406. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
998. On subject present orientation ANL . . . . Owing factionalism and general lack political coordination, officer corps not now considered likely plan coup. Some officers consider Prime Minister indecisive and too soft toward PL, and feel army not sufficiently consulted on broad lines national policy. Nevertheless, current cabinet position on settlement (two PL in cabinet, dissolution PL movement, quick restoration RLG civil and military authority in north) has general approval higher officers because would give ANL chance to (1) immediately enter strategic points two provinces and proceed with PL demobilization; (2) assign new security missions to auto-defense; (3) screen and reindoctrinate PL accepted into forces; (4) in due course, when forces reduced, include PL integrees among first demobilized.
While General Sounthone recently turned down suggestion of coup as improper to army role, refusal did not preclude any further action in event situation worsens. Question at what point various military factions would unite and rise, general feeling is major portion of army would intervene if it appeared RLG on point of sellout to PL, e.g., failure secure adequate guarantees on PL integration or offer of post Minister Defense to PL. In other words, breaking point likely come only if army’s existence or integrity threatened.
Meanwhile, army under aggressive leadership of Colonel Ouan is forging broad program to weld forces into more cohesive and influential organization, weed out incompetents and stress service to nation rather than political parties. Net effect such increases unity and efficiency will of course enhance capability for coup action if such contemplated in future.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2756. Secret. Repeated to Paris.↩