Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

407. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, December 28, 1956—6 p.m.

1005. Reference Embtel 1003.² As reported reference telegram decision now taken by RLG for PL settlement which includes coalition. It generally conceded National Assembly will accept this next week.

Embtel 921,³ paragraph (6) to end, set forth ideas what US might do in this contingency, but indicated decisions not then necessary. Now however we must decide on at least interim course of action and quickly. Manner in which US reacts and use we make of next few months may be of crucial importance to future this country.

Fact of coalition itself does not mean Laos under Communist domination (although PL Ministers will at least work for implementation by RLG “in good faith” of November 2 agreement (Embtel 704⁴) on diplomatic relations with bloc countries and acceptance aid). Apart from Souvanna, other Ministers who prevented complete sellout may be depended upon to make effort seek agreement on PL settlement carried out and exploited by RLG. Manner in which US assists them will be of major importance.

Agreement has positive aspects from our standpoint as well as negative. RLG will henceforth consider problem internal and that it free to act independent of ICC. With PL officially abolished as military force army better situated take direct hand in implementing settlement. Withdrawal of ICC if effected would not only enable army act with free hand against recalcitrant PL remnants but will remove from scene Samar Sen and rest of anti-West ICC elements. It is possible that Crown, seeing its future at stake, will urge ANL to act at first sign of PL double-cross and Souvanna might not be able to prevent this, particularly as other Ministers likely side with Crown, ANL and police in such circumstances.

Another positive aspect is that RLG now entitled take over administration of two provinces. While its capacity do so more doubtful, we now learn Chao Khouengs (Governors) have been designated and some at least of their assistants. RLG capacity could be reinforced by US ideas, planning capacity and materials—as continuation of what has been done already.(see paragraph (5) Embtel 921). But we may need quickly new stocks of medicines, blankets, etc., if RLG is to move in while PL in state of transition of sorts. (May need solicit OCB action facilitate requisite emergency support.) Should note also settlement further separates PL from Viet Minh and makes latter’s control more difficult.

As to US course of action I continue believe we should not forthwith cut off aid or take any irrevocable step, thus making Communists present of this buffer zone. Yet having so often said re-evaluation necessary if coalition occurred, re-evaluation must be genuine. My return on consultation would serve demonstrate this (as suggested Embtel 921 paragraph 7). Apart from tactical considerations I believe at this juncture talks in Washington could serve clarify situation somewhat and help in reaching understanding as to our future actions and policy in different contingencies. If this accepted, timing should be soonest possible after Assembly action approving settlement. Announcement if required might state that after initial six months here I was called back on consultation to report on situation. RLG would of course understand purpose of visit “reappraisal”. Suppose Hanoi Radio etc. might seek exploit my return to US but doubt that this important factor and might even help. My impression from import license episode is that withholding funds caused number of ministers have second thoughts about aid from China which shown to be only alternative if US aid withdrawn.

If settlement includes as expected taking PL into ANL for initial period, believe we should at once send note to RLG referring to previous démarche on integration of PL effectives and requesting information RLG intentions.

Assuming that result of re-evaluation is decision continue aid on provisional basis either through trial period (along French idea) or until conclusion complementary [supplementary?] elections, I think time has come to watch situation from standpoint of Souvanna being forced out of office. If he should show weakness in face PL non-performance or treachery, RLG colleagues and we might be on common ground in wishing force him out. It is less likely but we might also generate support if he seeks implement November 2 agreement on relations with or aid from Communist bloc too soon or on too sweeping basis. In meantime, since elements mentioned in Paris telegram 3135,⁵ with perhaps a few additions, do represent our best hope of holding Laos in long run, we must be seeking opportunities weld them into some sort of effective combination.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2356. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Bangkok, Ottawa, Saigon, New Delhi, and Phnom Penh and passed to USUN for Young.
2. Dated December 28, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/12–2856)
3. Document 403.
4. See footnote 3, Document 393.
5. In telegram 3135, December 24, the Embassy in Paris reported on a discussion with Katay, who was returning to Laos from the United States via Europe. Katay believed that Souvanna Phouma, Souphannavong, and Petsarath, allied with Bong Souvanouvong and financed by the Viet Minh or Chinese, were plotting to take over Laos. The Embassy’s view was that the “best hope of holding Laos” lay in the combination of Katay, Savang, Finance Minister Leaum Insisiengmay, the Army, and the provincial police. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2456)