494. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

711. Department pass CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference: Embtel 705.2 Phoui came by early second inform me of what occurred after my statement against coalition to him morning first.3 He said Crown Prince whom he saw immediately after leaving me was fully persuaded that US position was firm. Savang thereupon sought Phoui’s views, also Katay’s, and as we reported in reference telegram resultant opposition set in motion forces which dissuaded Souvanna from presenting to Assembly enlargement of Cabinet to include Pathet Lao on first.

Phoui said that after morning meeting of Assembly there was closed meeting of deputies from progressive and independent parties to see if they favored presentation coalition government at once or after That Luang fête. Consensus was to wait but some favored bringing into government once former RLG ministers who gave up their portfolios to enable present six-man cabinet gain investiture. Katay favored delay in presenting enlarged government of any kind. Katay also told deputies that when RLGPL agreements were formally signed they should go first to Cabinet and then Council of Ministers for approval prior to final submission to Assembly. Progressive and independent deputies thereupon agreed to postponement of enlargement.

During lunch for Casey, Phoui said Crown Prince asked his advice on Souvanna’s proposal to extend session until November 23. Phoui and Crown Prince opposed to such extension. Phoui understood that at afternoon session of Assembly on first Souvanna Phouma would give Assembly brief report of events up to then. Phoui said this concluded what he had come to tell us and commented he was encouraged at general agreement that RLGPL documents were to be scrutinized in orderly fashion step by step.

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On personal basis Phoui then told me that Souvanna Phouma said he had sought to bring about enlarged Cabinet with PL at this time because he felt that I was not opposed. Phoui knew there was no warrant for Souvanna so to claim but he recommended that I repeat to Souvanna today what I said to him through Phoui yesterday. I replied that I would and would add that Department had strongly endorsed my stand. Phoui also claims not be sure of Katay’s attitude who he says may be endeavoring to “push Souvanna into error.” In conclusion Phoui stated that what mattered to him were certain broad lines of policy which must be taken care of. Most important of these was actual return of two provinces and establishment of effective control by RLG before accepting PL into government. Nowhere was this positively provided for in accords although contrary provision had been selected. Phoui was concerned that this left way open for proponents of Souvanna’s line to urge coalition after only a symbolic act on part of PL. I told Phoui that I would stress this in conversations I might have.4

Parsons
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–257. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.
  2. Supra.
  3. See Document 491.
  4. For a report of the conversation, see telegram 714, Infra.