Office of the Historian

451. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

Vientiane, June 22, 1957—noon.

2182. Following comments on government crisis here sent now in view possibility Embassy Paris may be talking re Laos with French and Tomlinson 24th.2

Defeat of Katay has had or threatens have consequences as follows:

1.
Pathet Lao and their allies who were virtually panicked by probability week ago of Katay success have been given respite. We may expect Hanoi Radio, et cetera, et cetera, celebrate victory for “peace and neutrality” over American efforts through Katay use Laos its ends. At same time in Laos efforts may be made hamper police and ANL repressive measures which were stepped up after fall of Souvanna.
2.
PEO contacts with ANL yesterday indicated number of leaders who committed themselves rather eagerly to Katay line somewhat disoriented and discouraged. Do not believe this extends much to key commanders.
3.
Defeat Katay and refusal Phoui (which not necessarily final) remove for time being two candidates most acceptable to United States. For moment no one who could form what might be called “rightwing coalition” likely be designated. Now remains to defeat [Page 938] “leftwing coalition” under Bong if he is in fact designated. Defeat should be safely accomplished although Bong’s skillful manipulator and may drive some wedges which will hurt later.
4.
In view foregoing there is possibility Souvanna-Petsarath faction will derive principal profit from this exercise. From Pheng yesterday we gained impression Assembly would be disposed accept Souvanna government with Katay and Phoui as his principal lieutenants. Such government would have hard time carrying out policy line of any of principals involved. In any event importance Souvanna faction likely weigh more heavily in next round.
5.
Prospects for “right-wing coalition” also dependent on removing opposition Leuam and Voravong who believed to have sabotaged Katay for personal reasons. Tactics for such effort (by pressure or appeasement) almost inevitably involves United States attitudes toward these individuals. We are therefore giving particular attention to this but not clear yet what can be done.
6.
Failure Katay is regarded also as setback for United States as key politicos particularly and leading elements generally regard him as United States favorite. French, on other hand, have come through first round in good shape as Souvanna appears be moving into more strategic position.
7.
Optimism of Crown hard to take at face value but it safe to assume Savang as determined as ever bring about “right-wing coalition” under Katay, Phoui or members their groups and to avoid another Souvanna government and above all a Petsarath government. Crown Prince returning Luang Prabang for several days but will be back for next more critical round. Because of party and family groupings situation extremely complicated; no one can foretell outcome.

United States position. It seems to me important not let anyone conclude United States policy has in any way been altered by events and we will support any Lao leader who firmly defends his country’s interests. Otherwise I expect merely keep in close touch with usual contacts, stress importance forming strong government soonest and watch for opportunities use such influence as we have. It does not seem to me that any special message to Crown Prince or any public comments about Laos warranted at this time but if extremely critical situation arose this is possibility. Tripartite statement from Paris would obviously be undesirable even if it were possible to agree on one.

Parsons
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–2257. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok.↩
  2. See Document 453.↩