Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

443. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, June 3, 1957—6 p.m.

2049. Reference Deptel 1474.² Reftel overtaken by events. Next following telegram,³ which not limited distribution, should be read in context reference Deptel.

While I concur fully paragraphs 2–5 inclusive, paragraph 3 particularly valuable and as matter of fact for past few weeks in various talks here we have increasingly stressed importance positive efforts in 10 provinces under RLG control.

Following responds to request for comment:

1. Recent telegrams … report currently promising prospects Katay becoming Prime Minister and Embassy actions respect thereto. Phoui also meets criteria reasonably well and does not have certain of Katay’s disadvantages, least of which difficulty I find in having close, stable and responsive relationship with him. Phoui much easier to work with and would welcome his becoming Foreign Minister in Katay Cabinet. Lao finds Katay arbitrary, often tactless, always opportunistic, and quite a few can recall real or fancied double-cross at his hands. No doubt also he is generally thought to be venal. These qualities explain the antagonisms he engenders but he is still recognized as astute political leader whose strong qualities contrast favorably with Souvanna’s weaknesses. Katay has probably deliberately sought to overcome label of American stooge with which he was earlier tagged and this is factor which we must remember in dealing with him if he becomes Prime Minister.

2. If Souvanna should make serious bid become Deputy Prime Minister in Katay Cabinet he might, as Katay did, stand almost completely apart from responsibility of government or he might be assigned specific sphere of action. In view his susceptibility to hitherto often unhelpful French influence and his softness to PL and to his two brothers it would be disadvantageous from US viewpoint if he had much to say in foreign affairs.

3. Embtel 2011⁴ indicates Petsarath out of picture at present, long crisis could increase danger of resort to him, but I still believe he does not wish to make personal bid until later on if then. Before receipt reftel I had already taken means of long personal talk seek influence Petsarath’s views. I think most promising course is to continue such efforts and I derive some encouragement from development reported Embtel 2047.⁵ Petsarath has tendency emphasize points of agreement with each caller he sees; therefore not sure how much real effect we can have.

4. Problem reducing political factionalism is long-term one but we should soon see results present Lao efforts, which we naturally have been seconding, to bring independents and nationalists together and carry democrats along.

5. Crown Prince has done good deal behind scenes to bring about current situation and set stage for Lao leaders including Katay to reconcile their differences. There is slim chance Colonel Phoumi now commander second military district might be Voravong clan nominee for Katay Cabinet which would of course help tie in ANL.

See next following telegram for idea possible US contribution.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–357. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok.
2. Document 439.
3. Infra.
4. Dated May 29, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.11/5–2957)
5. In telegram 2047, June 4, the Embassy reported that Petsarath or his advisers were attempting by public statements to mitigate what the Embassy considered to be a too pro-Pathet Lao stance. (Ibid., 751J.11/6–457)