444. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
2050. 1. Given different motives of Bong and Phoui whose votes brought Souvanna down, it still appears his fall last week was accidental and not result of calculated maneuver. Yet there is little doubt he did not enjoy confidence of assembly majority for many of nationalists who maintained party discipline were at heart opposed, like Katay, whatever their motives. In this sense defeat of government was due and represented widespread anxiety over so-called “three brothers policy” and possible consequences not least of which was danger of loss US aid.
2. It hardly secret that US was not in sympathy Souvanna’s policy of appeasement and viewed PL as Communists. I personally acquainted various leaders with prospect reappraisal our policy toward Laos if PL come into government or certain other dangerous concessions come about. …
3. View dim perspective, if Katay or someone else acceptable to us succeeds in forming government, it may be last chance. If new government fails to end neglect and drift in 10 loyal provinces, to counter subversion and propaganda and to pursue energetically program of social and economic progress, result may be chaos or resort to Petsarath—a strong man with, to date, the wrong ideas. At that stage our prospects for another holding operation would no doubt be dim and all the ill effects on Thailand, Vietnam, and beyond which [Page 927] we have feared and which makes Laos important to us would be in more imminent prospect.
4. We must therefore not reward new and more promising government by wavering or diminishing our support. I have been deeply concerned of late at word from visiting US officials and other informal indications that aid to Laos in FY 1958 may be cut drastically regardless outcome of our efforts to keep Communists out of RLG. If that were to happen at this juncture effect on US position would be severe. My own influence would be substantially at an end if after having talked of reappraisal under certain circumstances aid were cut even though our friends in Laos had heeded our warning. This does not mean that we should slacken efforts to achieve economies without loss of strength, particularly in ANL program, but such efforts must be accompanied by continued demonstration effectiveness and constancy our support. Furthermore with critical importance of promoting positive aspects our policy we must somehow keep civil action and Operation Brotherhood programs in forefront of battle for progress in 10 loyal provinces.
5. As one concrete step to be taken immediately upon formation Katay or other government satisfactory to us, I recommend that Secretary send message which I would deliver initially in telegraphic form and which could be made public at option new Prime Minister. Apart from greeting and congratulating him upon assumption of office such message could emphasize particularly our desire cooperate in vital task economic and social development. While not neglecting importance national unity to which any RLG must be dedicated we believe next government should put new emphasis on constructive tasks and that we should associate ourselves with its drive to reach and benefit population and cement its loyalty to crown. Whereas last government was pre-occupied with wooing PL to detriment all else, new one should be encouraged make new departure on vigorous broad-scale internal development program.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–357. Secret; Priority.↩