438. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
6027. Reference Deptel 4702.2 Pursuant instructions Yost discussed Laos at length with Daridan and Lebel last evening. We described serious Congressional reaction to entry Communists into RLG and also, on basis personal experience, explained why we felt such “solution” is clearly more dangerous to security and independence of Laos than is maintenance status quo.
Daridan, as invariably in past, insisted there is no difference in feeling and objectives between US and France, but simply difference in tactics and manner necessitated by France’s delicate position as former governing power. He said that in order retain any influence whatsoever France must avoid appearance of intervening in internal affairs and must be ultra tactful in handling Laos leaders.
We replied we understood French difficulty but felt this particular issue so fundamental and grave that, unless we all exerted together full measure of influence we have, all Western positions in Laos would be undermined and perhaps lost. Daridan agreed and said that, in order avoid any possible misunderstanding on Souvanna’s part, Gassouin would be at once instructed to inform him again that there is no difference between French and US position and French are equally opposed to coalition which would bring Communism into RLG.
However, further probing brought out that difference does exist between French and US position. French would regard with equanimity, would even welcome, coalition govt on two conditions: (1) that “guarantees” (restoration RLG administration in two provinces, dissolution PL as party, disarming PL forces) would be agreed by PL and would be carried out simultaneously with establishment coalition [Page 918] govt, and (2) that Souphannouvong would “split away” from PL before entering govt. We pointed out that Souvanna has been claiming for years that Souphannouvong is “not really a Communist”, that nevertheless he has always remained subject to Communist dictation, and that we would believe he had “split away” only if he issued public statement denouncing PL as Communist controlled and antinational. Daridan agreed some such declaration would be required before split could be considered genuine.
In passing Daridan expressed hope we would not attempt to unseat Souvanna, saying (1) this would be interference in internal affairs which would be deeply resented and (2) Petsarath would be more likely successor than Katay. We said we knew of no effort to unseat Souvanna but expressed opinion his prestige so committed to early agreement with PL that if this fell through again he might well fall with it. Daridan noted Deputies certainly not prepared support coalition without adequate guarantees.
Comment: We believe that, while we can count on French to oppose coalition without strict safeguards, we cannot count on them to oppose coalition per SE. Their motives are (1) to promote settlement PL problem, dissolution ICC and termination their Geneva obligations and (2), more important, to preserve French influence through support Laos leaders who are sympathetic to them. They dread Katay developing into second Diem with resulting exclusion French influence from Laos. (Recent termination French naval and air missions in Vietnam, which they attribute to US initiative, has had considerable effect on their attitude and behavior in Laos.)
While this difference of approach could be important, we hope that it need not become so. It would seem to us, as far as we can judge from this distance, that best tactic vis-à-vis French would be (1) to hold them firmly to guarantees and conditions (such as those mentioned fourth paragraph this message) which it is practically certain Souphannouvong and PL would reject, and (2) to reassure them in concrete and convincing fashion that we have no desire to weaken their position in Laos.