Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

448. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, June 7, 1957—8:28 p.m.

1521. British démarche (London 6704 repeated Paris 1050 Vientiane 42²) and Katay’s prospective assumption power raise two questions re coalition: A) What we tell British French Katay; and B) what we decide among ourselves.

Re A), we see no reason bring up coalition issue with Katay nor does there appear be need make definite decision now when all factors completely uncertain. Katay has not asked our position on coalition and at same time he aware our support. We should propose therefore say nothing to Katay until and unless we have to, and continue tell British French we hope he succeeds forming government but shall wait and see with respect our own policy decisions.

Re B), it becoming increasingly possible we may be confronted requirement reassess our policy on coalition. Katay or other pro-U.S. Lao leader may soon raise question. Further, while we believe it highly unlikely PL will accept conditions posed by Katay for their entry into Cabinet, we cannot count entirely on continued PL intransigence. It just barely possible Katay will carry out announced program to point where PL participation government comes next.

We therefore put forth for consideration among ourselves possibility our tacitly accepting (i.e. heralded reappraisal would not result sanctions through aid program) two PL in minor positions Cabinet provided 1) Katay heads best Cabinet in sight and works vigorously on economic social development programs; 2) RLG authority restored two provinces, PL movement dissolved, and PL troops integrated into ANL with adequate controls before PL participation Cabinet; 3) we satisfied RLG has such command situation that PL entry government would not increase Communist subversive capability. Secondary factor in such possible eventual acceptance coalition would be prospect gaining effective British French support for anti-Communist Katay Government.

We wish stress anything we said near future to Katay British or French would be most guarded and so phrased as avoid commitment. No open shift our policy coalition would take place if at all until PL had performed on foregoing commitments Katay reportedly intends exact before PL entry Cabinet. We have succeeded in preventing disastrous developments under Souvanna by standing firm on coalition and do not wish to lose ground thus gained by premature or unnecessary change.

Request your comments.

Vientiane 2077 repeated Paris 459 London 420³ and Vientiane 2081 repeated London 419 Paris 458 just received.⁴ Would statement our attitude re coalition (Vientiane 2077) be used orally in answer questions from Lao leaders? Issued publicly? Made on our initiative? Second sentence Step 4 not clear. Is last paragraph Vientiane 2077 part of proposed statement?⁵

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–757. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Young and Byrne, cleared by Kocher, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to Paris and London.
2. In telegram 6704 from London, June 7, the Embassy transmitted a report of an oral démarche from the British Foreign Office suggesting British and U.S. support of a Lao Government under Katay based on the following four points: (1) resumption of negotiations on the basis of the December 28 declaration; (2) guarantees of dissolution of the Pathet Lao movement, integration of Pathet Lao forces into the Lao National Army, and restoration of Royal Lao Government’s authority in the two northern provinces; (3) acceptance of two former Pathet Lao into the proposed Katay government; and (4) a commitment by Katay to resign after 2 months if no agreement was reached with the Pathet Lao. (Ibid., 751J.00/6–457)
3. Supra.
4. In telegram 2081 from Vientiane, June 6, the Embassy agreed with the British proposal at least on the importance of the United States supporting Katay in an attempt to form a government, but did not believe it wise to raise the issue of coalition. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–657)
5. In telegram 2107 from Vientiane, June 11, the Embassy noted that it proposed making a statement orally to Lao leaders only in answer to anticipated questions. (Ibid., 751J.00/6–1157)