Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

411. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Embassy in France¹

Vientiane, January 4, 1957—5 p.m.

240. Reference: Paris 3251 to Department, repeated Vientiane 37.² View nature RLG–PL joint declaration, and fact of its probable presentation to National Assembly January 10 or shortly thereafter, believe it most important Katay return here before parliamentary consideration. His presence might contribute to more critical view-point toward provisions of declaration, and afford possibility his rallying support for modification.

To this end I suggest Katay be urged send telegram to Souvanna request presentation be deferred until his return, which we assume would within reasonable time limits conform to original schedule of presentation. Purpose this gambit would be:

1. Ensure Katay’s presence on political scene in time to bolster constructive opposition to worst features of declaration. Even though as Minister he will not have vote, he can participate debate as well as stimulate other members voice their criticism.

2. Provide test of Katay’s often-professed desire to block unconscionable accommodation to PL and to support free world.

Despite current low ebb his political fortunes, we consider Katay’s presence would not only be salutary in giving cohesion to political opposition to declaration but also force him face up to realities of moment by adopting clear-cut position, rather than by taking refuge in convenient absenteeism. Katay must realize if agreement goes through in present form, he or any other eventual successor to Prime Minister will be saddled with it. Perhaps it could be intimated to him that what he does at this juncture will undoubtedly be criterion in judging his eligibility for support he angled for so sedulously in Washington.

As for his apparent doubt he could block assembly approval of measure, we hardly think he in position judge temper of personalities and foresee outcome of debate having been so long and so far away from Laos.

There is, of course, risk that he might return only to judge opposition futile and go along with government of which he is nominal No. 2. At this stage we think risk worth taking. After all, he was absent when Cabinet decision taken, and even if he must respect majority view, he still entitled express his views before Assembly.³

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–457. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Department of State, which is the source text.
2. In telegram 3251, January 3, the Embassy in Paris reported that Katay had not left Paris for Vientiane, having been allegedly detained by a “crise de foie.” The real reason, the Embassy believed, was his doubts about being able to block the Assembly’s approval of a coalition government with the Pathet Lao. (Ibid., 751J.00/1–357)
3. The Department, in telegram 2518 to Paris, concurred with the Embassy’s views and hoped that Katay could be persuaded to return to Laos immediately. (Ibid., 751J.00/1–457)

   According to telegram 3268 from Paris, January 5, Katay planned to arrive in Vientiane on January 10. The Embassy noted that the coalition issue was to be presented to the National Assembly on that day, but Katay insisted Souvanna intended to hold off until the latter half of January. (Ibid., 751J.00/1–557)