Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

439. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, May 28, 1957—5:49 p.m.

1474. Vientiane 1896.²

1. Concur your proposed response prospective foreign inquiries re U.S. attitude concerning choice Lao Prime Minister.

2. Among ourselves however it clear some Lao leaders preferable to others. Problem is to find man who could check Souvanna’s coalition course, enjoy Crown Prince’s support and share his views on coalition (Vientiane 1982 repeated London 393 Paris 433 Saigon Phnom Penh Bangkok Unnumbered³) with which we fully agree, box in Petsarath so that he does not appear to Lao as only solution, and provide leadership for civic action, efficacious utilization American aid, monetary reform, and other internal ills besetting Laos.

3. Of two principal problems confronting Laos, political settlement and economic and social development, RLG has always seemed expend disproportionate amount energy on PL issue almost to exclusion advancement 10 provinces presently under RLG control. Lao desire political settlement understandable and we do not wish minimize importance reunification. Nevertheless we feel Lao should make greater effort consolidate control and increase loyalty population through improvement economic situation outside Sam Neua, Phong Saly.

4. In our view Souvanna has made little if any headway to date on either problem. His plan to achieve reunification through coalition could be disastrous to Lao and U.S. security interests, he apparently still misjudges PL, he has not given Army firm leadership, and so far as we aware has not pushed economic development.

5. Petsarath possesses required drive and leadership pull Laos up by bootstraps in economic and social reform but views on PL (Vientiane 1970 repeated Paris 428 London 388 Bangkok 935 Saigon Phnom Penh Unnumbered⁴) decidedly harmful. Further, pro-PL sentiments and advocacy accommodation to Communist neighbors far more dangerous in “strong man” like Petsarath than in supple Souvanna. Three brothers, singly or in combination, definite liability to U.S. interest.

6. In current situation we feel only Katay comes close to filling bill. He is tough politician who seems convinced PL duplicity and who strong enough resist their demands. At same time he able administrator and aware political importance giving tangible benefits to masses in order obtain their loyalty. Katay has disadvantages, chiefly widespread dislike of him among other Lao politicians, and we therefore encouraged at possible rapprochement with Phoui. We should appreciate elucidation nature personal enmity Katay engenders.

Accordingly, request your comments following points:

1. What are Katay’s prospects becoming Prime Minister? Can and should we do anything further this development? Are there other candidates who meet criteria outlined above?

2. Since Katay at present seems content have Souvanna remain in office, is there some way he and Souvanna could temporarily divide responsibility government, that is, Souvanna to handle foreign affairs while Katay took over active supervision concrete domestic programs such as civic action, aid, administrative reform?

3. What is your estimate of Petsarath’s chances assuming RLG leadership? What steps would you suggest to change his views on PL and accommodation to Communist Bloc? How can his influence be reduced and his assumption power prevented if his position re Communists cannot be reversed?

4. Regardless who is Prime Minister, is there any means reducing Lao political factionalism and bringing about semblance unity among Independents, Democrats, Nationalists?

5. Can we somehow (perhaps by clear-cut statement our support his views re coalition) stimulate Crown Prince to direct action in cooperation with Katay to unite all elements including Army opposed to taking PL into Cabinet and willing move ahead vigorously on broad-scale internal development program?

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.13/5–1357. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Byrne, cleared with Kocher and Jones, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to Saigon, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Paris, and London.
2. Telegram 1896 from Vientiane, May 13, reads in part as follows:

   “Should any Lao leader or group seek my view as to whether Souvanna should be refused confidence of National Assembly, I plan say this no affair of ours and that we are interested only in government which will vigorously defend Lao independence thus affording us chance continue support efforts of Lao build their country.” (Ibid.)

3. Telegram 1982 from Vientiane, May 25, reported on a conversation between Savang and Blakeney. During the conversation Savang said he opposed the entry of Souphanouvong or any other Pathet Lao into the government as “too dangerous,” and did not believe Souvanna’s solution proposed in January-February would be accepted. (Ibid., 601.4351J/5–2557)
4. Telegram 1970, May 23, reported on a conversation with a local correspondent who had interviewed Petsarath. Petsarath had not changed his favorable view of Pathet Lao administration of the two northern provinces. He was convinced that civil war must be avoided and that the Pathet Lao could play a useful role once they were integrated into Lao society. (Ibid., 751J.00/5–2357)