405. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
979. Sopsaisana (of Crown Prince’s household) was waiting see me on my return from seeing Nhouy Abhay (Embtel 9782). Sopsaisana said he was going to Luang Prabang 24th or 25th to accompany Crown Prince on visit to Nam Tha and certain points beyond in Phongsaly Province. Generals Ounthone and Somsanetharia accompanying. Purpose ostensibly receive oath of allegiance (as in Crown Prince’s recent trip south) but actually trip of greater import. Area contained elements of undoubted loyalty to Crown, particularly auto-defense units. Population there never forgot Crown Prince had sat tight in Luang Prabang when menaced by Viet Minh invasion and their courage and loyalty certain. According Sopsaisana there was great discontent with prospect of coalition government putting Pathet Lao into seats of power. Already they had been restrained from local acts of violence only with some difficulty. Pathet Lao in [Page 862] these areas taken up new positions here and there and had even fired upon loyal elements despite cease-fire. If coalition proposal agreed by Cabinet and if Crown Prince and his companions found during trip that local elements as loyal and as dissatisfied as Sopsaisana understood them to be, there could be trouble amounting to “sort of rebellion”. This could result in Viet Minh reaction from across border and it therefore necessary know United States position both in eventuality stated and in relation current RLG coalition proposal. Not up to Crown, urge pressure but what could we do?
Re coalition, I went over with Sopsaisana statement I had just made to Nhouy Abhay pointing out we had gone very far in exerting pressure, way beyond normal methods in fact. Import license incident had demonstrated US able act but almost settled and check for ANL should be delivered. I did not know what further pressure we could bring to bear at this time other than as set forth to Nhouy Abhay. Sopsaisana asked me to repeat to Souvanna what I said to Nhouy. I said I would once more even though it would not deflect him; moreover, I felt it my duty to do so.
As regards US position in event “rebellion”, I said I wished speak with extreme caution as US must not be involved or act in such way it could be accused of complicity. Re Viet Minh intervention I said Crown Prince had received certain assurances in Washington and more recently assurances for benefit of Laos had been given Katay. These I outlined. I said that this was our position should Viet Minh attack and he could so remind Crown Prince. Sopsaisana then said Hungary raised doubts as to effectiveness such assurances. Accordingly I pointed out differences between Hungarian and Lao situations.
Returning to question armed action by elements loyal to Crown, I asked number of questions. Was Sopsaisana aware provisions Geneva accords and that ICC would probably find violation? He replied PL had already violated Geneva accords and he hoped I would tell Souvanna that his proposed PL “settlement” would also violate them. I asked if any one in government knows about possibility of independent action up north which would in effect be reaction to government’s decision amounting to revolt. He said no one in government knows. I asked what would army’s reaction be. He said there were many discontented elements in army who would welcome it but others probably would not. Army had several times nearly moved to clear up situation in north. Re reaction southern Laos Sopsaisana said (as had Nhouy) discontented elements there too and much opposition to coalition proposal.
At close of talk I told Sopsaisana that I could not say more than I had without guidance from Washington and that was almost impossible obtain over Christmas weekend; however, as he was not [Page 863] leaving to join Crown Prince for two or three days, I would report at once and if I received reply, would get in touch with him.
Foregoing ties in with cryptic references (Embtel 9013) by Crown Prince which I had taken as indication possible coup d’état. It now clear that in royal entourage at least, possibility seems real (even though Sopsaisana took care say it would appear that PL attacked first). However, no indication from what Sopsaisana said that any well-developed or promising scheme is afoot and its success would depend upon reaction of army, population, and ministers opposed to Souvanna’s policies—none of whom alerted according Sopsaisana. Even though objective of any such action is anti-Communist, in my view US should keep hands off, at this stage anyway. (In fact, I would appreciate Department’s advice as to whether I should go further in discouraging it than indicated above.4) I am by no means assured of Crown Prince’s action in internal matters as I am of his soundness in diagnosing external affairs and their effect on Laos. However, as Sopsaisana himself indicated, any action such as he described could boomerang fatally on Royal house if not successful. This leads me think that situation not quite so sensational or dangerous as Sopsaisana’s language indicated. Perhaps he was instructed by Crown Prince sound out US and as I was cautious, so will caution prevail up north. In any event, it is unfortunate Savang not there speak for himself as it is unsatisfactory base evaluation on what Sopsaisana says.
Army attitude crucial and according … source army is now too divided unless Souvanna should give in much more. In fact deal now before cabinet apparently has good deal of army support (Nhouy so indicated to me this morning quoting his nephew Kou Prasith) on grounds it would give greater freedom to ANL to act if PL fail to behave.
In absence reaction from Department I will tell Sopsaisana before goes Luang Prabang that we do not have enough information [Page 864] to judge satisfactorily but that for reasons indicated above I would personally urge great prudence.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2256. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris.↩
- Supra.↩
- Dated December 7, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–756)↩
- The
Department of State’s advice was transmitted in telegram 768 to
Vientiane, December 24, which reads as follows:
“Agree need for extreme caution re apparent Sopsaisana approach for US to support possible uprising auto-defense units against Souvanna Government.
“On return Crown Prince from North, however, you may take appropriate opportunity obtain his or Sopsaisana estimate of situation without however implying possible US involvement.
“Department also notes … ANL too divided at present to be counted on. Request your … estimate [Infra] at what point Army may be expected take firm stand assuming further accommodation to PL and Communism occurs.” (Ibid., 751J.00/12–2256)
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