Office of the Historian

410. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1

Washington, January 3, 1957—7:24 p.m.

804. Vientiane 1005,2 1018,3 1029.4 We greatly concerned see RLG coming off even worse than expected in December 28 communiqué. We have always considered, any formal agreement notwithstanding, PL would attempt frustrate effective restoration RLG administration two northern provinces and would insist troop reintegration terms be such as to enable PL subvert Army. Latest declaration, however, by exceptionally vague language re PL part bargain and PL membership commissions which will oversee execution “settlement”, facilitates PL objective to unanticipated degree.

We hope you will be able exploit uneasiness shown by several Cabinet members to delay Assembly approval Souvanna’s communique or insure version accepted by Assembly gives RLG at least minimum controls in assimilating PL and installing its authority throughout territory. Consequently, while there merit in proposal your returning here for consultation before Assembly decision, we estimate you can accomplish more by remaining Vientiane and spreading word along lines final paragraph Vientiane 10175 re totally disadvantageous impact of communiqué for RLG.

We presently intend however (unless future developments suggest different course action) recall you soonest after decision on coalition [Page 871] to have you participate promised policy reappraisal and demonstrate seriousness with which we regard PL entry into Cabinet and other RLG concessions to PL. If after receipt separate message other channel you still believe advisable return Washington following acceptance coalition by Assembly, recommend you consult Crown Prince this score. Unless Savang considers recall unwise and you concur his reasoning, you might then let it be known to Lao leaders you have been asked return Washington if Assembly approves settlement including PL participation Government. Travel orders will be telegraphed when and if necessary.

We concur your recommendation re fast note to RLG referring previous U.S. démarche on integration PL troops if and after settlement reached.

In handing over check for January ANL requirements (Icato 5256) make clear we unwilling commit greater amount this time in view confusion current Lao political situation. FYI: We do not wish deliver to Lao sum which could tide them over considerable period and which would consequently vitiate or even negate effect of any re-evaluation following coalition decision. Since ICA administrative procedures completed on entire $5 million however U.S. able act quickly release February funds if future political developments so demand. End FYI.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–257. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Byrne, cleared by Kocher, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to Bangkok, New Delhi, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Paris, London, and to USUN for Young.↩
  2. Document 407.↩
  3. In telegram 1018, December 29, the Embassy reported that the Lao National Assembly would not take up the December 28 agreement with the Pathet Lao until January 7. The Embassy also reported on uneasiness over the agreement among some Assembly deputies, several government ministers, and the Lao National Army. Nevertheless, the Embassy noted, approval of the deal with the Pathet Lao seemed likely. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2956)↩
  4. In telegram 1029, January 2, the Embassy reported the views of the Canadian ICC Commissioner and British and French diplomats in Vientiane, all of whom were less pessimistic than American Embassy personnel about the chances for success of Pathet Lao–Royal Lao Government cooperation. (Ibid., 751J.00/1–257)↩
  5. The last paragraph of telegram 1017, December 29, reads as follows:

    “Comment: Fact, if such it is, that ICC will not be leaving coincident with application terms of agreement seems to us serious retreat on part RLG which until day or so ago was insisting on this. Souvanna had claimed problem would immediately become internal, thus permitting him crackdown on PL if they failed to deliver. Now PL are entering government, August communiqués have been elaborated in terms favorable to PL on domestic and foreign policy front, PL dissolution formula is watered down to vague phrase, RLG has no guarantee of restoration of authority in North, and no details have been settled re integration. In fact, PL will have equal status settling these problems through membership mixed commissions. In addition, ICC remains in position bar way RLG unilateral action enforce its authority.”(Ibid., 751J.00/12–2956)

    ↩
  6. Not printed. (Ibid., 751J.5–MSP/12–3156)↩