Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

440. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, May 29, 1957—6:58 p.m.

1478. Department’s 4702 to Paris repeated Vientiane 1461 London 8212 Saigon Phnom Penh Bangkok Unnumbered; Paris 6027 repeated Saigon 92 London 945 Vientiane 77.² On instructions Robertson, Young today reviewed U.S. position re coalition, French position Laos, and Petsarath for Landy, Counselor French Embassy.

Young stated we somewhat concerned at difference emphasis French and U.S. views on coalition. We believed Laos so spongy that coalition would give Communists chance set up base geographically and administratively throughout Laos. Far from settling problem, coalition, we feared, would only further weaken and divide Laos. We adhered to position set forth on delivery three notes, i.e. coalition extraneous to reunification, and hoped French through influential status Laos could impress upon Lao relationship entry Communists into government, increased subversive potential, and U.S. Congressional support.

Young then stated we hoped French in no doubt re U.S. attitude French position Laos. We not trying through devious or obvious means replace French Indochina. Nor were we trying divide Laos, either by abandonment two provinces to PL or by Southern secession. We understood difficulties integrating Laos but nevertheless like French we saw Laos as territorial entity.

Young’s third point concerned Petsarath. While we had reserved judgment for considerable period we now considered Petsarath’s views harmful Western position Laos and Southeast Asia. We were totally opposed his reported opinion PL not Communist and Viet Minh ties broken; moreover his desire accommodate both domestic and foreign Communist elements seemed open door to subversion even wider than Souvanna had. We started from fundamental premise Chinese Communists backed by USSR using Laos and Cambodia as fulcrum for take-over all Southeast Asia, and were therefore distressed that influential Petsarath appeared have swallowed Communist line.

Landy informed us Quai, following Yost’s talk May 24,³ instructed French Vientiane warn Lao entry few Communists would mean end Laos, end U.S. support, and end French Military Mission.

He added French had endeavored obtain postponement coalition issue but Petsarath had again stirred things up, though it appeared responsible Lao opinion opposed coalition and considered two provinces unimportant. He promised further details current instructions to Gassouin later this week.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–2957 Secret. Drafted by Byrne; cleared by Kocher; approved by Young; repeated to Paris, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, and London.
2. Documents 437 and 438.
3. See Document 438.