445. Letter From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Ambassador in Laos (Parsons)1
Dear Jeff: You will be interested in some of the high points of the rather lengthy discussion which took place Wednesday, May 22, at the OCB meeting2 on the Laos Outline Plan of Operations.3 Three main topics arose: The strategic importance of Laos, the cost and size of the Army and police forces, and support for one man à la Diem.
My main impression is that the members of the Board were extremely interested in the problem of Laos, which they recognized as a tough one, and they were anxious that the courses of action of the Outline Plan succeed. Although there was at times considerable levity, sparked chiefly by General Cutler of the White House, there was clearly a basic acceptance of the importance of Laos to our security.
Governor Herter began with an expression of our concern that all agencies were “dragging their feet” in Laos, which was of considerable strategic importance as a buffer state. (I had briefed him on the need of urging much faster execution of programs.) We had to contend with an uncertain situation in the North and a difficult government. The American financial outlay was clearly disproportionate to the population and size of the country, but we had to take into account Laos’ strategic significance rather than its numbers. The important question was whether we could hold the area. Economic soundness could not be the only criterion for the aid program; we had also to consider the requirements of a highly competitive effort against the Communists.
To a question as to why the Lao Army cost us so much, Mr. Hollister said that we were paying too much per soldier throughout Indochina. We had, however, to recognize that in this part of the world one could not pay a soldier without also paying for his family and that we had inherited inordinately high troop pay scales from the French. Each month he resisted turning over $2.5 million for the Army, and each month the State Department insisted it had to be done for political reasons. He just did not know the answer to the problem.
[Page 929]On costs, Mr. Allen Dulles twice suggested that ICA should by now have found some way to “lick” the unfavorable exchange rate … Hollister responded that Washington agencies were working on the problem, but it was not easy. The matter was exceptionally complicated and could not be hastily remedied. A rise in prices after an ill-thought-out devaluation could quickly offset any temporary benefits from the devaluation. Further inconclusive discussion of the exchange rate followed.
Then, Mr. Hollister suggested that perhaps the way to reduce the cost of the Army was to reconsider its use: It would be worthless against the Viet Minh, so that its mission might better be only to assure internal security.
General Cutler commented that the French had started the Army wrong so far as pay was concerned, but he thought that, since the Pathet Lao were also Lao, perhaps we were supporting 25,000 lemons against 6,000 Pathet Lao citrons. Perhaps the whole idea ought to be reassessed.
I gave a strong defense of the need to support the ANL, pointing out that it was one of our major anti-Communist assets in Laos. We had reduced the cost per man inherited from the French throughout Indochina and had succeeded in getting the Lao Government to pare the Army from 30,000 down to 25,000. It was politically and militarily unwise to cut the force level further in the absence of a political settlement insuring Lao Government control over the Pathet Lao and in the absence of a police force fully capable of handling internal security.
General Cutler and Mansfield Sprague, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, asked me whether the Army could be reduced if the police were built up. Yes, I said. Could the Army be cut in another year, asked Sprague. Maybe, I replied, but always with the two provisos of an adequate police force and some successful solution to the Pathet Lao problem.
Cutler thought the police a fine idea, but found $5 million a year a fantastically high expenditure for Laos. Hollister came through to defend the need of vehicles, equipment, and construction, apparently to General Cutler’s satisfaction.
Cutler then concentrated on the need to support some strong political personality in Laos and would not be deterred by the tangential remarks of other Board members. Courses of action concerning the reduction or termination of U.S. aid were all very well, he said, but if we cut off aid, Laos would soon be in Communist hands. We had to do something to make our disengagement unnecessary. …
I explained that there now appeared to be only two strong leaders, Katay and Petsarath, that we considered Petsarath’s views dangerous, and that we had already taken steps to give support to [Page 930] Katay. … As a result of Cutler’s persistence, Courses of Action 20–1 and 20–24 were added to the Laos Outline Plan. I think they strengthen the paper.
Other questions of interest were: 1) Cutler asked why we spend money on economic development for such an “unreliable” people. I emphasized the Lao were not unreliable, and Hollister stressed the need of building up local resources in order eventually to reduce Laos’ dependence upon outside aid. 2) Governor Herter was curious as to how we envisaged the termination of the Geneva Accords. I said we had no concrete plan, that it was probably a long-range problem, and outlined the various and unpredictable factors involved, such as the Geneva co-Chairmen, the ICC, and the Lao Government. 3) Sprague wished to know whether Laos would eventually federate with Thailand. I thought this unlikely, in view of the Lao mistrust of the Thai, but thought there might be increasing cooperation with the Philippines.
Upon the Board’s approval of the paper, subject to the changes resulting from the meeting, Governor Herter reiterated our fear that we were all dragging our feet in Laos, and declared this could not go on if we were to hold the place. For a little country, Laos presented one of our toughest problems.
As I hope will be evident from the foregoing, the discussion was lively, and everyone was sooner or later put on the spot by General Cutler’s direct questions designed to provoke and stimulate. The paper as a whole was very favorably received, and for the moment at least Laos’ importance seemed to be understood. Both Governor Herter and General Cutler commended Pat Byrne and the working group for their work.
One copy each of the Top Secret and Abridged (Secret) versions of the Laos Outline Plan will shortly be pouched to you under cover of a letter from the Under Secretary. We hope it will prove helpful to you in accomplishing what we wish to accomplish in Laos.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, EA Files: Laos, Lot 68 D 77, Top Secret Laos 1957. Top Secret; Official–Informal. Drafted by Byrne.↩
- Another briefer report on the OCB discussion of May 22 on Laos is ibid., OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Preliminary Notes of OCB Meetings.↩
- The “Outline Plan of Operations With Respect to Laos,” May 29, was approved by the OCB on May 22 and modified on June 4. A copy is ibid.: Lot 61 D 385, Laos Documents.↩
- These actions in the approved
paper read as follows:
“20–1. To forestall seizure of power by Communist or other anti-U.S. elements, promote and support Lao leaders who will cooperate with the U.S., resist Pathet Lao demands, vigorously pursue economic and social development programs, and secure support of the Army, Police and the Throne.”
“20–2. In case of an imminent or actual Communist attempt to seize control from within, and assuming some manifest local desire for U.S. assistance, take all feasible measures to thwart the attempt, including even military action after appropriate Congressional action.” (Ibid.)
↩ - Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩