Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

493. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, November 1, 1957—6 p.m.

705. Department pass for information CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference: Embtels 700² and 701.³ Phoui has not yet come to tell me outcome today’s crisis⁴ but just now at 4:30 I had encouraging news from Holliday, who saw Phoui at Crown Prince’s luncheon for Casey and stayed on to talk with Savang alone afterward.

Early today Souvanna assured Crown Prince all 3 documents (joint declaration, military and civil agreements) had been signed. Actually Savang said they had only been initialed and had not been approved by Cabinet. Savang said he had told Souvanna that as King’s representative, he could not oppose formation of a new government but consequences of forming coalition government with PL, as Prime Minister proposed, would have to be his sole responsibility. Furthermore, he wished consult leaders of independent and progressive parties (Phoui and Katay).

When Savang consulted Phoui (who had by then heard my position and been authorized to repeat it to Savang as well as Souvanna), Phoui told Crown Prince that if Souvanna persisted with his proposal independents would withdraw from government and oppose Souvanna’s efforts. Subsequently when Katay was informed of Phoui’s position, he also said that he would withdraw his support of Souvanna.

When Souvanna was informed he decided against any enlargements of government at this time and instead to propose immediate adjournment of Assembly and a special session to convene November 23 (Assembly was scheduled to adjourn November 20.) At luncheon Crown Prince persuaded Phoui to press on behalf of Independents for definite closure of Assembly on second with no proposal for reconvening at later date.

Assuming foregoing is confirmed, it would appear immediate crisis is over for present. In report Holliday commented that this incident seemed certain to discredit Souvanna and he gave some credit to suspicions already voiced that Souvanna will resign after That Luang ceremonies. Holliday also commented that it appeared as though Souvanna realized text of 3 documents, which had been rushed to completion, would not be acceptable to Cabinet and he had tried to make a fast end-run to Assembly. Holliday further found firm determination of Crown Prince encouraging. He added parenthetically that apparently Crown Prince had assumed from what he had heard of my statement to Phoui that immediate effect of coalition at this time would be cessation of US aid. (It will be recalled in this connection, however, that I did not directly threaten suspension of aid, but said that precipitate action on part of RLG would lead to conclusion that RLG placed no value on US assistance in future.)

I am dining at Souvanna’s for Casey tonight, which may prove to be a social occasion of unusual interest.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–157. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.
2. Document 491.
3. In telegram 701, November 1, the Embassy reported on conversations concerning the developments in Vientiane with Holliday, Australian Foreign Minister Richard G. Casey (who was visiting Laos at the time), and Armand Gandon, Second Counselor of the French Embassy. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–157)
4. See telegram 711, Infra.