Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

495. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, November 2, 1957—7 p.m.

714. Department pass CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference Embtel 700.² At Souvanna’s request I called on him noon second which was just after Assembly had finished day’s session by approving military and political agreements. Souvanna was jubilant and handed to me text of joint communiqué³ which he said he had completely revised and which he said I would now find satisfactory. At his request I read it, acknowledged that it did include many improvements (it was text revised presence Crown Prince week ago) and said that I reserved more considered comments as well as those of my government pending full study of it and accompanying political and military accords. Souvanna promised me copies of latter as soon as they could be translated.

I then told Souvanna that while my government wished always to take understanding view whenever possible, I had had to make certain remarks yesterday on being confronted by a message received through Foreign Minister that Souvanna had decided present coalition government to Assembly same day. Souvanna at once picked up word “decided” and said that he had only intended to present such government provided his colleagues agreed. He had informed me also for this reason. As opposition had developed in several quarters he had not carried out his intent.

I then read exact French translation of statement to Phoui contained Embtel 700. Souvanna interrupted me at point where I had said that PL were to be included in government even before a symbolic return of two provinces. He claimed that this was inaccurate and that there had already been a symbolic act at his house. (Even if this is so, it certainly is not equivalent to act in Assembly before public, diplomats and ICC.) Souvanna then made one or two other minor objections to statement and requested rectification of points mentioned above, saying that my government would otherwise be judging on basis of incorrect information. I said that I would telegraph his comments but these points seemed to me insignificant as compared with major aspects of policy which we found dangerous.

I next asked Souvanna if PL would be brought into government before political and military agreements had been carried out. I expressed hope they would not. Souvanna said this was impossible as it would take two months, for instance for some of PL effectives in remote areas to reach assembly points. I then asked him when it was planned to present enlarged government including PL. To this he replied, “Not before end of That Luang ceremonies but probably within two to three weeks.” In response to further question as to when joint communiqué would be published he said, “Probably some time next week.”

Several times in talk Souvanna pleaded with me to persuade my government that RLG should be given one to two months after formation of coalition government to demonstrate that agreements were workable and that PL would cooperate. He said he had absolute faith in PL and I said I had none. I said further that under our existing policy it would now appear necessary for us to reconsider and thoroughly study our policy towards Laos if PL came into government. As I left, Souvanna once more pleaded for one or two months saying this was all he had to ask. My final sentence at the door was that I could promise him only one thing, namely, that my government would study matter diligently.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–257. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh,
2. Document 491.
3. The text was transmitted in telegram 716, Infra.