502. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
807. Reference Embassy telegram 806.2
Even though Crown Prince was ostensibly responsible for successful intervention it would inevitably be believed that United States pressure was really responsible. Apart from reactions generated locally at thus thwarting current emotional urge for national unity there would be possibility of subsequent disorders, Viet Minh intervention and other wider repercussions which it is very difficult to judge from here but which Souvanna freely predicts.
On other hand, if deal goes through it is equally difficult to predict whether or not RLG can maintain control of situation and prevent ultimate Communist take-over. I am somewhat more hopeful about RLG capabilities now than before but this of course, presupposes continued United States support and cooperation during period of implementation of accords and thereafter. Suggestions mentioned Embassy telegram 7983 cannot be forwarded before tomorrow but they do not envisage willingly abandoning Laos.
If Crown Prince poses question to me as suggested above there will probably not be time to consult Washington. I would, therefore, appreciate any guidance deemed possible now. Only middle ground I [Page 1032] can see is to tell Savang that if coalition government comes in I will be withdrawn participate in re-evaluation and I cannot foretell consequences although United States desire support Laos and help keep it out of Communist hands will persist so long as there is practical possibility of obtaining appropriations at home and of their serving purpose intended here. To foregoing I could add United States would be considerably more impressed if Souvanna’s plans had received consideration by all competent Lao bodies such as Council of Ministers and King’s Council as well as formal approval by Assembly.
Question of message from Secretary to Crown Prince may be foreclosed by news just received (6 p.m., 14th) that he arrives tomorrow with Assembly to be convoked probably 16th or 18th. If Savang does elect to intervene, which is doubtful unless he is told flatly aid to be ended, I think message should be adapted if possible to his views at time. This is probably impracticable unless tempo here slows. If he does not intervene there may well be useful moment for message after coalition is a fact. Such message could refer to re-valuation which thereby necessitated and inform Savang that this would proceed in light of information available as to how RLG executes agreements. It could thereafter assure him that statement made to him in Washington 1956 still stood. If through our evaluation duly constituted and competent branches of United States Government were satisfied that Government of Laos was resolutely (and successfully) defending independence and integrity of Kingdom, it could count on continued moral and material support of United States within practical limits. In meantime American people and government regarded with understanding desire of Lao people for national unity and would deeply resent any alien effort to exploit to detriment of Kingdom’s true interests this natural desire.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1457. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.↩
- The operative part of telegram 806, November 14, described Souvanna’s efforts to bypass the Crown Prince and other possible sources of opposition, “Phoui remonstrated against such cavalier behavior and accords have now been transmitted ‘for information’. After some argument Souvanna also agreed that [to?] telegram requesting King send representative for opening of Assembly specifying sixteenth as desired date.” The telegram continued, “Phoui says nothing can prevent success of Souvanna’s program unless possibly if Crown Prince should intervene.” (Ibid.)↩
- See footnote 3, Supra.↩