Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

508. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 18, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Prospective Pathet Lao Entry into Lao Government

Communist participation in a coalition Cabinet in Laos appears imminent, and chances for a favorable turn of events seem remote.

According to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, the “settlement” he has worked out with his half-brother, the Pathet Lao leader, will be executed as follows: In a formal ceremony before a special session of the Assembly, now expected to be convoked on November 18, the Pathet Lao will symbolically hand over the two provinces and lists of Pathet Lao personnel.² Later on the same day an enlarged Cabinet including the Pathet Lao (we have only one unconfirmed report³ that they will be given two portfolios, Reconstruction-Urbanism and Religion-Fine Arts) will be presented to the Assembly,⁴ the vote on investiture to take place the following day.

Integration of Pathet Lao troops (1,500 will be taken directly into the Lao Army and the remaining 5,000 will be placed in the reserves) is scheduled to be completed within 60 days, but until the agreement is fully implemented the Lao National Army cannot occupy the two provinces and seal off the Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese frontiers. There is no reference in the agreement to screening and reindoctrinating Pathet Lao troops, so that the Communists are permitted to hand-pick 1,500 of their best men for infiltration of the Lao National Army.

The political accord provides for nominal restoration of the Government’s administration over the two provinces over a three-month period. Higher-ranking administrative posts are to be divided 50–50 between the Government and the Pathet Lao. Lower-level jobs are to be retained by Pathet Lao incumbents until municipal elections are held, scheduled for within three months after the agreement’s effective date. Since the Pathet Lao will remain in a position to control the municipal elections, they will probably be returned to office. The Pathet Lao movement is to be succeeded by a legal political party permitted to operate throughout Laos, the legal superstructure facilitating support for existing illegal underground activities.

This “settlement” is clearly of the dangerous type we have been trying to prevent; that is, the Communists immediately gain seats in the Cabinet, with consequently increased penetration opportunities, whereas control of the two provinces is restored to the Government only after long delay and on terms which will probably make “control” a meaningless word.

We are no longer able, however, to prevent some kind of coalition. Souvanna has managed to obtain widespread support for a quick “solution” without regard for the cost; Katay has taken the line that no matter what the settlement terms the execution of them can be made safe, but since he has suffered a severe stroke⁵ even his countersubversive effort may be rendered impossible; Phoui feels increasingly powerless to resist the tide toward coalition; and the British and French consider it unwise to oppose a settlement apparently having general Lao support. Only the Crown Prince might change the course of events, but our Ambassador believes it unlikely he will intervene unless he is told flatly that U.S. aid would be cut off if coalition goes through.

Should the Crown Prince ask the question, the Ambassador recommends that he tell Savang that, if the Pathet Lao enter the Cabinet, the Ambassador will be recalled to participate in a Washington reappraisal of our policy toward Laos. He would add that he could not predict the result of the reappraisal but that the U.S. desire to support Laos and help keep it out of Communist hands would persist so long as the practical possibility of obtaining funds from the Congress and of their serving their intended purpose in Laos existed. I have authorized the Ambassador to make such a reply because 1) the Crown Prince was told last year that the Ambassador would be recalled if coalition materialized; 2) the statement conforms to our letter of November 13, 1956, in which we stated that we might be obliged to reappraise our political and economic policies toward Laos if the Government took steps (among them coalition) which we considered might jeopardize Laos’ prospects for survival as an independent state; and 3) it gives us sufficient flexibility as to the outcome of the reappraisal. Some concrete display of the seriousness with which we regard the situation is required to avoid the impression that we have tacitly approved coalition with the Communists, but we do not wish to lose our freedom of maneuver on the aid issue.

Ambassador Parsons has commented: “If the deal goes through, it is …⁶ difficult to predict whether or not the Lao Government can maintain control of the situation and prevent an ultimate Communist take-over. I am somewhat more hopeful about the Royal Lao Government’s capabilities now than before, but this, of course, presupposes continued United States support and cooperation during the period of implementation of the accords and thereafter.”⁷

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1857. Secret. Drafted by Byrne and concurred in by Kocher and Jones. A marginal notation on the source text indicates that the Secretary saw this memorandum.
2. The ceremony took place on November 18 and is described in telegram 831 from Vientiane, November 19, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/11–1957)
3. Telegram 782 from Vientiane, November 12, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.13/11–1257)
4. Souvanna Phouma presented the Assembly with his Cabinet in the afternoon of November 18; it included two former Pathet Lao as ministers. In addition to Reconstruction and Urbanism, Souphanouvong was Minister for Plan. The other Pathet Lao minister was Phoumi Vongvichit, Minister of Religion and Fine Arts. (Telegrams 782 and 830 from Vientiane, November 12 and 19; Ibid., 751J.13/11–1257 and 751J.00/11–1957 respectively)
5. According to telegram 789 from Vientiane, November 13, Katay suffered a stroke on November 12 which completely paralyzed his right side. (Ibid., 751J.13/11–1357)
6. Ellipsis in the source text.
7. The quotation is from Document 502.