Office of the Historian

386. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

Vientiane, October 1, 1956—6 p.m.

515. Department pass Defense and CINCPAC. Reference Embtel 508.2 As Bouasy3 repeated 29th pledge consult me (or try have Souvanna do so) before any commitment made on PL troop integration into ANL, need for clear-cut US position may arise in week or so. While I am not sanguine that issue will be presented to US in neat packaged form, would obviously be useful have one ourselves so that I could take initiative necessary. Would therefore appreciate comments earliest on following outline which assumes US position should not be rigid but retain sufficient flexibility meet contingencies and also above all avoid responsibility for any breakdown RLG/PL negotiations:

1.
US not pay for any PL effectives transferred directly to ANL. (But would pay for certain number indirectly transferred, see below.)
2.
No objection to RLG itself maintaining and supporting PL effectives for limited initial period sufficient accomplish screening step 3 below (even though indirectly US might be unavoidably financing part or all of cost). Would be understood even in initial period RLG would endeavor minimize numbers.
3.
All PL effectives to be identified, photographed, registered and screened …. US prepared advise on organization re indoctrination camps … and fund necessary reindoctrination expenses.
4.
Definite period reindoctrination and training of minimum 4 months (preferably 6) which would provide further observation and screening, with further elimination unsuitables, before incorporation into ANL.
5.
Explore feasibility within year of post-screening integration, of an over-all reduction ANL force level to 15,000 with ex-PL restricted to 5 percent of total.
6.
Provided foregoing points agreed to, US will finance screened and reindoctrinated former PL effectives as part of ANL, in numbers not to exceed 5 percent approved ANL force level present or future. (PEO and ARMA consider over 500 integrees dangerous, but if political considerations dictate and careful screening assured, would reluctantly go along with 5 percent.

A further point will be brought to attention RLG immediately, as may affect present preliminary jockeying: RLG to take great care [Page 826] retain complete control (not bind itself to contrary in PL talks) as to location and positioning units to be made up of former PL effectives, so as to minimize risks to national security in event of mutiny or insurrection.

USOM, PEO, … and Army concur this message except that PEO/ARMA suggest additional point (which appears unrealistic to me) as follows:

No PL in command positions above platoon level, or any policymaking position in general staff, till minimum 6 months after integration into ANL. (PEO and ARMA recognized difficulty selling this to RLG but feel it should be included.)

Parsons
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751].00/10–156. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Ottawa, Saigon, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and New Delhi.↩
  2. In telegram 508, October 1, the Embassy submitted a preliminary report of Pathet Lao-Royal Lao Government joint military commission meetings on enforcement of the cease-fire and integration of Pathet Lao effectives into the Lao National Army. (Ibid., 751J.00/10–156)↩
  3. Acting Minister of Defense, Royal Lao Government.↩