.
2. Document 507.
3. According to telegram 842 from Vientiane, November 19, the National Assembly unanimously voted (26–0) for the coalition government as presented by Souvanna Phouma. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1957)